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Energy policy in many countries, driven by concerns about resource scarcity and 
environmental damage, is promoting a shift from fossil fuels to a variety of renewable 
sources. This has consequences both for sustainability and energy security, concepts which 
share common features, some of which are poorly defined or lacking good data. Using the 
Process Analysis Method for systematically selecting (sustainability) indicators, we 
recognised the need to account for risks arising from resource discovery and processing, 
conversion, and the use of the final energy vector. We analyse the whole of the fuel supply 
chain in a six stage process for 25 renewable and non-renewable fuels, both current and 
potential sources. We find that causes of risks can be categorised into seven groups, 
namely: economic, environmental, innovation, manufacturing, political, skills, and 
technical. Furthermore, we identify 34 specific causes of risk which we assess to compare 
their relative importance for the different fuels. In both structuring the problem, and 
quantifying individual risks we use published information and consultation with experts to 
ensure that the analysis has a broad range of inputs. All of these impinge on a national or 
supra-national assessment of energy security, which are important for the formulation of 
energy policy. Using the UK as a case study, we have applied our method to both reference 
and low carbon future energy system scenarios to calculate the levels of risk as the system 
composition changes. Our method underlines the need for assessments and data relating to 
many issues which are commonly not considered as part of energy security. 
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Climate change was one of the most important international concerns for the last quarter of 
the 20
th
 century, but will probably be the defining issue of the 21
st
 century. There is a 
substantial and growing evidence base for the effects of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(IPCC, 2015) as the driving force for damage to the natural environment and the provision 
of ecosystem services. This is leading to calls for better understanding of, and tools to 
assess, the security of energy, water, and food (Keairns et al., 2016). 
The most recent international accord to limit GHG emissions, the Paris Climate 
Change Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016), commits signatories to constraining global 
temperature increase using the mechanism of Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs). An NDC describes the ambition and steps a nation will take to reduce its GHG 
emissions in five year accounting periods. Many nations have already created targets for 
using sustainable sources of energy (Jaccard et al., 2012) which Krewitt et al. (2007) 
suggest could amount to meeting half of global energy demand.  
The UK contribution to climate change agreements is guided by the Climate 
Change Act (HM Government, 2008). This commits the Government to achieving an 80% 
reduction in GHG emissions compared with 1990 by 2050 using a series of five-yearly 
‘carbon budgets’. The UK Government makes policy recommendations to meet these 
budgets, monitored by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2013, 2017). Current 
planning is for the fifth carbon budget (CCC, 2015a). Principally, this to be achieved by a 
switch from using fossil fuels to renewables. However, there is discussion about the 
continued use of gas for electricity generation if coupled with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technologies. 
The Government’s policy relating to, and views on, energy security are set out in 
the Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017a). Although this document does not explicitly 
reference the previous energy security strategy (DECC, 2012) there are common threads. 
The main difference is that the clean growth strategy is more focused on short-term 
security of supply regardless of the fuel mix emphasising flexibility, adequacy, and 
resilience. The 2012 strategy selected indicators for  the supply of consumer fuels with 
respect to adequate capacity, diversity, reliability, and demand side responsiveness 
(including longer term demand reduction). The policy direction that remains common is 
the reliance on regulated competitive energy markets (Ofgem, 2017) to deliver diversity of 
supply and robust infrastructure. The return of the capacity market mechanism for 
 2 
electricity supply is charted by Grubb and Newbery (2018) in their review of electricity 
market reforms (EMR, introduced in 2013). Also part of the EMR is the support for  
deploying new renewable generation through the ‘Contracts for Difference’ mechanism 
(BEIS, 2019). Playing a role at the local level, the community energy strategy (DECC, 
2014, 2015a) set out to support ES (and climate) policy objectives by reducing energy 
bills, developing skills, and reducing costs. There is a tension within Government over 
developing energy policy with Craig (2020) suggesting that “… the Treasury doubts the 
necessity of rapid domestic decarbonisation, and instead orientates its policies towards a 
future in which such a transition occurs at a slower pace, if at all.”; an example being the 
easing of the burdens on the UK oil and gas extractive industries (HM Treasury, 2014). 
The difficulties of translating energy policy into law is highlighted by Cairney et al. 
(2019). In his summary of recommendations for UK energy policy going forward, Jim 
Watson’s message to the Government was that “Policies to support renewable electricity 
generation should be more ambitious”. 
Commitments by the UK Government have inspired much work in pathway 
modelling for reaching the declared target (DECC, 2010a; Hughes and Strachan, 2010; 
Burt, 2011; Ekins et al., 2011; Skea et al., 2011a; Allen and Chatterton, 2013; Spataru et 
al., 2015; Trutnevyte et al., 2016; Demski et al., 2017). A well-considered overview of 
energy system scenarios relevant to the UK was conducted by Holland et al. (2016). The 
dominant UK energy systems models aim to find the least cost pathways (Ekins et al., 
2011). 
The UK Government expects to spend approximately £100 billion on energy 
infrastructure between 2010-2020 and a further £375 billion in the longer-term (HM 
Treasury, 2013). Turnover rates in long-lived energy infrastructure mean that investment 
costs remain sunk past the UK’s policy focus of 2030 towards 2050 (Li and Trutnevyte, 
2017). Many policy failure risks remain hidden including the lack of upstream emissions 
accounting for fuels, that CO2 capture will claim 70% of emissions rather than the policy 
expectation of 90%, and that energy efficiency policies must be physically manifest at a 
much faster rate than current efforts are achieving (Barton et al., 2018). The key question 
is will the necessary decisions improve sustainability and security, or lock the nation into 
inflexible systems? 
Any method for analysing scenarios for emissions reductions needs to account for 
the important physical, social, and economic characteristics; Narula and Reddy (2015) 
observe that individual indicators of energy security (ES) cannot give a complete picture, 
 3 
whilst Lefèvre (2010) claims that economic assessments alone of the welfare effects of 
energy [in]security typically do not give useful guidance for policymakers. The tensions 
between the physical, social, and economic characteristics stem from social-political risks, 
economic growth, planetary bio-physical capacity, ecosystem burdens, and the effects of 
climate change (Bithas and Kalimeris, 2013; Csereklyei and Stern, 2015; Lenzen et al., 
2016). It was noted by Lesbirel (2004) that an ex-ante analysis of ES risks would be 
important to conduct because “…subjective perceptions can and do  play  a  crucial  role  
in  understanding  risks.” Whilst Lesbirel made this comment in the context of pricing, we 
can extend the idea. 
The rationale for our study is neatly summed up by Månsson et al. (2014) in their 
survey of methodologies of ES assessments, concluding that greater effort should be put 
into developing methods for: 
1. evaluating sources of insecurity that can be dynamic and adaptable, 
2. comparing energy carriers [vectors] and supply chains in the medium-term, 
and 
3. assessing adaptive capacity and transformability. 
We adapt and extend these to consider the long-term consequences of risks. 
Transformability is defined as “the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when 
ecological, economic, or social structures makes the existing system untenable” (Walker et 
al., 2004). 
 
1.1 Energy Security and Sustainability: Two Sides of the Same 
Coin? 
The ‘long-term’ can be described as inter-generational, so for long-term ES the energy 
supply and demand system must be sustainable. Therefore we suggest taking a 
sustainability approach to measuring ES; a short review of ES indicators and frameworks 
is given in chapter 2. The link between sustainability and ES has been made previously 
(Stirling, 2009) and adapted for the UK project ‘Energy Security in a Multi-polar World’ 
(Barrett et al., n.d.). 
There are very large number of sustainability assessment frameworks from which 
to choose (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2014). Frequently, broad-based sustainability 
appraisals are used in assessing sustainable development environmental impact, or human 
development. Less attention is paid to exploiting these approaches in more detailed 
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process-oriented studies. An additional reason to attempt using an established method for 
generating indicator sets is that of the many ES indicators, aggregate indices, and 
frameworks few are being taken up by governments. In part this is because many of the 
proposed frameworks are hard to use, not transparent, not directly comparable with each 
other, or offer only an incomplete view i.e. environmental or economics biased. 
Some appraisal methods only deal with a single aspect of sustainability, for 
example, land use, natural resources or ecosystems (WRI et al., 2005; UNEP, 2006; van 
Dijk et al., 2011), urban development (Moroke et al., 2019), or the circular economy 
(Hanumante et al., 2019). Some methods are designed specifically for a particular 
technology family e.g. hydropower (IHA, 2018), renewables as a class (LUC and Ecotec, 
2001), or project development (Baxter et al., 2002; Arup, 2019). The IHA protocol is 
interesting as it asks the same questions at each stage of the lifecycle (except that 
decommissioning is ignored). Others offer insufficient flexibility in some other way. For 
example lifecycle assessment and its variants use extensive data inputs, but are unable to 
accommodate qualitative information. The ISO standard provides assurance of compliance 
with the method (Pryshlakivsky and Searcy, 2013), but this imposes constraints (Baumann 
and Tillman, 2004). Criticisms of LCA summarised by Lazarevic (2018) include the 
credibility and veracity of data, incompleteness of the aspects being analysed, and subject 
to creating hierarchies of worth or value (industrial, environmental, economic). Exergy 
analysis does not distinguish between renewables and non-renewables, nor the exo-toxicity 
of waste products (Hammond, 2004). The criticism in common is the inapplicability 
beyond their designed (narrow) boundaries of operation. We need a framework that is 
flexible and can be adapted for both quantitative and qualitative information. 
Our requirements for selecting a method are that the key variables such as 
competing technologies, geographical sources of fuels, environmental constraints, 
technical limits, and societal factors, can be accounted for in a relatively disaggregated 
manner yet be able to cope with UK and non-UK issues. Furthermore, we need to be able 
to assess future portfolios of primary fuel supply and installed capacities of energy/power 
supply technologies. We can analyse the supply of primary fuels by examining their supply 
chains and treating the technologies which exploit these fuel as subsidiary.  
The Process Analysis Method (PAM) for sustainability assessment fits these 
requirements (Darton, 2017). The PAM was developed whilst examining a palm oil 
production facility (Chee Tahir and Darton, 2010) and subsequently applied to 
technologies for removing arsenic from drinking water (Etmannski and Darton, 2014), 
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river basins (Wu et al., 2015), bioprocessing (Sanchez et al., 2016), and extended to assess 
network processes (Neumüller et al., 2015). We have direct experience of applying PAM 
to the UK car fleet (Smith et al., 2013a). The purpose of the PAM is to assess how 
processes cause impacts which enhance or diminish the three stores of capital. The impacts 
cause observable issues for the recipient stakeholders which are measured by indicators 
and their metrics. In this way, the PAM is data-driven, transparent, robust, and repeatable. 
Darton (2017) details how to implement the PAM for a system of interest, but we 
summarise the seven steps: 
1. Give a clear and concise high-level view of the processes which comprise the 
system. 
2. Define the system boundary. 
3. Define sustainability in the context of the system described. 
4. Define the ‘perspectives’ – yardsticks by which to judge whether the change in an 
indicator moves the system towards or away from sustainability. 
5. Identify broad groups representing the impact generators and receivers (the 
stakeholders). 
6. Identify candidate indicators and their metrics. 
7. Check the candidates against the definition of sustainability and that each has a 

















Figure 1.1 The PAM sustainability framework. After Smith et al. (2013). 
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In operating the PAM to generate candidate ES indicators we observed a key 
difference with sustainability. The difference manifested as an impact being a lack of or 
the absence of something (or an action) e.g. flight of capital with the issue being regulatory 
uncertainty. The question this generated was how would an indicator and metric be devised 
to represent something which by definition may not be measurable, and almost certainly 
would not have reliable data available. Experimenting with different formulations or 
proxies for what were clearly risks (extant or potential) did not improve the candidate 
indicators. 
 This arises because of the way that risk is considered and incorporated into the two 
concepts – security and sustainability. Broadly, sustainability analyses creates indicators or 
measures by gathering data and then considers how a perturbation e.g. a policy 
intervention or technological advance, might affect those indicators. A risk, however, 
might never occur. If it were to occur, then an assessment can be made in the sustainability 
framework, but if a risk has not yet manifested itself it cannot be readily accounted for in a 
sustainability assessment. Security assessment, whether in the realm of politics, business, 
cyber, or military, is wholly dependent on the consideration of risk. 
The purpose of creating a risk register in our case is to assist in identifying impacts 
which a pure sustainability approach does not naturally capture, particularly where novel 
fuels or technologies are not yet in widespread use. In part it is a filter mechanism since the 
risk register may capture well-characterised risks such as health effects created by 
emissions. That is not to say that attempting to identify the impacts and issues directly is 
wrong, but we found that it was unsatisfactory in developing a comprehensive picture of 
all the impacts caused by the processes. We cannot measure what is not known about 
private decisions. Figure 1.2 schematically shows how we propose incorporating the risk 
register into a modified PAM for (energy) security studies. Furthermore, how the emergent 
properties of aggregated risks (a risk profile) for a portfolio of current and future fuels is 
not obvious from knowing detail about individual causes of risks. Henceforth, we 
concentrate on developing our understanding of the ‘Process (Stages and Risks)’ box. 
Scenarios analysis is better at incorporating a view of the future, but it is not a 
sustainability method per se. From this point forward we only consider the risk analysis; 
the PAM for ES is addressed in section 11.4 on further work. For the purposes of 
developing a first comprehensive risk register suitable for ES assessment, we deem it 
necessary not to be restricted to the three stores of capital. The supply chain naturally starts 
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with a resource, so ‘fuel supply chains’ makes sense as the unit (system) of analysis. Our 
method is developed in chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Schematic of a modified PAM incorporating risk for assessing security.  
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The aim is to create a method – adhering to the princples of the PAM – to reveal detail of 
risks in current and proposed national energy systems portfolios whilst incorporating 
relevant international dimensions. The need is to be able to assess, as part of an ES 
strategy, whether or how policy support should be directed for particular technologies or 
fuel types in the context of creating a sustainable energy system. The objectives are: 
1. Identify the set of fuels and dissaggregate the activities which make up the supply 
chains into an appropriate number of stages. 
2. Create a set of risks by critical review of literature relevant to the supply of fuels. 
3. Quantify these risks within a register (for the UK) in a transparent manner through 
each supply chain.  
4. Seek expert feedback on the relative importance of risks identified. 
5. Investigate for patterns in the types and classes of risk, and identify the most 


















6. Apply the method to compare profiles of risk in energy system portfolios to 
understand the relative overall risks for future UK energy systems. 
Objectives 1-4 relate to the design and performance of the method, whilst objectives 5 and 
6 relate to the application of the method. 
 
1.3 The Novelty of this Work 
To the best of our knowledge, no attempt been made to create a risk register for energy 
systems or ES. Risks analysis for projects or businesses is commonplace, but not in terms 
of a national energy systems portfolio nor for forward projections (scenarios).  Using risk 
as the basis for analysis aligns better with the priorities of those in the private and public 
sector who decide about support or investment. The relative importance of a broad and 
balanced set of risks in the context of energy systems has not previously been studied 
which allows for new understandings of trade-offs and interactions between competing 
fuels (and conversion technologies). The use of a formal sustainability assessment 
framework to analyse energy security or risk has not previosly been attempted. 
 
1.4 The Structure of this Thesis 
In chapter 2 we give a brief review of the more well-known ES assessment frameworks 
and indices, and a general overview of risk assessment methods. Following on from the 
point above where we start the risk assessment, our methodology (chapter 3) describes the 
working definitions of the process stages, fuels, the causes of risk, and the construction of 
the risk matrix. Chapters 4-7 provide evidence to support the numerical entries in the risk 
matrix for each fuel (grouped by type of fuel for convenience). We have adopted the same 
method and style for each of these evidence chapters, with each fuel section covering 
stages 1-4 plus any unique elements of distribution and use. Chapter 8 covers the common 
elements stages 5 and 6 for all fuels, and some miscellaneous items. We present the risk 
matrix for each stages in Appendix A. Observations and analyses of the final matrix are 
given in chapter 9, along with the calculations for the system risk profiles and the 
projections using two sets of well-known scenarios. In the final chapter we draw 
conclusions and present some of the ideas for further developing and applying this work. 
 9 
2 Background: Risk and Energy Security Assessment 
The World Economic Forum (WEF, 2017) highlights many risks related to energy and 
climate, but the most important point they make is the extent of the connections between 
these risks. Chilvers et al. (2017) suggest that energy policy and science are broadening to 
consider the energy trilemma i.e. the simultaneous delivery of low carbon, secure and 
affordable energy services. To make progress, assessment of future scenarios needs to link 
the impacts and constraints of energy and resource use on society, the environment, and 
the economy. In complicated systems, large numbers of small changes lead to uncertainty 
(RAE, 2015). 
There are two bodies of literature which we need to survey, namely how risk is 
dealt with in ES assessments, and the methods of measuring risk independent of 
application area. It is clear that no attempt has been made to generate directly a risk 
register for ES, but we can gain insight into some of the important elements of risk to ES. 
 
2.1 Energy Security Indicators and Assessment Frameworks 
For more than a decade researchers have lamented the lack of a clear and consistent 
definition of ES (Azzuni and Breyer, 2018). Typically, definitions are drawn up from one 
of two perspectives: economics, or politics and strategy (Checchi et al., 2009). According 
to Winzer (2012) the reason is that authors create a definition based on the threats to ES 
which they have selected for their (limited) analysis. But Månsson et al. (2014) are more 
forthright in stating that studies depend on both the research question posed and the 
background of the researchers involved. They also note that different methods and 
approaches use conflicting assumptions. Furthermore, definitions of ES depend on the 
scope in terms of the fuels selected or how much of the process system is taken into the 
system boundary (Cherp et al., 2012), and the time horizon chosen (Azzuni and Breyer, 
2018).  
Many analyses are for the short-term being more concerned with ‘security of 
supply’ (keeping the lights on or fuel flowing) than sustained or long-term sustainable 
supplies of energy (or sources of fuel) at the multi-decadal scale. An example of the 
difficulties in developing a clear definition is captured by the one presented by Jewell et al. 
(2014): “low vulnerability to vital energy systems”. However, it is unclear what a non-vital 
energy system might be, though they define vulnerability as a combination of risk and 
resilience. 
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Recent useful and extensive reviews of the variants of ES definitions have been 
conducted by Winzer (2012), Ang et al. (2015), Jones and Dodds (2017), and Azzuni and 
Breyer (2018). Additionally, Cox (2016) surveys concepts relevant for electricity security 
specifically. The principles of measuring ES and the complexities of selecting indicators 
have been set out by Axon et al. (2013). 
 
2.1.1 Energy Security and Sustainability 
Several authors consider energy supply security to be linked with sustainability. Valdés 
(2018) identifies 16 studies which he considers to have their roots in sustainability. 
However, many of these studies use the term ‘sustainability’ in an ill-defined (or 
undefined) fashion. Keppler (2007) states that the only connection is that both operate the 
precautionary principle, but this is a limited interpretation of the UN’s concept of 
sustainability (United Nations, 1987). This is also the case for The World Energy Council 
(WEC) World Energy Trilemma Index in which they consider energy sustainability to be 
defined by ES, energy equity, and environmental sustainability (WEC, 2018). WEC’s 
definition of ES can be interpreted as acknowledging intergeneration equity (“the ability to 
meet current and future energy demand”), but their definition of sustainability (“the ability 
to mitigate natural resource depletion and environmental degradation”) is limited in scope 
and thus not concomitant with the United Nations definition of sustainable development. 
 APERC (2007) and Von Hippel et al. (2011) adopt the Bruntland definition of 
sustainability i.e. “the sustainable development and use of energy resources that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs” (United Nations, 1987). We concur with Narula and Reddy (2015) that ES and 
energy sustainability can have divergent trajectories, but conceptually should be closely 
coupled. There is some agreement that economic indicators are not suited to long-term 
timeframes (Jansen and Seebregts, 2010; Lefèvre, 2010; Månsson et al., 2014): this is 
another similarity between ES and sustainability. Stirling’s 2x2 framework (Stirling, 2009) 
– adapted from his work on sustainability – incorporates the time period of a threat (risk) 
and the type of action taken in response (whether internal or external to the system). 
 
2.1.2 It’s All About Risk 
According to Jansen et al. (2004) the key to assessing ES lies in assessing the different 
types of risk in the energy system. Likewise, Lieb-Dóczy et al. (2003) suggest that security 
[of supply] requires understanding of risk, though their approach is restricted to risks of 
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system interruption. But in a curious misunderstanding of the term ‘risk’ Molyneaux et al. 
(2016) suggest that renewable energy is risk-free. 
Although infrequently used as part of a definition of ES, the term ‘risk’ may be ill-
defined, or used in a restricted or informal sense. The most frequently used restricted case 
is for security of supply (Stern, 2002; Lieb-Dóczy et al., 2003; de Joode et al., 2004; Grubb 
et al., 2006; Scheepers et al., 2006; Creti and Fabra, 2007; Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007; 
O’Leary et al., 2007; Rutherford et al., 2007; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008a; Le Coq and 
Paltseva, 2009; Cabalu, 2010; Löschel et al., 2010; Newbery and Grubb, 2015). Other 
researchers use ‘risk’ to express the threat that energy [in]security poses to society or 
specifically consumers e.g. de Joode et al. (2004) and Olz et al. (2007).  
Some researchers use the term ‘risk’ to confer a sense of ‘undesirable’ without 
defining or stating what constitutes the risk itself. Examples of this practice are the ‘fuel-
specific supply risk’ indicator (Frondel and Schmidt, 2008) (a Herfindahl-type measure of 
import shares) or the ‘Risky External Energy Supply’ index (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009), 
both of which are concentration measures. Those devising such indicators and indices 
assume that an increasing or decreasing value is desirable or undesirable, and that if a 
value (or change in the value) is determined to be undesirable it is a ‘risk’. 
Other terms used are threats and vulnerabilities which some authors use as 
synonyms for risk. Kucharski and Unesaki (2015) distinguish between risks and threats by 
defining risks (human or technical) as originating within the energy system and threats as 
impinging on the system. To some extent, they agree with Winzer’s (2012) 
characterisation. The distinction between risks and vulnerabilities is given by Krishnan 
(2016) as adverse implications and the inability to cope, respectively. The security studies 
research community use the terms ‘securitisation’ and ‘riskification’ (Stoddard, 2012; 
Judge and Maltby, 2017) by drawing the distinction that ES is more about risks than 
threats. 
 
2.1.3 Dimensions Used in ‘ES Risk’ Frameworks  
There are a limited number of specific risk assessments or frameworks for ES. The core set 
of dimension which many authors use comprise: economic, environmental, geological, 
(geo)political, and technical e.g. Checchi et al. (2009). However, the same scopes or 
definitions vary between authors. There are variations such as Winzer (2012) who uses 
only three categories namely technical, human, and natural risk (encompassing 
environmental and geological as others define them), and  Johansson (2013) who groups 
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together economic and political risk factors, but keeps the technological and environmental 
groups separate. Curiously Sun et al. (2017) use the 4As dimensions – availability, 
accessibility, acceptability, and affordability – as risk factors. 
Despite Kucharski and Unesaki (2015) distinguishing between risks and threats, it 
is puzzling why they would then categorise external risks as economic, environmental, 
societal, geological, technological, and geopolitical, but exclude technical and human 
causes of risk (which they treat as internal to the system).  Although the categorisation is 
interesting, their distinction is not self-consistent. For example, Kucharski and Unesaki 
have both anthropogenic and natural causes of environmental threats; the human-caused 
threats are self-induced. Moreover, the geological threats fit perfectly well into the 
environmental risk category. As part of the EU standard for ES the Crisis Capability Index 
(Scheepers et al., 2006) explicitly mentions only political risks, but includes environmental 
and technical constraints which are couched in terms of risks. 
Using a risk management approach Keppler (2007) analyses the energy supply 
chain in what he calls dimensions (five) and eight different risks, namely supply and 
production (geopolitical, regulatory and technical risk), transport (safety and technical 
risk), distribution (regulatory risk), consumption (price and environmental risk), waste 
disposal (technical and regulatory risk). His approach is focused on the level of risk which 
consumers are willing to bear, and subsumes the dimensions in a set of processes. 
Risk and resilience – with ‘external’ and ‘domestic’ dimensions – are used in the 
IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security (MOSES) (Jewell, 2011). Although this 
exercise is data-driven and clearly guides the user to assigning a risk level, MOSES is 
focused on infrastructure and specifies values of, say, the number of LNG terminals or 
interconnectors corresponding to each of five risk levels. It is not clear whether these are 
normalised  or not e.g. to population size. Another drawback is that governance, 
institutional, and investment factors are not taken into account because, according to 
Jewell, they are not easily quantified. Furthermore, the MOSES system is limited only to 
IEA member nations and cannot be used to compare nations (only an individual fuel over 
time for each separate nation).  
In assessing security and risk the Global Energy Institute (2018) state that the aim 
of their ‘Energy Security Risk Index’ is to understand the likelihood of an energy shock 
and its impacts on a country’s economy. This is a limited view of risk and may better be 
described as resilience since a low score (meaning low risk)  yields a higher rank (where 1 
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is high). The indicators they present are not couched in terms of risk, but they are an 
interesting indicator set. 
Although there is no definitive rule for how many groups into which the risks 
should be disaggregated Kristensen et al. (2006) suggest five or six, and the PESTLE 
method for multi-criteria decision making (e.g. Kolios et al. (2016)) uses six (political, 
economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental). In their assessment of the food-
energy-water nexus de Amorim et al. (2018) also use five categories similar to PESTLE, 
though omitting ‘legal’. Hsu et al. (2017) group ‘risk factors’ (causes/sources of risk) into 
four ‘constructs’ (categories of risk) for assessing the operational safety of oil tankers. For 
projects in the oil and gas sector Schroeder and Jackson (2007) use eight categories of risk, 
namely health, safety, and environment; operational; procurement and materials; scope 
definition; market and commercial; organisational; planning and scheduling; and 
technology. We will consider these in our choice of categories and causes of risk. 
 
2.1.4 Causes of Risk 
There is no clear list of core risks used by most authors, though political (in)stability, price 
volatility, technical failure, and natural disasters broadly are often incorporated.  To these, 
Olz et al. (2007) and Winzer (2012) add physical security threats. Winzer (2012) gives a 
further 12 causes of risk. The Technical Risk category comprises infrastructure 
interdependency, emissions, and mechanical and thermal failures. The Human Risk 
category covers demand, strategic withholding, capacity underinvestment, political 
instability, and geopolitical risk. The third category, Natural Risk, accounts for resource 
intermittency, resource depletion, and natural disasters. Of these, ‘underinvestment’ is 
particularly interesting, which is noted as insufficient investment in the UK ES strategy 
(DECC, 2012). Other interesting causes of risk are: the probability of disruption on 
transhipment routes (Sun et al., 2017), fatalities from accidents (Malkawi et al., 2017), the 
cost of the release of radioactive materials into the environment (de-Llano Paz et al., 
2014), cyber security (Escribano Francés et al., 2013), and water consumption (Malkawi et 
al., 2017). Hammond and Waldron (2008) and Eskandari Torbaghan et al. (2015) consider 
risks generally for electricity distribution, and Foxon et al. (2005) and Wilson (2013) risks 
relevant to innovation in general. A number of reports and papers examine sets of risks in a 
broader context e.g. (Markusson et al., 2012; EY, 2013a, 2013b; WEF, 2017; de Amorim 
et al., 2018). 
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The lack of a coherent framework for identifying risks leads inevitably to 
inconsistency. Within the dimensions (categories) authors may apply any one to a single 
fuel, or mix and match the causes of risk for different fuels in the same dimension. For 
example, Checchi et al. (2009) use oil price in the economic dimension, but not gas prices. 
By the same token, they concentrate on gas transit (not oil) in the geopolitical category. In 
their assessment of UK gas security BEIS (2016a) only consider supply-side indicators 
such as continued supply from various sources (including interconnectors) and the state of 
the market (whether healthy and/or functioning). 
 The International Index of Energy Security Risk (Global Energy Institute, 2018) 
uses indicators such as import exposure (by fuel type), electricity prices (by user type), 
energy use intensity, electricity diversity capacity, CO2 per capita. But none are couched as 
risks. In classifying risks (“causes of threats”) as primary, secondary, and tertiary, 
Johansson et al. (2016) imply that some have different levels of importance. However, they 
do not make clear why risks are allocated to a category, nor do they use any sort of 
weighting factor, nor do the categories correspond to likelihood or impact. In defence of 
Johansson et al., the risks they identify and their descriptive language is helpful, for 
example “Lack of investment in search and exploration”, “lack of education”, or “Lack of 
physical energy resources”. Oddly, other risks are not couched in the same way e.g. 
“Unsuccessful development of alternative energy sources”, “Poorly functioning markets”, 
and “Imbalance between supply and demand”, which are undesirable outcomes rather than 
causes of risk. Similarly, the IEA’s MOSES (Jewell, 2011) uses ‘political stability of 
suppliers’ rather than the lack of stability – there is no risk in a supplier-nation being 
stable. A further problem with MOSES is that the risk (and resilience) indicators used are 
not consistent across all fuels. 
 The ES literature contains a wealth of indicators describing the areas (broad or 
niche) of concern or interest. Using the principal studies of interest it is possible to 
discover from appropriate indicators what may be the associated risk and the underlying 
cause of that risk (Kruyt et al., 2009; Sovacool and Mukherjee, 2011; DECC, 2012; Axon 
et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2014; Portugal-Pereira and Esteban, 2014; Hughes et al., 2016; 
Cox, 2018).  
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2.2 Assessing Risk 
Oxford Dictionaries define risk as ‘a situation involving exposure to danger’ or ‘the 
possibility that something unpleasant or unwelcome will happen’. The latter is more 
helpful in the context of ES and is sufficient for our use. This is in agreement with 
Molyneaux et al. (2016) who give a succinct review of definitions of risk and risk 
management in various engineering contexts. The evaluation of the level of risk is usually 
defined as the product of probability of occurrence and the consequence of the outcome of 
the risk materialising (Gardoni and Murphy, 2014). Historically, risks were evaluated in 
terms of single impacts of interest, such as financial loss or number of injuries per period 
of operation, but the methodology is equally applicable to any other impact – 
environmental or reputational damage, for example. We will observe these principles of 
risk assessment and adapt the risk matrix method widely used in the chemical process and 
other industries. 
Techniques abound for assessing risk in different situations, types of organisations, 
projects, and industries with specific legal requirements for health and safety, and each 
assessment has a unique context and aim (Jordan et al. (2018) and references therein). The 
International Standards Organisation has developed protocols for assessing risk using this 
wide variety of techniques (ISO, 2009), which were updated during 2018. Both versions 
are designed for detailed application (using various techniques) to an organisation or 
closely bounded situation e.g. a laboratory or piece of equipment. The guidelines are not 
designed to accommodate national-scale assessments, though the 2018 release will be 
broader in context and apply to any type of decision and not just risks (Cross, 2017). 
Despite this, Aven (2016) considers that the foundations of risk assessment are not as firm 
as might be desired, and there is evidence that current techniques may be poor at capturing 
the true nature of risk quantification (Farooq et al., 2018). 
In his general theory for characterising risk Aven (2017) examines consequence 
and uncertainty. Although developed in the well-defined context of hazard analysis there 
are principles which we can apply to creating a method for assessing risks relevant to fuel 
supply chains. In describing uncertainties Aven suggests that it is reasonable to provide 
subjective assessments of uncertainties where knowledge and judgments reflect expert 
opinion; this he captures as the concept of ‘strength of knowledge’ (SoK). A good level of 
SoK is judged as: 
1. having reasonable assumptions, 
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2. there being data or information available, 
3. a strong degree of agreement between experts, 
4. how well the phenomena can be modelled, and 
5. how rigorously the knowledge has been tested. 
 
This approach reflects well the necessities for assessing risks for which expert opinion may 
be the main source of information.  
By drawing lessons from disaster preparedness Gardoni and Murphy (2014) 
developed an understanding of the importance of the cause of a risk (person or 
organisation “…whose actions create or help to maintain risks”). In terms of the PAM 
these are the impact generators. They attach three characteristics (‘subdimensions’) to the 
cause of risk, namely causation and responsibility, whether the risk is voluntary or 
involuntary, and the relationship between who causes the risk (impact generator) and who 
is put at risk (impact receiver). The cause of risk concept allows for a single source to give 
rise to multiple risks. Gardoni and Murphy also have an interesting view of what 
constitutes a consequence. They suggest five characteristics, namely the kind of risk, 
extent of the risk, temporal aspects, whose consequences matter, and the distribution of the 
consequence. The first (kind of risk) is what most researchers consider as the level (size) of 
the consequence, but Gardoni and Murphy subtlety distinguish between kind (importance) 
and extent (amount) of the consequence. The fifth subdimension (distribution) does not fit 
with the first four since it is a value statement i.e. the assumption is that an equitable 
distribution is a good or desirable outcome. In terms of the PAM, this would be classed as 
a perspective, which are transparently labelled as the lens through which an analyst 
conducts the method.  
Through their analysis of risks associated with terrorism Aven and Renn (2009) 
concluded that complex systems with elements of ambiguity require a more broad 
characterisation of the risk and its context than probability distributions alone can offer. 
They suggest using scenarios to understand impacts in a qualitative manner. Aven (2016) 
stresses the need to better understand the use of knowledge (and lack of knowledge) in risk 
assessment and management. Also important for systems where some risks are hard to 
quantify is separating ‘understanding a risk’ (using quantitative methods) and 
‘acknowledging a risk’. Although Amundrud and Aven (2015) discussed ‘acknowledging’ 
as the need to act upon ‘understanding’, we can remold the concept to account for ‘known 
unknowns’ where it will not be possible to acquire data for a risk that clearly exists. 
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 Therefore we rely on the literature to help adapt an appropriate method, but our 
guiding principle is that the characterisation of the system of interest should meet the needs 
of the risk assessment and that of the decisions made subsequently (adapted from Aven 
(2017)). 
 
2.2.1 Understanding Risk in Supply Chains 
Supply chain risk (SCR) is defined in the context of a company or entity in a supply chain 
(Nakandala et al., 2017). However, Peck (2006) prefers to consider the supply system as a 
network, rather than a linear chain. For the purposes of our national-scale assessment of 
different fuel types, this distinction is not necessary. Often, SCRs are classified as either 
internal to the system (supply chain) or external e.g. national or international economics, 
natural disasters, or terrorism (Jüttner, 2005; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Tang, 2006; 
Trkman and McCormack, 2009). Heckmann et al. (2015) also consider risks relative to the 
supply chain boundary, but they divide the “sources of risk” into those associated with 
network and process activities, with the location of the risk subsumed in the network 
category. 
Although SCR is an under-researched topic (Nakandala et al., 2017) with a sparse 
literature, there are some important examples of risk assessment practice in the context of 
fuel supply chains: process safety in the chemical industries (Whipple and Pitblado, 2010), 
oil and gas (Schroeder and Jackson, 2007; Fernandes et al., 2010), oil tankers (Hsu et al., 
2017), electricity transmission (Eskandari Torbaghan et al., 2015), physical security of 
energy assets (Bjerga and Aven, 2016), and infrastructure (IRM, 2013). Although in the 
context of ES (rather than SCR) Bradshaw and Solman (2018) split gas production into 
upstream (supply), midstream (transhipment), and downstream (demand). 
 
2.2.2 Systemic Risk 
A systemic risk is frequently defined as one with non-linear functional and structural 
interdependencies among system components leading to cascading effects (Haldane and 
May, 2011; Helbing, 2013; Battiston et al., 2016; Burkholz et al., 2016; Ledwoch et al., 
2018; Scheibe and Blackhurst, 2018; Convertino et al., 2019). This definition was 
developed in a mostly economic context from the perspective of complex systems analysis; 
the key point is that ‘systemic’ is taken as dynamic (meaning able to cascade through the 
system under consideration). In contrast, Hochrainer-Stigler et al. (2019) contend that this 
‘contagion’ approach downplays the importance of human agency. This leads them to state 
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that systemic risk is usually due to an endogenous risk such as a cascading failure, and 
claim that volatility is a systemic risk (in the context of markets). This definition appears to 
be dependent on the viewpoint of the observer (it is not strictly a system boundary 
redefinition). Defining systemic risk more broadly to incorporate human–environment 
interactions is supported by Keys et al. (2019) in what they term ‘Anthropocene risk’.  
Johannsdottir and Cook (2019) suggest that systemic social, cultural, environmental, 
economic, security, and policy factors combine to create an event which may cause a 
tipping point leading to the breakdown of the system itself (not just a component). 
Similarly Venkatasubramanian and Zhang (2016) use entire system collapse where the 
failure negatively impacts a large number of people and their environment, causing 
enormous financial losses. We consider the latter part of this definition to be unnecessarily 
restrictive. 
A characteristic of a systemic risk is that the source of the risk may be obscured or 
redistributed to many other entities i.e. the source occurs everywhere and may be low risk, 
but the exact level of consequence is uncertain. The risk is that each entity will manifest 
simultaneously in an unpredictable pattern, or that a known risk is split amongst other 
entities with a non-uniform distribution. 
Experts with different backgrounds give varying meanings to the term ‘systemic’ 
(Renn et al., 2019) with Boholm and Prutzer (2017) noting the major gaps in knowledge 
about risk interaction. In recent years popular discourse and the academic literature have 
linked systemic risk mostly with economics and finance (Haldane and May, 2011; 
Langsam and Fouque, 2013; Engle and Ruan, 2019; He and Krishnamurthy, 2019; Iqbal 
and Vähämaa, 2019; Simaan et al., 2020). Furthermore, analysis has too often been 
focussed on individual elements e.g. firms (Chen et al., 2013). However, engineered 
systems (broadly defined) are receiving some attention, though the scope of ‘systemic’ is 
more varied. Examples of non-economic or financial topics where systemic risk has been 
examined are: infrastructure resilience (Convertino and Valverde, 2019), managing the 
multi-factor components of eye conditions (Iyer et al., 2019), environmental factors 
presenting systemic risk to financial systems (Johannsdottir and Cook, 2019), climate 
change as a systemic risk to potable water provision (Boholm and Prutzer, 2017), 
toxicology (Fransway et al., 2019), flood management (Convertino et al., 2019), safety in 
the chemical process industry (Reniers et al., 2012; Venkatasubramanian and Zhang, 
2016), terrorism (Goldin and Mariathasan, 2014), and oil and renewables stock prices 
(Reboredo, 2015). 
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Zare-Garizy et al. (2018) recognise the scarcity of real-world data relating to 
systemic risk in supply chain networks but much of the work on risk in networks has been 
for individual firms and their own supply chain, often through case studies. One notable 
exception is systemic risk caused by clustering chemical production plant. The co-location 
of companies producing unrelated products can arise because of the advantage in sharing 
facilities e.g. heat network or a trans-shipment facility. However, the physical proximity 
may introduce the risk of a cascading operational failure or more hazardous incident 
affecting multiple supply chains (Reniers et al., 2012). In the manufacturing sector, this has 
been described by Scheibe and Blackhurst (2018) as a trade-off between efficiency and 
systemic risk. An interesting conceptualisation of the dynamic nature of systemic risk in 
supply chains is that of Wu et al. (2017). They describe the systemic risk as a node at the 
nexus where the causes of risk arising in the supply chain and the range of possible 
cascading consequences meet. Both Ledwoch et al. (2018) and Zare-Garizy et al. (2018) 
use centrality measures to estimate overall risk, whilst Reniers et al. (2012) use an effect-
distance metric (distance being physical or conceptual). 
In considering systemic risk in terms of security, the interaction between energy 
security and the energy transition is identified as a systemic risk by Bellos (2018). Oil 
supply as a systemic risk to energy security in discussed by Sun et al. (2017). Pasqualino et 
al. (2019) recently attempted to model systemic risks for food and energy, and Sartori and 
Schiavo (2015) have examined food trade globalisation. More generally, systemic risks to 
environmental security (Liotta and Shearer, 2008) and access to, and security of, water 
supply (Distefano et al., 2018) have received attention. Ermolieva et al. (2016) have 
modelled (simultaneous) food, energy, water and environmental security, emphasising the 
emergent (systemic) risks. 
From critically analysing the systemic risk literature, we suggest that there are two 
types of cause of systemic risk in fuel supply chains as an element of energy security, 
omnipresent and nodal: 
1. Omnipresent: when a risk is present in most or all fuel (resource) supply chains, 
and perhaps most or all stages, irrespective of the consequence level. 
2. Nodal: where a mechanism exists such that a single event may cause a cascading 




The understanding of systemic risk we adopt for this study is that the whole system is 
affected to some extent, but not necessarily catastrophically. Thus a systemic risk would be 
one that affects whole of the fuel supply chain and not readily managed by a single actor 
(Government, company or regulator). This is in accord with Johannsdottir and Cook 
(2019) who – in their case study – treat oil spills from shipping as a systemic risk to the 
natural habitat of the arctic i.e. one source of risk might cause damage to all flora, fauna, 
and resources within a geographic boundary (the system boundary). Examples of outcomes 
of systemic risk affecting ES are international financial gridlock, world war, a climate 
catastrophe, solar flux interruption due to a super-volcano eruption, or the immediate 
cessation of all fossil fuel use due to a global agreement. A less restrictive definition of the 
sphere of operation of systemic risk could be taken as a risk that affects all fuels at a 
particular stage (though not all stages of a single fuel). Systemic risks do not necessarily 
have the high consequence levels. 
 
2.2.3 What is the Point of a Register of Risks? 
All companies and organisations will keep a risk register as a matter of good governance. 
According to Willams (1994) a risk register has two roles as “a repository of a corpus of 
knowledge” and that it should“…initiate the analysis and plans that flow from it”. 
Williams was writing in the context of projects, but many nations keep a risk register, often 
related to physical security (Hagmann and Cavelty, 2012). The UK risk register (Cabinet 
Office, 2017) also incorporates emergencies such as severe nuclear power plant accidents, 
maritime disasters, infectious disease outbreaks, cyber attacks, and civil unrest. In his 
analysis of the British and Dutch national risk registers Vlek (2013) suggests using a 
broader concept of risk which he defines as “…an insufficient potential to meet external 
harmful demands.”. Aven and Cox (2016) bluntly suggest that (inter)national assessments 
need to incorporate risk analysis techniques to be more effective. Amongst their eight 
principles for governments on how to deal with risk Aven and Renn (2018) advise: 
 that the risk level needs to be arrived at by balancing the different issues using a 
value and evidence/knowledge-informed context-dependent process, 
 supplementing formal analyses with broader judgments of risk and stakeholder 
involvement, 
 managing risk using discursive strategies leading to risk- and dialogue-oriented 
policy development, and 
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 openness and transparency with the public and about the processes in use. 
 
2.2.4 Risk Matrices 
Whilst observing the principles and examples from previous studies, we will use a 
modified risk matrix (RM) approach for our study. In many industries and businesses RM 
are used as a quantitative hazard prioritisation tool, though there are some drawbacks. 
However, many researchers and practitioners advocate RM as a semi-quantitative or fully 
quantitative tool. 
Quantitative RMs are in widespread use because they are perceived as being easy 
to construct, explain, and score (Thomas et al., 2014), for example electricity generation 
(Hammond and Waldron, 2008), future (smart) electricity networks (Rossebø et al., 2017), 
human health (Schleier and Peterson, 2010; Vatanpour et al., 2015), pipelines 
(Henselwood and Phillips, 2006), process safety (Whipple and Pitblado, 2010), project 
management (Hillson and Simon, 2007), shipping (Hsu et al., 2017; Marchenko et al., 
2018), agricultural pollution (Hewett et al., 2004), and water recycling (West et al., 2016). 
Several organisations give guidelines for using RMs in their sectors (NPSA, 2008; IMO, 
2013; IPIECA and IOGP, 2013). 
 Despite their popularity quantitative RMs exhibit a number of drawbacks, though 
with careful design for a specific task, these can be mitigated. Hitherto identified 
drawbacks are spurious resolution i.e. lacking granularity (Cox, 2008; Smith et al., 2009), 
they cannot measure aggregated total risk for a process where the risk scores have units 
(Baybutt, 2016), they cannot account for correlated risks (Hubbard and Evans, 2010; 
Baybutt, 2016), can be subject to cognitive bias (Smith et al., 2009; Hubbard and Evans, 
2010), mathematical inconsistency (Cox, 2008; Hubbard and Evans, 2010; Thomas et al., 
2014), potential for ranking reversal errors (Baybutt, 2016), and range compression (Cox, 
2008; Ni et al., 2010; Levine, 2012). By way of dealing with flaws Cox (2008), Levine 
(2012), and Baybutt (2016) suggest using logarithmic scales to increase the dynamic range 
of values, Smith et al. (2009) counteract cognitive bias by applying statistical tests such as 
maximum likelihood estimation, and Duijm (2015) suggests using probability-consequence 
diagrams with continuous scales. Despite the shortcomings, Duijm (2015) concludes that 
RMs “…offer support in cases where explicit quantification cannot be agreed upon.”   
For quantitative RMs we note a number of methodological advances. Some authors 
have exploited fuzzy logic combined with Analytical Hierarchy Protocol (Hsu et al., 2017) 
and hierarchical holographic modelling (Nakandala et al., 2017) to weight risk factors, and 
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fuzzy mapping for aggregating risk matrices (Bao et al., 2018). Peace (2017) suggests  
using RM in conjunction with goal trees. Allan and Yin (2011) consider the likelihoods of 
pairs of risks occurring which they claim allows examination of dependencies. 
More pertinent to our case, some authors comment that the important point is using 
the RM tool for the right job. Bao et al. (2018)  consider that subjectivity is a useful 
characteristic of RMs since they are a risk management tool, thus effective for assessments 
where data are insufficient to use quantitative tools. Baybutt (2016) suggests that RMs 
should only be used for initial decision guidance, whilst Peace (2017) recommends that 
RMs are used as a reporting mechanism as part of a risk assessment using other tools and 
discussion. More generally, Johansen and Rausand (2014) suggest using deliberation, 
incorporating stakeholder views and other information, as part of risk-informed decision-
making, and MacKenzie (2014) advises that categorical scales are best used when 
communicating with a wide variety of stakeholders and decision-makers.  
There are some recent advances from which we can draw lessons. Fernandes et al. 
(2010) suggest using RM within a (hierarchical) framework for identifying the risk agents, 
risk sources, risk objects, and risk events. Goerlandt and Reniers (2016) advocate 
visualisation techniques as part of the RM method, and Aven (2017) has incorporated a 
method for assessing the ‘strength of knowledge’ where subjective judgments need to be 
made in the absence of sufficient data. 
 
2.2.5 Summary 
Many researchers have recognised the key elements of ES. But despite a plethora of well-
intentioned and mostly self-consistent ES indicators, indicator sets, and frameworks of 
analysis, they are not often being taken-up in policy circles. In part, this may be attributed 
to terms such as ‘risk’, ‘resilience’, and ‘sustainability’ being used inconsistently. The 
principal gap is the need for coherent framework, and transparent analysis, using tried and 
tested ideas about risk and impact. 
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3 Constructing a Risk Assessment Methodology 
The methodology is designed to be independent of any nation or source of fuel though 
inevitably a country-assessment will need to take account of opportunities or limitations 
presented by geography, specific political matters, or the economic state (level) for 
example. Therefore we are creating a way of assessing the risks of using a fuel type in 
general, not assessing the risks of any individual project. The application to a nation – the 
case study – will test the method and illustrate its potential use. 
 After defining the system boundary, there are five main steps for setting up the 
framework for the risk assessment (Figure 3.1). First we identify a set of classes of fuel 
sources and define their characteristics. Secondly we exploit the PAM to identify and 
define the process stages at an appropriate level of disaggregation. The level of 
aggregation chosen is dependent on the purpose of the study and the size of the team 
available to carry out the proposed study. Thirdly, from a combination of the PAM, review 
of literature, and expert input we identify and define seven categories of causes of risk. 
Fourthly, using review of literature and expert input we identify and define the causes of 
risks. In practice a feedback loop exists between the third and fourth steps to settle on a 
manageable list. Lastly, we construct and test the risk matrix to evaluate the performance 
of the interacting elements of the framework. Then we generate the risk register i.e. 
analyse the likelihood, level of impact, consequences, and scale of the causes of risk and 
use it to analyse the changing relative level of risk for different energy system scenarios. 
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Identify and define: sources of fuels
Construct and test the risk matrix
Identify and define: causes of risks
Identify and define: risk categories
Identify and define: process stages
REVIEW
Conduct the risk assessment
Analyse future energy scenarios
Define the system boundary
Assessment Framework
 
Figure 3.1 The steps taken (with feedback) to generate the assessment framework. 
 
3.1 Raw Fuel Sources 
The nomenclature for the fuel category (Table 3.1) is meant to name the fuel source 
directly and not the technology or conversion device. However, to be pragmatic it is not 
possible to be wholly consistent. Gas is a good example. The gas used for domestic and 
power generation purposes is methane. But so-called natural gas is made up of fractions 
with different molecular weights (ethane, butane, propane) and various impurities 
including water, and carbon monoxide/dioxide. Processing separates the different fractions 
for various uses, including  butane and propane which can be blended to produce LPG for 
transport or gas heaters – clearly having a part to play in any ES analysis. Methane may 
also be produced from fast pyrolysis processes (along with hydrogen), anaerobic digestion, 
or landfill sites. Another source is methane hydrate deposits. There are also various other 
gases proposed as fuel sources, but which for the near future can only form a niche fuel or 
be a theoretical possibility. Thus it is helpful to aggregate some of these gaseous fuels into 
categories and to split the sources of methane as renewable and non-renewable. 
Rules of thumb for deciding the groupings are the type of processing which the fuel 
requires, the stage of maturity of the technology, or the scale of operation. Although what 
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may constitute ‘unconventional’ may become conventional in years to come, we should 
recognise that an ES analysis must take account of the current state as well as looking to 
the future. Some useful definitions (and references therein) for conventional / 
unconventional fuels are given by Rogner et al. (2012). 
In Table 3.1 the ‘Fuel Transport Required’ column refers to whether Stages 2-4 are 
co-located or not. For many fuel sources the capture conditioning, and conversion 
processes are carried out in the same device (e.g. a wind turbine) meaning that the fuel is 
never transported. Another example is hydropower. Although to be able to capture the 
‘fuel’ (water) a dam has to be built, which is a different device to the turbine required for 
conversion, the distinction is not meaningful for this scale of analysis. The fuels are 
mostly, but not exclusively, renewable. The criterion is that the captured fuel usually has 
only a single end-point at that location. Another way of looking at this is that the 
conversion technology is taken to the site of fuel source, never vice-versa. For some fuel 
categories the distinction is less clear-cut. Two examples are Solar (thermal, power) and 
Thermal (geological). Solar (thermal, power) was first devised to super-heat steam and 
drive a standard turbine to generate electricity which clearly requires no transport of the 
fuel. Recently however, hybrid fossil-CSP systems have been conceived for which gas 
would need to be transported. These two types of conversion system are often conflated. 
For Thermal (geological), the fuel source (heat) is extracted on-site, but the water required 
to inject into the rock formation may well have to be transported to the site – this is co-
locating extraction and conditioning of the resource, but not the conversion. Thus Thermal 
(geological) is categorised as requiring transport, although this relates to the heat transfer 
medium. 
We use the common classification of energy sources and fuels as renewable or non-
renewable. An alternative for renewables – carbon-free – is proffered by Harvey (2010), 
but this is contentious since we are concerned about the whole of the supply chain. This 
leads to classifying Nuclear (fission) alongside Solar (electric) and Wind (off- and on-
shore) as carbon-free, yet clearly fissionable fuel is exhaustible and non-renewable. 
Categorising a fuel as renewable or non-renewable is mostly self-explanatory, but two 
interesting cases emerge namely Thermal (geological) and Waste. Many authors categorise 
geothermal energy as renewable, for example Stefansson (2000), Turkenburg et al. (2012) 
and Skea (2015), whilst Harvey (2010) classes it as carbon-free. Geological reservoirs of 
thermal energy are exhaustible (Nazroo, 1989; Younger, 2014), only replenished (if at all) 
on geological timescales, and are therefore non-renewable. Waste, on the other hand, could 
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be considered as renewable since replenishment is at a considerably faster rate. However, 
as the total amount of waste available is solely a function of societal behaviour, we take 
Waste to be non-renewable. There is precedent for considering demand reduction in the 
same framework as supply-side mechanisms. Eyre (2013) proffered a scheme for an 
energy efficiency feed-in tariff (FIT) to operate in a manner to FITs for renewable power 
generation. 
The categorisation of the bio-derived fuel sources is difficult and for the sake of 
clarity we have broken our nomenclature rule. Biogas (except landfill gas (LFG) and 
sewage gas) and Bioliquid are not strictly sources, but end products, as both are derived 
from Biomass. However, their manufacture cannot be wholly incorporated into Biomass 
(solids) as the process pathways threaded through the stages are entwined and technically 
coupled to different degrees at different points making a complicated story. As there are 
several distinct end uses (and final energy vectors) the risks more readily relate to the 
conversion technology (Stages 3-4), the distribution method (Stage 5), and the use (Stage 
6). In part, the complexity arises from the immaturity of some process pathways and the 
marginal economic benefits.  
A categorisation more in keeping with our system of nomenclature would be, for 
example, Waste (agriculture, slurry), Waste (agriculture, solid), Waste (municipal, 
organic),  and Waste (municipal, solid). However, in this case Biomass (wood) would still 
need to be used for virgin woody crops e.g. willow likewise Biomass (non-wood) for crops 
such as oilseed rape, aquatic biomass, or sugarbeet grown specifically for processing into 
bioliquids. In addition to these niche categories, the complications of common processing 
facilities will still occur. Furthermore some of these separate categories will have some 
proportion mixed with others before conversion to the final energy vector. Therefore we 
have adopted a pragmatic approach to distinguish the bio-based sources of fuel by the 
technology used for conditioning the raw fuel. In a more detailed or disaggregated study, 
the alternative categories could be adopted; likewise if bio-based fuels were a more 
significant proportion of a nation’s primary energy supply. Any biogenic material 
converted outside the system boundary and imported would be considered as Gas 
(unconventional) or Oil (unconventional), for example. 
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Fuel Category Type Fuel Transp. 
Required? 
Notes 
Biogas Renewable Yes The production of methane from biogenic sources such as sewage, livestock manures, and 
agricultural waste for direct combustion or injection into the gas network. In some cases shares 
similar production methods to bioliquids. AD is a common route, the fuel being waste, 
however, it is renewable c.f. gas (unconventional). Off-gas from landfill sites is considered in 
this category. 
Bioliquids Renewable Yes Shares some production methods with biogas and biomass, but bioliquid manufacturing is 
likely to be a unified facility. Bioliquids can be produced from upgrading gases or as by-
products from biomass processing. Mostly for transport fuels; products include methanol, 
ethanol, biodiesel. 









No Conceived as a ‘negative fuel’ – negafuel. There are two elements: energy efficiency through 
use of or redesign of devices, and change in behaviour by people. See Note 1. 




Yes Currently liquid nitrogen, ammonia, hydrogen, and carbon dioxide (CCU). See Note 2. 
Gas Non-
renewable 






Yes Shale gas, methane hydrates, coal-bed methane (CBM), aquifer (water dissolved), coal 
gasification. Excluding pyrolysis as the fuel in that case is waste and methane is a by product 
from by processes. For AD, the fuel is also waste (animal and human waste), but it can be 
considered as renewable (see biogas). 




Renewable No Community-scale, kW devices for rivers. 
Nuclear (fission) Non-
renewable 
Yes Including thorium. 
Nuclear (fusion) Non-
renewable 
Yes Meaning deuterium and tritium. 
Oil Non-
renewable 





Yes Shale oils, tight oil, extra-heavy oil, bitumen. See Note 3. 
Ocean (tidal) Renewable No Subsurface stream devices and lagoons. 
Ocean 
(unconventional) 
Renewable No Including osmotic and thermal, but excluding wave and tidal. 
Ocean (wave) Renewable No  
Peat Non-
renewable 
Yes See Note 4. 
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Solar (electric) Renewable No Photovoltaic including IR wavelength devices. 
Solar (thermal, 
power) 
Renewable No Mostly MW-scale concentrated solar power (CSP) devices for raising steam, excluding solar 
water heating for buildings. See Note 5. 
Solar (thermal, 
water) 
Renewable No Mainly for building-scale uses, distinct from CSP.  
Solar (updraft 
tower) 









Renewable No Low grade thermal energy drawn from the near sub-surface environment. See Note 6. 
Waste Non-
renewable 
Yes MSW, plastics, tyres, . Energy recovery (EfW) by incineration or pyrolysis, plus AD. For 
pyrolysis and AD, the processing to produce methane and hydrogen is a by-product of waste 
management in this study. For AD see Biogas. 
Wind (offshore) Renewable No  
Wind (onshore) Renewable No Excluding micro turbines. 
 
Note 1: The direct provision of energy services e.g. heat networks with water as the energy vector (both industrial and residential) or the 
provision of lighting or cooling, may lead to a reduction in demand through efficiency gains of scale. However, the relevant causes of risk are 
included elsewhere, so to avoid the danger of double-counting we exclude these from the definition. The provision of heat is especially difficult 
to categorise as water is an energy vector and the plant supplying the hot water might be waste low-grade heat from industry or a dedicated CHP 
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unit fired by another fuel such as Biomass, Gas, or Gas (unconventional). We treat these in Stage 6 (Use) of the relevant fuel because the fuel is 
delivered to the heat producing device via the distribution stage (see section 8.2.2). 
Note 2: These may not be primary fuels, however, each may have implications for ES. 
Note 3: Unconventional Oil encompasses a wide range of sources. The main ones listed are marginal to current production and are uneconomic. 
Our definition excludes coal-to-liquid (CTL) since it has little impact on the UK. 
Note 4: Peat cutting for energy use in the UK is a small scale activity concentrated in rural areas, especially Scotland, and mostly carried out by 
householders. The annual UK energy statistics dataset (BEIS, 2017b) does not record usage, though the International Peatland Society estimates 
20 kt per annum (WEC, 2013) most of which is for horticulture. Although we could consider peat as biomass, it is non-renewable. Therefore peat 
has been excluded from our study.  
Note 5: These do not have any practical possibility of deployment in the UK. Within the confines of the system boundary of the UK case study 
we will not consider these further. In the long-term future it may be possible that commercial Solar (thermal, power) may be sited in Southern 
Europe or North Africa, but their contribution to UK ES could only be through a European Supergrid transmission system and then via 
interconnectors. 
Note 6: The ground temperature at 1-2m depth varies little seasonally and acts as bidirectional store from where thermal energy (the ‘fuel’) can 
be extracted and rejected thermal energy deposited. The principal technologies are ground-source heat pumps (GSHPs) and ground-water heat 
pumps (GWHPs). The fuel for an air-source heat pumps (ASHP) is the sun (by various mechanisms) heating the air. However, we treat ASHPs 
as an electrical device (demand) because the rejected heat during the summer is lost to the atmosphere – air cannot act to store thermal energy in 
the same way as the sub-surface. Systems for recovering thermal energy from minewater share technical characteristics with Thermal 
(geological) and are classified as such. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of the generic fuel categories and their definitions. 
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3.1.1 Grid-scale Storage and Interconnectors 
Even though grid-scale storage would naturally be considered a security of supply matter 
(for balancing intermittent renewables) it cannot be considered as a primary fuel since it is 
agnostic to fuel sources and is mediated by an energy vector (the electron) which is already 
in the distribution system. The storage device will normally transform the electrical energy 
into another form e.g. chemical, kinetic, or gravitational potential. This may then be used 
as a store directly or in the case of pumped storage systems, operated to move water to a 
higher level lake. Grid-scale storage is also functionally indistinguishable from a generator.  
Interconnectors (crossing the system boundary) possess an interesting status. 
Interconnectors are infrastructure, but they could be considered as a fuel with a 
geographical offset (with the conversion stage in another country). Moreover, 
interconnectors exhibit some of the characteristics which we associate with storage, such 
as acting as a balancing mechanism for National Grid. The definition becomes blurred with 
pure infrastructure when considering structures such as a ‘North Sea Grid’ linking off-
shore wind with several countries including those operating two-level pumped storage 
systems. 
 Grid-scale storage and interconnectors are considered at the distribution stage as 
they may have impacts on the investment, development, or deployment of renewables.  
 
3.1.2 The UK Case Study 
The case study will not use all of the fuels outlined in Table 3.1, we indicated that Solar 
(thermal, power), Solar (updraft tower) are not relevant to the UK. We deem Exotic gases 
and liquids, Nuclear (fusion), and Ocean (unconventional) to have a very low probability 
of being deployed in the UK. Furthermore, we note that Hydro (low head) and Peat make a 
very small contribution to UK energy supply. 
 
3.2 Process Stages 
The descriptors for processes and activities have been made explicit where possible, but 
where the range is wide, generic labels have been used. The point is to give a link to the 
level of complexity or scale of the operation to assist in assessing the risk specific for that 
fuel at that stage. Furthermore, using the PAM, the identified impacts result from 




Figure 3.2 A schematic of the six process stages. The three groupings of extraction (stages 
1-2, transformation (stages 3-4), and end use (stages 5-6) are broadly useful, though 
renewable fuels often have stages 2-4 co-located at the conversion site. 
 
Analysing the fuel supply chain and processing system using the PAM, we suggest 
that the following high-level stages are appropriate for the scale of this study (Figure 3.2): 
1. Exploring for energy resources: Measuring the potential is measuring the quality of 
the fuel source. Exploration and discovery activities include geological prospecting 
and seismology, wind surveys, assessments of water and plant resource together 
with ecology, collecting data relevant to specific sites (above or below ground / 
sea). 
2. Exploiting the raw energy resource: Production, capture, and transport of raw 
resource. Design and construction of facilities, operation, import/export of product. 
Get resource (or raw material) to the mine/site entrance, and/or to the processing 
site for upgrading.  
3. Conditioning the raw energy resource into fuel: Condition, process, and transport 











4. Converting the fuel to the final energy vector: Conversion of the fuel to the final 
form of the energy vector. This includes storage in the form of electricity, pumped 
(potential), thermal, and kinetic energy. 
5. Distributing the energy vector for sale to the end user: Distribution of the energy 
vector including the monitoring, design, construction, and maintenance of the 
infrastructure. 
6. Using the final energy vector: The users will be household, business, public sector 
and charitable organisations, and industrial consumers operating electrical devices, 
vehicles, and heating systems. 
 
The aggregation of the processes is commensurate with the key processes in all 
extractive industries. All stages include consideration of disposal of waste, site 
decommissioning, technical innovation, and efficiency. Stages 2-6 include the risks of 
project development. An important reason for being explicit about use (Stage 6) is that 
impacts and risks can be readily associated with that stage. In terms of Winzer's (2012) 
continuity concept, Stages 1 and 2 align with commodity continuity and Stages 4-6 align 
with service continuity. However depending on the fuel type and geographical location, 
Stage 3 will fit into one or the other. This demonstrates an advantage of process 
decomposition over a simpler two-phase approach and strikes a balance of too many to be 
manageable and too few to be meaningful. 
Transportation of resources, materials, and fuels is required within (intra-stage) and 
between stages (inter-stage). Although different forms of transport (bulk carriers, road, 
train, shipping) are required between world regions each with different risk profiles, we 
considered it unfeasible to have separate stages for each. Whilst there are fuels for which 
separate transport stages do make sense this is not universal. For example, where the fuel is 
exploited and converted at the same site (renewables) this does not work well since it is the 
final energy vector (the electron) which is transported. Electron transportation is readily 
absorbed into the distribution stage since the technologies are to all intents and purposes 
identical. The reason for making transport more prominent is that if it is considered in 
energy systems models at all, it usually only acknowledged through price. This underplays 
the importance of the risk associated with moving very large quantities of fuels. For the 
single country case study we account for the transport risks at each stage. The main risks 
which we identify are of nuclear fuel (new or spent), gas transit pipelines, and oil on the 
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Analysing the whole supply chain for each fuel in terms of the six stages (Figure 
3.2) shows that some stages are not relevant for some fuels because those processes or 
activities are co-located (Table 3.2). For example, ‘conditioning of the fuel’ has no 
 physical significance for wind turbines so the exploit, condition, and convert stages occur 
in the turbine installation itself. Therefore stages 2-4 may be combined for Wind (offshore) 
and Wind (onshore). This a pattern common to many renewables: Hydro, Ocean (tidal), 
Ocean (wave), and Solar (electric). For Solar (thermal, water) and Thermal (low 
temperature) there is no distribution stage as they generate low-grade thermal energy (low 
exergy value) which can only be used locally. The Biogas, Gas, and Gas (unconventional) 
chains share a different characteristic in that the fuel leads to two forms of final energy 
vector – electricity and heat – depending on whether the gas is used by a power generator 
or by end-users directly in buildings. 
Mechanical processing generally refers to crushing, grinding, and sorting. 
Mining could be underground or open cast. Chemical processing has a wider 
definition, but the plant and site requirements will frequently be of similar complexity 
and size. Furthermore, the levels of safety requirements (and risks) will be generic. We 
specified ‘refining’ for Oil and Oil (unconventional) as that is a well-defined set of 
physical and chemical processes. 
We take Demand Reduction to be applicable to activities of the end-user, 
including transport. In particular we consider that Stages 2 and 3 are best captured as 
information (and education) and design activity. Stages 4-6 concern the deployment 
and use of devices to aid energy efficiency and the practice of modified behaviours. 
 
3.3 Categories and Causes of Risks 
All risks originate in either the natural environment or human activity. Informed by the 
literature review, we have broken the two sources into sevens distinct groups which readily 
arise from ES considerations. The categories are chosen to reflect the concerns of the time 
expressed by public and private organisations e.g. skills has been separated from the 
political category. Other activities are diffused through categories e.g. activities of the 
public such as protest (political) and operations (technical). 
In their work on risk metrics Johansen and Rausand (2014) describe 11 desirable 
criteria which a metric should meet: validity, reliability, transparency, unambiguous, 
contextuality, communicability, consistency, comparability, specificity, rationality, and 
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acceptability. We use these as a guiding principle for selecting the causes of risk. There 
were a large number of generic risks which could have been included, but the list needed to 
be kept to a manageable number – a number just large enough to describe a complex 
system at a high level. From experience using the PAM to find indicators for complex 
systems, we consider that the number of generic risks should not exceed around forty. Our 
analysis is based on 34 currently.  
Initially, from the literature, more than 80 risks were identified. Much of the 
literature highlights single risks or tightly defined groups and these are discussed in 
subsequent chapters supporting the judgements made for the likelihoods and impacts for 
the matrix. Many of the causes of risk identified in the literature review were found to be 
suitable for the scale we are considering, so could be captured in the generic definitions. 
Others were not likely to have impacts beyond a single project, thus were not suitable for a 
high-level analysis. Some were unique to a single fuel or nation, which could be 
incorporated into another broad category, often political. When constructing and reading 
this table it is important to note that: 
1. The category is the cause or source of the risk, then the specific risk is interpreted 
in the context i.e. activity of each stage. The practice of interpreting the risks is 
manifest in the form of a question.  
2. The risk being considered is the risk to the ES of the nation or bloc (within the 
system boundary), not the risk to a project or company. 
3. In any single fuel supply chain (at any or all stages) there will be multiple supply-
countries with different characteristics e.g. standard of governance. 
4. Some risks will have two parts even within a single stage – one for inside the 
system boundary, one external. We judge which is the most important element to 
base our assessment. This is expressed in the risk matrix using the 
macro/meso/micro ‘scale’ characteristic identifier (section 3.4.2). 
5. These are risks at the location of the activity (in a general sense) which could have 
an impact at the system boundary. 
For each risk category we state the nature of the risks they encompass (summarised in 
Table 3.3), the desirable outcomes of the activities in each of the areas, and then some of 
the specific causes of risk, why they were selected, or their limitations. The interpretations 
of the full set of causes, summarised in Tables 3.3-3.9, explains the high-level generic risks 
used in the risk matrix. This cannot be considered as a complete look-up table for the risk 
matrix, but it guides the deliberations of the risks in each stage of the supply chain. 
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Category Nature of the Risks 
Economic Uncertainty, lack of transparency, lack of access to capital 
Environmental Climate change, resource depletion, natural hazards 
Innovation Unsolved problems, scaling, competition 
Manufacturing Lack of capacity, lack of resilience 
Political Weak governance, corruption, lack of ‘licence to operate’ 
Skills Lack of capacity, lack of quality 
Technical Human error, lack of resilience 
Table 3.3 Summary of the nature of the risks in each category. 
 
3.3.1 Economic 
The levels of macroeconomic activity and stability are important. The provision of capital 
is required for all scales of energy systems. The return on investment (ROI) should be 
stable and predictable for a time well beyond the payback period. Competition in any 
relevant markets needs to be fair – the market needs to be well-functioning. 
The nature of the risk: A lack of predictability leads to uncertainty. In turn this 
affects access to capital since the projects are large (relative to the size of the borrower) 
and instability during the payback period is unacceptable. For commercial schemes, 
without a reasonable return on investment (ROI) access to capital is likely to be restricted.  
The causes of risk (Table 3.4): Risks arising from competition take several forms, 
but are not exclusively economic. For the purposes of our study we have incorporated the 
following discussion in the economic category as a lack of well-functioning markets. A 
number of the associated risks would be most usefully considered at the individual 
company or project level. Competition at some stages of the supply chain (or energy 
system more generally) may reduce risk, at others it may increase risk. Too much or too 
little competition are both a risk. Too much competition leads to reduced margins, pressure 
on infrastructure (costs money) and other essential items (e.g. staff training, safety 
features) and increased risk of failure (or become inefficient at delivering benefit for a 
nation). Too much competition may also present an opportunity risk, as limited technical 
expertise is spread more thinly amongst R&D programmes (public or private) for a 
multitude of widely differing technologies. The well-known purely economic risks 
manifest as cartels either as a state-supported national company or as groups of companies 
or nation states. Too little competition and prices may be inflated unless regulated 
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appropriately (where possible), or perhaps viable solutions to problems may not be 
discovered. At different stages in the fuel supply chains the risks may be summarised thus:  
 too few / many sites competing for exploitation,  
 too few / many companies competing for access to sites,  
 too few / many companies supplying equipment and services, 
 
Using wind turbines as an example, the risk arising is due to too few manufacturers 
of turbine blades (manufacturing capacity is a separate issue). The markets for generators 
and steelwork are more widely spread for other devices; there may be other risks arising 
due to materials criticality, but there are many suppliers in these markets. Uncertain 
decommissioning costs is not solely an issue for nuclear fuels. As more knowledge is 
discovered about environmental impacts of waste and spoil the legal requirements for 
disposal and treatment may become more stringent. Offshore wind turbine with pile 
foundations will provide an interesting future risk since clean-up is hard to ensure because 
access to the sea bed is difficult. Subsidies are incorporated in the risk of lack of access to 
capital because it may affect the price of that capital. 
 
Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Lack of a well-
functioning market 
Are there plenty of suppliers for equipment, components, 
systems, or services for the required activities? Or is there 
evidence of monopolistic market actors? 
Lack of access to 
capital 
Are the required components, systems, or services considered 
as mature or immature, or how significant is the investment 
compared with normal business operations?  
Unable to agree a price 
for licence or permits  
Is the price of permits for access, extraction, siting, or disposal 
of waste a significant proportional of operating costs? 
Uncertain 
decommissioning costs 
If the decommissioning costs are unknown, what is the impact 
on the viability of the activities?  
Price volatility How significant is volatility in the price of equipment, 
components, systems, or services for the required activities?  




The stability and predictability of the environs of a scheme and the long-term stability of 
the climate are highly desirable (minimal likelihood of catastrophic natural hazards). The 
environment is the provider of the natural resources – fuels, water and minerals – required 
for the energy supply chains under examination. There is an argument to use the over-
arching term ‘ecosystem services’ as this includes the provision of water. However, the 
only ecosystem service common to many fuels at various stages is the requirement for 
water. The requirement for biotic ecosystem services is restricted to the three classes of 
biofuels, and then will only be relevant at Stage 2 (Exploit). Therefore we refer to water-
use explicitly, and account for the biotic ecosystem services as a variability in the quality 
of the fuel source with the consequences cascading through the subsequent process stages. 
The nature of the risk: The continued use of fossil fuels is likely to lead to changes 
in the climate with impacts on the near- and long-term. The depletion of resources is a risk 
to all fuel supply chains, but more acute for some. Over-extraction of a resource may lead 
to the loss of ecosystem services. The environment will present unpredictable natural 
hazards. 
The causes of risk (Table 3.5): Difficult physical access and the concept of 
‘physically isolated’ resources can be interpreted in two ways. First the geographical 
remoteness of, say, Lithium deposits in the High Andes, or oil in the arctic. Although these 
two examples are outwith the boundary, UK companies may be exploiting or relying on 
the supply chain. However, it is not legitimate to treat anything outwith the boundary as 
remote; this is too wide a definition. For example, with respect to the UK, Saudi Arabia is 
remote to the system boundary, but access to the resources is relatively easy, but oil from 
the arctic is remote from everywhere. We can assume that if the commodity is widely 
traded, the market is easy to access. The level of the geographical remoteness external to 
the system boundary is mediated through price with volatility, in part, taking account for 
the ease of access. The second, and more directly useful definition to the Environmental 
risk category, is that any UK installation offshore requires special equipment to operate 
beyond what would be needed if the same resource were extracted onshore.  
The quality of the fuel source relates to the impact on the activity in each stage of 
any variability in the physical or chemical constituents of the raw fuel. At the exploration 
stage quality and quantity of a deposit are what is being determined. Quality is interpreted 
as how the variability impacts on how difficult it is to determine the viability of the 
resource at any given site. We considered whether to interpret quality as long-term 
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availability since this characteristic of a fuel source might determine whether exploration is 
undertaken, however, this would be better done in a resource availability normalisation 
exercise once the risk profiles are determined. This is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Difficult physical access Is the site physically remote or with difficult terrain? 
Natural hazards Is the site subject to significant natural hazards? 
Quality of fuel source How significant is resource composition variability, 
including ecosystem services, on the required activities? 
Lack of water availability How dependent are the activities on water availability? 
Lack of critical materials 
availability 
How reliant (currently or projected) is the availability of 
critical materials for the activities? 
Table 3.5 Summary of the definitions of the environmental causes of risk (independent of 
fuel and stage). 
 
3.3.3 Innovation 
The extraction and processing of fuels currently used (either bulk or niche) require on-
going incremental technical development. For unconventional fuels or new sources, the 
need for innovation is essential if new devices to extract and exploit are to be developed 
successfully. Innovation of business models and structures are also important. 
The nature of the risk: The inability to solve problems. A new device or process 
may not be scaled to a size that makes any significant difference, or be economically 
viable, or it may not be possible to engineer a practical, safe, and reliable commercial 
system. Market structures and regulation may prevent new opportunities developing. For 
mature technology, systems, processes, or business models the risk lies in competition 
from innovation. 
The causes of risk (Table 3.6): The weak technology transfer environment risk aims 
to account for early-stage tech at TRL<7, say; for example, fourth generation nuclear 
fission reactors, any fuel classed as unconventional, tidal stream, or wave. This is not about 
improvements in current technology, but aims to capture the risk of relying on a proposed 
fuel, device, or technology ‘fixing the problem tomorrow’. 
The risk of activities in the supply chain having only marginal improvements 
consists of several components, namely the inability to: 1) improve efficiency, 2) reduce 
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environmental impact, 3) reduce costs, 4) reduce material use, and 5) scale process or 
conversion device. The question is whether a physics or engineering limit has been 
reached, and if so how problematic would it be if no further reductions or improvements 
were made within that fuel supply chain? Of particular importance is the scalability of the 
process or conversion device to meet either global-scale demand, or to fit small-scale 
distributed systems. Scalability is frequently over-looked as a risk factor in energy 
systems. Thus innovation will be difficult and perhaps require large R&D programmes. 
We take as our definition of the marginal improvements risk that greater security is gained 
with technologies with scope to improve more. Thus mature technologies are associated 
with higher risk values. We set the definition this way around as we assume that mature 
technologies and business models offer low operational risk (high experience factor) in 
current operation. But that such technologies do not necessarily offer flexibility to 
changing circumstances – economic, environmental or societal. A burgeoning technology 
may be able to further improve the ES state. It should be noted that technologies for shale 
oil and gas extraction may have significant room for improvement and offer short-term ES 
or security of supply of oil and gas. 
When considering R&D issues, one of the key questions is whether the current 
capacity is able to meet the level of the challenge i.e. are there are enough centres of 
expertise and can very long programmes of activity be sustained when the practical 
solutions may be decades away. Related to this is the question of whether too many 
competing technologies are a risk. How significant is the impact of too much competition 
having on spreading expertise amongst developing fuels and is this leading to an 




Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Weak technology transfer 
environment 
Are there many opportunities for a new technology or 
practice to be deployed? Hard for niche or small-scale 
activities. 
Lack of public subsidy Would the R&D cease if no subsidies were available? 
Only marginal 
improvements likely 
Is the technology required mature with a history of only 
incremental improvement i.e. near the top of the S curve? 
Lack of material 
substitutability 
To what extent are the technologies dependent on the 
properties of particular materials? All materials e.g. high-
grade steel. 
R&D capacity or 
capability does not match 
the challenge 
Are the barriers to start R&D so high that only large 
organisations can afford to participate? Is there a vibrant 
R&D landscape for the technology in question? 
Optimism bias  To what extent does optimism bias of future improvements 
in technologies and efficiency gains over-inflate the value 
placed on the likelihood of an activity remaining 
competitive or becoming mainstream? 
Table 3.6 Summary of the definitions of the causes of risk for innovation (independent of 
fuel and stage). 
 
3.3.4 Manufacturing 
We include construction relevant to energy systems within this definition of 
manufacturing. The manufacturing sector needs to provide capacity of facilities and 
processes, and that globally there is resilience i.e. multiple specialist manufacturers. This 
point of resilience is different from there being competition amongst manufacturers – it is 
about there not being a single point of failure geographically. Manufacturers should use 
resources efficiently, and operate safely with respect to the workforce and the 
environment. 
The nature of the risk: A lack of resilience caused by too few centres of 
manufacturing expertise (capacity). 
The causes of risk (Table 3.7): Moving beyond R&D to the manufacturing stage a 
risk is whether there is sufficient capacity (not competition) to manufacture the required 
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system components or conversion devices. Although we have couched the question in 
terms of the present i.e. how significant would be the loss of some current manufacturing 
facilities globally, there is also an element of scale-up risk here. However, for the purposes 
of this study we place the scale-up question at the innovation stage. In terms of the 
capacity to construct sites, for the fuel Demand Reduction it is how significant might the 
impact be of a low rate of demolition of energy inefficient buildings? 
 
Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Insufficient capacity to 
manufacture system 
components or conversion 
devices 
Is there sufficient manufacturing capacity to meet demand? 
This is separate from the number of different manufactures 
(competition). How significant would be the loss of some 
manufacturing facilities globally? 
Insufficient capacity to 
construct sites 
How significant are demands (scale, complexity, number) 
for constructing the extraction, processing, or conversion 
sites?  
Insufficient rate of 
infrastructure construction 
If new infrastructure were not put in place, what is the 
impact on the activities (including ICT)? 
Table 3.7 Summary of the definitions of the causes of risk for manufacturing (independent 
of fuel and stage). 
 
3.3.5 Political 
This is a broad category with risks that may apply equally to both the nation within the 
system boundary and those from which fuels are sourced. Putte et al. (2012) adapt the 
definition of political risk from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the 
World Bank: 
“The probability of disruption of the operations of companies by 
political forces and events, whether they occur in host countries or 
result from changes in the international environment. In host countries, 
political risk is largely determined by uncertainty over the actions not 
only of governments and political institutions, but also of minority 
groups and separatist movements”.  
 
We include actions of the public as they are part of the polity. The following discussion is 
in line with the view of good governance set out by the World Bank) (2018). The political 
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system should be incorruptible. Stability is the key factor, both in terms of public safety 
and the socio-legal system. Specifically in relation to investment in energy systems, this 
means the stability of the policy environment and the regulatory framework. The legal 
system needs to be fair and robust, with an independent judiciary able to protect rights of 
property and provide prompt and fair dispute resolution. Furthermore, the system of 
taxation should be predictable and transparent. The legislature sets or adopts safety and 
employment laws, which should be enforced equally in all workplaces. Also required is the 
need for internationally acceptable ethical standards of behaviour (employment, legal, 
fiscal, etc) in public life. The nation being assessed should have normal international 
relations nor engage in violent internal suppression or external aggression i.e. the absence 
of violence. Public protest must be allowed, but the safety and security of both energy 
system sites and the public be protected. NGOs should be allowed to campaign openly. 
The nature of the risk: In extremis instability may lead to public unrest affecting 
the ability to operate in a country or region. Instability also arises from a changing 
regulatory or policy framework. Both have an impact on operations and investment 
decisions. The presence of corruption or other unethical behaviours is a risk. Public protest 
(localised or orchestrated) poses a risk to the ‘licence to operate’. 
The causes of risk (Table 3.8): Poor institutional governance is a broad term which 
incorporates several elements which give rise to risks with different time-scales.  
1. If a Government or supra-national body were to lack an independent judiciary 
and/or have a weak legal system insufficiently robust to resolve disputes in a fair 
and reliable way, the impact on the ability to exploit the fuel source in that region 
could be severely hampered. The risk of investing finances and people in such a 
region would be significant. 
2. One possible consequence of poor institutional governance is the risk of corruption 
flourishing. The question is how significant is the concentration of the fuel source 
in regions where there is evidence of corruption taking place? 
3. Poor diplomatic relations has a strongly time-varying component. The state of 
international relations can fluctuate significantly and quickly. On the short-term 
scale, this presents a problem for security of supply rather than long-term ES. The 
key question is whether, if a Government or supra-national body were to be subject 
to international sanctions, there would be an impact on the contribution of fuel 
source at the system boundary. However, even subject to sanctions (trade, 
investment, or personal travel bans) fuel sources may still be exploited. 
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4. The ‘licence to operate’ can be interpreted in two ways. First, the legal licence to 
explore for and extract resources, or to own and sell premises for example. The 
inability to obtain licences may be as a result of corruption or other illegal activity. 
The second form is more subtle and predicated on the willingness of the citizens to 
allow unhindered the exploration, extraction, processing, or conversion of 
resources. Their concerns may be connected with ownership of land, environmental 
issues, access to jobs, or fair and equitable distribution of proceeds of sales. 
5. Connected with weak legal systems is the risk of a Government or supra-national 
body breaching contractual agreements. Short-term agreements are a security of 
supply issue rather than ES. The question is what would be the impact on the 
contribution of the fuel source at the system boundary should such a breach occur? 
 
The trigger of social instability and unrest may be poor governance. One 
consequence of the lack of a fully-functioning legal system (and police force) may be theft 
of the extracted fuel, processed energy vector, or infrastructure assets. But how significant 
might the impact be of a major or prolonged incident on supply of the fuel at the system 
boundary? An additional consequence is a heightened risk of kidnap (for ransom) of staff. 
This includes any unwillingness of external workforce to relocate, rather than placing this 
in the Skills category. Poor governance may also lead to volatility in the national economic 
activity (where the fuel source is located) – the question is whether uncertainty of fiscal 
policy or unstable inflation is a sufficiently serious issue with an impact at the system 
boundary. Furthermore, a well-governed nation will consult, consider and meet the 
concerns of a wide range of stakeholders i.e. mechanisms should exist for considering and 
reconciling the differing views of stakeholders (including non-state actors). 
In UK law landowners have no right to extract subsurface resources, namely Coal, 
Gas, Gas (unconventional), Oil, Oil (unconventional), and Thermal (geological) – 
ownership is retained by the Crown (Roberts, 2017). But a trespass case upheld by the 
Supreme Court in 2010 established that landowners did have the right to block anyone 
from deploying infrastructure such as piping, regardless of the operating depth. Thus, 
extraction licence-holders would have to negotiate with many landowners and the risk of 
denial of access would be significant. The Infrastructure Act of 2015 gave developers 
automatic access to ‘deep level land’ below 300 m (Burns et al., 2016). 
Protests against a local scheme or a national or international campaign organised by 
an NGO is ambiguous in relation to ES risks. The protests may bring about change in 
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policy to facilitate ES rather than pose a risk. As part of a US-UK cross country survey of 
attitudes toward shale gas extraction Evensen et al. (2017) also asked about support of 
some renewable and non-renewable fuels. They observed from the poll of UK adults (n = 
3823) that Hydro, Solar, and Wind received strong support to be part of the UK energy 
supply portfolio, Gas had less support (but still well-supported), whilst Biomass, Coal, Gas 
(unconventional), and Nuclear (fission) had the least (but similar) level of support. 
A changing policy or regulatory environment may be triggered by lobbying of 
politicians by industry actors or their representatives, NGOs, or public protests. A change 
is foreign policy may pose a risk.  
 
Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Denial of permission to 
access sites 
What impact if an individual, company, or Government were 
to prevent access to a specific site or region? 
Lack of social stability Are relevant nations or blocs subject to political unrest 
(including physical security of the workforce and assets from 
acts of sabotage and terror)? 
Changing policy or 
regulatory framework 
How significant would be (or has been) the impact on 
activities if a national or supra-national legislature were to 
change relevant laws, regulation, or policy direction? 
Poor institutional 
governance 
How significant is the concentration of activities in regions 
where there is evidence of weak or governance (corporate and 
legislative)? Levels of corruption, or law enforcement. How 
much confidence in the legal system to uphold agreements 
Disputed landrights or 
resource ownership 
How significant is the concentration of activities in regions 
where there is disputed landrights or ownership of resources? 
Insufficient rate of 
improvement in, or lack 
of enforcement of, 
standards and codes 
Are current regulations likely to be enforced and is there a 
record of improvement? This includes standards for vehicle 
emissions, quality and consistency of product, health and 
safety, and buildings codes. 
Significant public 
concern 
Protests (physical or online) against an activity representing 
each stage. 





The operation of sites and processes requires skills from basic manual tasks to specialised 
technical design and engineering expertise. The education sector should produce the 
variety of skills needed and sufficient numbers of people (capacity). The educated 
workforce should be flexible and the quality of the basic and advanced qualifications be 
reliable. 
The nature of the risk: The lack of availability, flexibility, and quality.  
The causes of risk (Table 3.9): For developed nations basic education levels can be 
assumed, with the differences showing in the supply of technicians and specialists. Most 
countries regard skills in the energy sector as important for the economy. Consequently 
there may well be restrictions on numbers of expatriate personnel employed, and 
requirements on employment and training of own nationals. Low levels of basic education 
or training will slow deployment rates and lower operational efficiency. 
 
Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Lack of basic education 
levels in the local 
workforce 
At the location of the activities, is there a sufficient supply 
of working-age citizens with basic numeracy and literacy? 
Lack of vocational training 
of the local workforce 
At the location of the activities, is there a sufficient supply 
of citizens trained with appropriate practical skills? 
Lack of specialists in the  
local workforce 
At the location of the activities, is there a sufficient supply 
of citizens with specialist skills or is it easy to persuade 
such people to relocate? 




The energy system should be reliable and with sufficient capacity to offer resilience when 
plant or infrastructure have planned or unplanned outages. Furthermore, the system should 
be safe with respect to the workforce and the environment. 
The nature of the risk: Human error, sometimes due to inexperience, in design, 
operation, and management, is the cause of technical risk. Consequences may be financial 
loss, wasted resource, injury and death, or a pollution event. Although a lack of resilience 
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in technical systems is in part due to design errors, constraints may have been imposed 
from decisions in other categories. 
The causes of risk (Table 3.10): Pollution episodes may arise due to inappropriate 
waste management. The consideration is whether or not there is an impact of a chemical or 
mechanical failure of the spoil / waste storage facility on the viability of that fuel source. A 
related risk is dealing with waste at the decommissioning stage. If it is not possible to 
safely and completely deal with waste, there may be consequences of whether the fuel 
source remains viable in the long-term. Whilst this is highly pertinent for long-lived 
radionuclides, it is not exclusive to the nuclear industry. It is useful to consider separately 
the risk of a pollution event caused by any type of stored waste after a site has ceased 
operating. Although the generation of highly toxic waste causes a risk, it is the handling of 
the waste that presents the principal risk. Operational failure also encompasses injuries and 
deaths as this is a management failure to implement health and safety standards at a level 
comparable with those in the UK. 
 
Cause of Risk Interpretation 
Pollution event How much impact from operational pollution events on the 
environment (including ecosystem services)? 
Unable to neutralise waste 
at decommissioning 
If the waste cannot be made safe at the decommissioning 




How much impact or delay would the lack of specialist 
equipment have on activities? 
Operational failure How much of an impact would an outage of a major 
facility have on the activities? The cessation of production 
may be due to equipment failure, human error, or 
management failure.  
Infrastructure failure How much of an impact would an outage of a major 
infrastructure link have on the activities? This could be 
failure of transport, transmission, distribution, ICT, or a the 
discovery of an equipment design flaw. 




3.4 The Risk Register 
Our register (Appendix A) is a matrix consisting of the risk score (likelihood multiplied by 
impact) generated from the risk matrix, a visual indicator of the consequence level, the 
location of the cause of risk (inside or outside of the system boundary, a note to remind the 
reader of the main technology or activity for which the risk assessment is being made, and 
the scale at which the risk manifests. 
We acknowledge that the completed risk matrix includes value judgements, but 
these have been taken on the basis of long experience, with support from literature and 
published sources, and a stakeholder consultation. The key point to note is that the final list 
of causes of risk remains generic, but that the numerical levels of impact and likelihood are 
specific to the nation or the bloc under consideration (the system boundary). It is important 
not to try to make a global risk assessment as this would be fruitless because there is great 
diversity in nations and their energy use. The detailed assessment (impact and likelihood) 
needs a sharp focus, but it is important to emphasise that the entries are not specific to 
projects or a company. 
As the risks identified are generic, each stage is considered separately for whether 
the cause of the risk is relevant to that particular stage – it is only the actions in the stage 
that contribute to the potential risk. In the register, the same risk may occur at more than 
one stage. Double-counting is avoided because risks are risks whenever they occur and the 
activities by which the risks may manifest may be different. There are a small number of 
exceptions to this; poor institutional governance and lack of social stability are recorded 
once only. However, the risk is re-evaluated and recorded a second time if a process chain 
crosses the system boundary i.e. consecutive stages move from having a ‘global’ location 
signifier to ‘UK’. The mechanism for selecting which causes of risks need to be considered 
for each stage is: 
1. These are risks at the location of the activity associated with that stage for that fuel 
source – this is independent of the system boundary. The ‘Principal Risk Location’ 
identifier signifies the sources data which should used to make the assessment. 
Many fuel sources will not only be scattered globally, but may also be present 
inside the system boundary. In many cases, however, the concentration of that fuel 
inside the boundary will be low. Where the source is relatively evenly balanced e.g. 
oil and gas, assess which source is increasing. A detailed disaggregated study may 
separate these sources and conduct analysis on both. 
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2. Does the cause of risk have an impact on whether the activities in the stage can 
proceed or not? If there is little likelihood of the cause of risk stopping or 
hampering the activity, it is unlikely to be a relevant cause of risk for that stage. 
3. If the level of the cause of risk were to fluctuate up and down without having an 
impact, then it is unlikely to be a relevant cause of risk for that stage. 
 
This is not to say that any prior knowledge from earlier stages is ignored, but that it 
contributes – directly or indirectly – to the level of the risk. In the first stage – exploration 
– lack of access to capital is not uniformly relevant to the fuel sources at all stages. For 
example, exploration for oil and gas is costly whether on- or off-shore, but for biogas 
minimal effort is required for exploration. For exploitation and conversion, access to 
capital is likely to be important for most fuel sources. A second– and more clear-cut – 
example is uncertain decommissioning costs. By definition, the decommissioning costs 
must be well understood for the exploration stage, even if they are less well understood for 
full-scale exploitation. A third example is that a changing policy or regulatory framework 
(in the UK) might not deter exploration of a particular fuel source in the first place 
(whether that was by a UK or non-UK company). Using this criterion, causes of risk which 
are not fully relevant to at least one fuel at a particular stage are eliminated from 
consideration at that stage. Another clear example of why it is necessary to only consider 
risks within the stage can be drawn from the distribution stage. Once a fuel has been 
converted to, say electricity, the infrastructure is blind to the original fuel source or the 
conversion technology used. 
Even so, the first stage (exploration) remains different in nature from the other 
stages since there is no possibility of material flow across the boundary as it is by 
definition not producing commercial volumes of resource. Exploration is only potential 
supply, not supply itself. Thus it does not seem to have an immediate impact on ES or risk 
to ES at the system boundary. The principle risk associated with exploration is that no 
resource is found, or for any discovered resource that the conditions to exploit it cannot be 
agreed upon. Scale of the risk is also important when considering which causes are most 
relevant. For example, a pollution event may occur at the exploration stage, but because for 
many fuel sources any exploration scheme is small by definition any spillage or escape of 
resource into the environment will have a limited impact. Once the most relevant causes of 
risk are identified for each stage, the specific issues for the nation or bloc within the system 
boundary are incorporated using the levels of impact and the likelihood. 
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The list of fuel categories needs to be thought about a little differently at the 
distribution and use stages – it is based on the final energy vector that is produced at 
conversion rather than the raw fuel source necessarily. For example, diverse fuel sources 
are converted into electricity by different technologies. However, it remains appropriate to 
keep the categories consistent since fuels for transport can be entirely different, with the 
fossil-derived vectors skipping the conversion stage (as defined). The impacts occur at the 
use stage where the public operate the ‘conversion’ devices. 
The conversion, distribution and use stages predominantly take place inside the 
system boundary. Thus at the point where the final list of risk causes is drawn-up, some of 
the causes of risk may not be strongly relevant for the case study under scrutiny. It should 
also be borne in mind that these three stages are more closely associated with security of 
supply (than ES per se). 
 
3.4.1 Principal Means or Technology Descriptors  
There are two reasons to create short high-level descriptors for each fuel supply chain at 
each stage: 1) to show how various stages have no physical meaning for some fuels, and 2) 
a simple reminder as the risk matrix is spread across six large tables. The descriptors for 
each stage of each fuel characterise the most important high-level element of that stage i.e. 
the technology used or the means by which activities occur.  
An implication for the risk matrix arising from co-located stages is that all the risk 
for that fuel supply chain is attached to the first of the merged stages. The other stage(s) 
merged with the first one are rated as zero risk. This is reasonable since once the first 
hurdle is overcome all other activities automatically follow. An interesting point is the 
possibility that although the first hurdle may be risky, the overall risk profile for the whole 
supply chain might be lower. By the same token, a set of merged stages might present a 
low risk as a prelude to a high risk stage. Analysts and commentators might easily focus on 
the low risk element (relating to a technology perhaps) without paying sufficient attention 
to the overall profile of the whole chain. Showing the whole profile in this way highlights 
the heterogeneity of risk in in fuel supply chains. 
 
3.4.2 The Scale of the Risks 
An interesting categorisation of the scale of risks to projects was proposed by (Bing et al., 
2005) and used by Ke et al. (2010). The idea is that the scale is categorised by the origin of 
the risk in relation to the system boundary. This, it is claimed, can help identify areas or 
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groups of risks that need treatment or monitoring. In particular ‘meso’ scale risks which 
Bing et al. consider are factors at the project scale, are different in nature to those arising 
from the relationships between actors involved within the project. We adapt this scheme 
(Table 3.11) and suggest that these definitions are likely to be useful for supply chains in 
general. 
 
Scale Definition for 
Projects (Bing et al) 
Definition for Food Supply 
Chains (Nakandala et al) 
Definition for Fuel 
Supply Chains (author) 
Micro Between agents 
within projects 




Supply chain operations 
beyond the company 
National (Governmental) 
Macro Beyond the project 
system boundary 
External to the supply chain International (widespread 
or treaty-governed) 
Table 3.11 Definitions for the scale of operation of a risk in fuel supply chains adapted 
from (Bing et al., 2005; Nakandala et al., 2017). 
 
The scale of any risk may be different at each stage for any fuel because the 
technology or activity required may be different. Furthermore, we need to account for 
entities within and outwith the system boundary. The decision of which level is most 
appropriate should be screened against the ‘principal risk location’ identifier. Therefore the 
principal risk location is defined as either ‘subject nation’ or Global. Stages with activities 
predominantly outside the system boundary will be labelled as ‘Global’, and inside the 
boundary as ‘subject nation’ e.g. UK. 
There are different implications for whether the micro, meso, macro scale is located 
as national or global. We suggest that appreciating the differences aids understanding of 
the risk profile and its dispersion. A more nuanced view of which fuels or parts (or 
proportions) of the supply chain are influenced by different scale actors may help shape 
approaches to policymaking. This is to say that micro and meso scale activities still have 
meaning in the international (Global) context. For example, governments set policy and 
regulate businesses – whether they are inside our outside the system boundary – but which 
stages and risk categories (or individual risks) are affected may change the way R&D 
programmes are funded perhaps, or may signal the need for negotiation or support for 
companies operating in that regime (if Global). Another example of the location difference 
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is that an NGO may protest internationally about the use of fossil fuels (a macro scale 
activity) but the same NGO could campaign to halt drilling at a site through the planning 
process (a micro scale activity). The national Government sets the planning rules and the 
relevant environmental regulations (a meso scale activity). We consider this avenue to be 
worth exploring. The three scales may be characterised as: 
 
Micro: company (or project) level which could include interactions between companies 
across the system boundary. Within the system boundary communities, regional 
authorities, or companies could be implementing projects or operating a specific site.  
 
Meso: a national Government has the ability (if it chooses) to regulate or control the 
activity. Whether this is the Government within the system boundary (the UK Government 
in the case study) or an exogenous Government depends on the nature of the issue. Some 
stages or fuels will have a similar issue within and without the system boundary. Activities 
or companies part of regulated markets, or governments subsidising R&D support, are a 
good examples. Another indicator of this level is a significant number of companies within 
the system boundary supplying technology and services for that stage of the supply chain 
of that resource. In a more disaggregated study, the detailed differences between 
Governments can be drawn out. 
 
Macro: generally taken to mean that the control rests with supra-national organisations, or 
that the market for the fuel source is dispersed internationally. Components of sub-systems 
are made by international or globalised companies. Projects, sites, or activities require 
international consortia which may raise finance directly from the international markets.  
 





Principal Risk Location 
Global UK 
Micro Site or activity outside the UK regardless 
whether a UK or non-UK company is 
conducting the activity 
Site or company activity 
within the UK. 
Meso Non-UK Government activity or sphere of 
influence 
UK only Government 
activity or sphere of 
influence 
Macro Activity dispersed internationally or influenced by a supra-national 
organisation 
Table 3.12 Definitions of scale for the UK case study with respect to the principal risk 
location. 
 
The Risk Score and Consequence Level 
First we define the likelihood and impact, and the consequence level implied by the risk 
score. Subject to the avoiding the pitfalls outlined in section 2.2.4 we draw on best practice 
guidelines for risk rating matrices given by (Standards Australia, 1999; IRM, 2013; Duijm, 
2015; Baybutt, 2018). 
Likelihood is commonly a five point scale, however, this is more appropriate for a 
clearly-defined project or well-bounded organisation such as a firm. Many of the risks to 
which a project or company are exposed are more readily described in detail where 
quantification is meaningful and often essential. For a high-level analysis of a system 
which has risks aggregated, it is not meaningful to quantify grouped risks in detail. 
Furthermore, as our study is examining long-term ES, the potential impacts of many risks 
which a national assessment needs to take into account are impossible to know in detail. 
The interesting and useful interpretation of long-term risks is in understanding the relative 
importance. Thus, broad bands representing likelihood are sufficient. For different types of 
risk, probability (number of occurrences of the risk per number of times the operation or 
action is carried out) or frequency may be more applicable. We have adopted a three-point 
frequency scale (Table 3.13). 
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Descriptor Level Frequency Definition 
Rare 1 < once per 10 y Only occur in exceptional circumstances 
Possible 2 Once per 10 y May occur 
Likely 3 Once per 1 y Expected to occur 
Table 3.13 Summary of the approximate timescales guiding the frequency of occurrence 
judgements. 
 
The descriptions of the impacts and their levels need to be scale-independent i.e. 
not be related only to project- or company-level activity, however, they must encompass 
such. Many risk analyses will use three or five levels to describe the impacts of identified 
risks. However, we have chosen a four-point scale (Table 3.14) to force the analyst away 
from a ‘middle way’ and to positively select a slightly above or slightly below average 
response. Furthermore, for high-level analyses across the full range of fuel supply chains, 
subtle distinctions for broad categories are not always meaningful. For project-level 
analysis greater disaggregation is essential for operation efficacy. We tested a five-point 
scale with ‘catastrophic’ as the most extreme impact (enforced cessation of activity), but 
found such a definition for unconventional fuels not to be particularly helpful. The four 
broader descriptors make it easier to capture the essence of the risk for a fuel at different 
stages in the supply chain. 
 
Descriptor Level Generic Definition 
Insignificant 1 Any impact is only at the edge of ‘normal’ or accepted 
operation. 
Minor 2 Recoverable short-term loss of activity, delay, or function. 
Moderate 3 Recoverable, but sustained delay, loss, or change in function. 
Major 4 Irrecoverable change or loss of function or enforced cessation 
of activity such as complete loss of fuel source, loss of life, 
closure of business / site / operation. 
Table 3.14 Summary of the definitions of the impact levels. 
 
As the product of the impact and likelihood scores (Table 3.15) determines the 
consequence level (Table 3.16) there cannot be overlap between these categories. In the 
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circumstances that we are using a four-point scale and not five, it is defensible to leave 
rare-major events out of the high level category. Thus, as there is a gap between six and 
eight, this is used to delineate the high and moderate consequence levels. Likewise, an 
insignificant impact that has a likely occurrence could be at the low or moderate level. We 
judge that a likely impact is not one that should automatically be considered as having a 
low level consequence. Our risk rating matrix obeys both of Cox’s lemmas governing the 
requirements for weak-consistency (Cox, 2008). 
 
   Likelihood 
   Rare Possible Likely 









Insignificant 1 1 2 3 
Minor 2 2 4 6 
Moderate 3 3 6 9 
Major 4 4 8 12 
Table 3.15 The possible combinations of likelihood and impact giving the risk score and 
consequence level. 
 
Consequence Level Required Response 
Low 
 
None – these risks are within the expected range for 
companies, governments, and societal organisations 
Moderate  
 
Ranges from ‘watching brief’ to some action required 
(technical or policy) 
High 
 
Mitigation plans must be in place, or policy needs immediate 
attention to formulate an alternative route to reduce the level 
Table 3.16 A guide for considering the broad meanings of the consequence levels 
determined by the risk assessment. 
 
3.4.3 Testing and Operation Methodology 
The methodology for testing the matrix to establish the relative levels between causes of 
risk in different fuel supply chains has four steps: 
1. test one cause of risk across the range of fuels at two stages,  
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2. select one renewable and one non-renewable fuel to test all sources of risk at the 
same stage, 
3. revisit step 1) and 2) to revise decisions as necessary, 
4. revisit and adjust definitions of causes of risk, and level and scale indicators. 
 
The risk of lack of access to capital was selected from Stage 2 (exploit) and Stage 4 
(convert) for the first step test. For the second step coal (non-renewable) and off-shore 
wind (renewable) were checked at stage 2 (exploit). Although this is not a large number to 
test, the number of individual entries is large enough to obtain consistency of assessment. 
We checked the relevance of risk causes for those fuel sources which have merged stages 
e.g. for Wind (offshore), the stages exploit, condition, and convert.  
 For risks which are not relevant to that fuel at that stage, or relevant to that stage at 
all, the risk matrix entry is highlighted in blue and scores as zero in the subsequent 
analysis. The merged stages for fuels such as wind are coloured grey; they too score zero. 
The zero score is justified as reflecting the lower risk associated with co-location of stages. 
A key difficulty with such a large matrix is consistency. Each set of risks, levels, 
and scales was checked against the meanings. Similar fuels were checked against each 
other to understand why any differences occurred. It remains the case that some causes of 
risks are uncommon. Such situations are assessed on a case-by-case basis and recorded as 
part of the discussion of the justification for the decision made. 
The evidence used to support the expert judgements of the likelihood and impact 
values is a type of meta-analysis in that we are using other studies and their observations 
(not usually directly articulated as risk) to inform our study. The methods for analysis of 
the risk matrix are discussed in chapter 9. 
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4 Assessing Risks for Renewables 
The renewables group includes the large- and small-scale fuels. We discuss selected 
decisions in the risk matrix (Appendix A). Mostly these risks discussed are those assessed 
as having the highest risk rating, but also some of those with moderate ratings. We also 
comment if the likelihood score is high, even if the impact is low, if this presents an 
interesting point. Furthermore, the selection is based on some elements in different stages 




In 2016 large-scale hydro generated approximately 3.7 TWh of electricity (BEIS, 2017c), 
about 2% of UK supply. Commonly, hydro schemes are considered to be a good option for 
reducing carbon emissions (Whittington, 2002), but there are concerns about the total 
lifecycle emissions (Turkenburg et al., 2012) due to factors such as rotting vegetation from 
the flooded area (Song et al., 2018). In the UK there are 105 hydro plants with a generating 
capacity of greater than 1 MW. Scott and Molyneux (2001) give a clear description of the 
dam constructions used in the UK, but Bartle and Hallowes (2005) suggest that greater 
emphasis will be placed on low-head hydro schemes in the future. 
 
Stage 1 
For the most part, the risk profile for hydro at this stage is the same as most renewables, 
though as all hydro projects are site specific (Turkenburg et al., 2012) determining the 
potential requires detailed studies. The major difference, however, is that there will be 
significant public opposition to large-scale hydro schemes (Bartle and Hallowes, 2005) and 
having the potential to scupper a scheme even at the study stage. 
 
Stages 2-4 
The capital requirement for a hydro scheme is sufficiently great (Turkenburg et al., 2012; 
Ansar et al., 2014; Song et al., 2018) that if the risk occurs, the scheme cannot go ahead. 
Severe weather events (natural hazards) such as unusually heavy rainfall can pose a risk to 
hydroelectric facilities. So too can drought (quality of fuel) as the generator station inlet is 
not located at the bottom of the dam. If the lake level falls too far the power plant cannot 
operate. In the longer term climate change may have an adverse impact (Carless and 
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Whitehead, 2013). We consider the need for critical materials to be similar to that of wind 
because of the turbines, likewise for materials substitutability. We judge that the 
manufacturing causes of risk are all moderate, in part due to the site-specific nature of 
these large projects.  
In the political category, the changing nature of UK policy will affect hydro in the 
same way as other renewables. However, the main risk is significant public concern. 
Opposition will not be restricted to the planning stage, but will continue into the early 
stages of construction too. However, it will be most likely to cause major delays but not 
derail the entire project. 
Hydro schemes are not free from causing pollution, for example the alteration of 
the natural flow regime, creation of barriers to fish migration, temperature changes to the 
downstream aquatic environment caused by dam discharges, and CO2 released by rotting 
vegetation once flooded (Song et al., 2018). Sediment transport is also a pollution event 
noted by Song et al. (2018), though Bartle and Hallowes (2005) do not consider this to be a 
significant problem in the UK. Although there have been notable dam failures even in 
Europe (Sovacool et al., 2016) with significant fatalities (Burgherr and Hirschberg, 2014) 
and property damage (Sovacool et al., 2015), we judge the likelihood of a failure in the UK 
to be low (though it would be catastrophic). 
 
Stage 5 
We judge the profile to be identical to that in section 8.1.1. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.1. 
 
4.2 Ocean (Tidal and Wave) 
There is a wide variety of devices to capture ocean energy with some (mostly tidal) 
schemes in test around the world (Turkenburg et al., 2012; Flynn, 2015; Khan et al., 2017). 
Activities in the UK have been reviewed by many authors (Kerr, 2005, 2007; Elliott, 2009; 
Bahaj, 2011; Lawrence et al., 2013) with a dedicated review of tidal barrages by Burrows 
et al. (2009) and wave energy converters by Rusu and Onea (2015). The total UK ocean 
energy resource has been estimated as 69 TWh yr
-1
 for wave and as 216 TWh yr
-1
 for tidal 
(stream, barrage, and lagoon) (The Crown Estate, 2012). Proponents claim that up to 40% 
 60 
of the UK electricity demand could be met by ocean energy alone (Bryden, 2006). More 
recently Gove et al. (2016) claimed that renewables (including wave and tidal) could meet 
the whole of the UK demand without encroaching on biologically or environmentally 
sensitive areas. However, they did not correlate resource and grid connectivity. Specific 
geographical areas have been assessed, for example wave energy for Scotland (Venugopal 
and Nemalidinne, 2015) and the UK’s western coast (Yates et al., 2013). 
 Specific sites have been studied in detail, for example the Severn barrage (DECC, 
2010b; Kelly et al., 2012; Binnie, 2016), the Swansea Bay lagoon (Fairley et al., 2013; 
Petley and Aggidis, 2016; Waters and Aggidis, 2016), and Cardiff Bay (Crompton, 2002). 
The development of test facilities for wave devices (‘Wave Hub’) is described by Greaves 
et al. (2009) and the Orkney and Edinburgh sites by (Lawrence et al., 2013). 
 Opinion of tidal schemes have changed markedly over time; Baker (1991) 
considering tidal schemes to be benign, but Flynn (2015) stating that they were the most 
controversial. Recent work has led to a subtle understanding that island communities do 
not hold the same opinions as rural communities in respect of ocean energy (de Groot and 
Bailey, 2016). 
 Although the risk levels are not identical for wave and tidal, they are sufficiently 




We judge that the risk profile broadly the same as for Wind (offshore), and note a number 
of issues particular to tidal and wave energy. The localised nature of wave energy 
persistence and distribution is noted (Coker et al., 2013) and that assessing its potential 
requires significant experimental facilities (Saulnier et al., 2012) and modelling capability 
(Venugopal and Nemalidinne, 2015). There are few organisations (including companies) 
with the capabilities, thus many detailed estimates for specific sites remain commercially 
confidential (Bahaj, 2011) leading to a lack of shared learning (Jeffrey et al., 2013). We 
note too that there are recent improvements to tidal stream measurement techniques (Sellar 
et al., 2015; Hashemi et al., 2016). On balance, we suggest that this raises the risk of lack 
of a well functioning market for measuring the potential resource to a moderate level.  
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Stage 2 
For tidal, Kolios et al. (2016) consider the economic category of risks to be the most 
significant. Many authors note that the lack of access to capital is the most important risk 
(Mueller et al., 2010; Bassi et al., 2015; Bjørgum and Sørheim, 2015; Vazquez and 
Iglesias, 2016). Leete et al. (2013 and BVG Associates (2015) specifically cite revenue 
support (subsidies) as a key issue for capital investment, and MacDougall (2017) suggests 
that the timing of investment is affected by investors balancing their portfolios as they 
exercise their options on multiple seabed licences. We judge this risk to be in the highest 
category for both wave and tidal – it is clear that major delays have been experienced by 
technology developers. For similar reasons to stage 1, there is evidence of a lack of a well 
functioning market. There is uncertainty in the knowledge of decommissioning costs for 
tidal since there is infrastructure to remove (a great deal in the case of barrages).  
 A difference between wave and tidal is in the risk posed by the quality of the fuel 
source (Bryden, 2006). The timing of tides is predictable and the volume flow rates too, 
but with less certainty since flow rates are spatially heterogeneous in three dimensions 
(Evans et al., 2015). However, for wave even inter-seasonal variability is hard to predict 
(Neill et al., 2014) this is in addition to wave activity being a wind-driven process. Thus 
we assign a moderate level to wave. Natural hazards also present different risks to wave 
and tidal. The surface is a much more rough environment with severe storms completely 
destroying some wave devices on test. Therefore we assign the highest possible rating to 
wave. But tidal schemes also face natural hazards, for example, storm surges (Lewis et al., 
2017) and sea-level rise due to climate change since the life-time of tidal barrages would 
be in excess of 100 years (Ahmadian et al., 2014). We consider the need for critical 
materials to be similar to that of wind because of the turbines, likewise for materials 
substitutability.  
 As wave and tidal are early-stage technologies we would expect the causes of risk 
in the innovation category to have some prominence. The most important of these is the 
lack of public subsidy for R&D  (Kolios et al., 2016) which is sensitive to many factors 
(MacGillivray et al., 2014) including: publicly-funded research centres (Corsatea, 2014), 
demonstration sites and R&D grants and co-funding (BVG Associates, 2015), and 
commercialisation (LCICG, 2012a; Leete et al., 2013). Overlapping with the state of the 
technology transfer environment is an interesting observation by Vantoch-Wood and 
Connor (2013) which they coined as the ‘Matthew effect’ – to those who have, more shall 
be given. This may lead to new developers being locked out of access to support, whereas 
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an existing developer with the same idea simply adding it to their existing portfolio might 
find it easier to obtain funding and other support as they are established. Zeyringer et al. 
(2018) claim that the UK market alone will not be large enough to bring costs down 
sufficiently to make wave and tidal competitive. Specific technology transfer issues noted 
are IP protection and spillover from other offshore industries (Foxon et al., 2005; LCICG, 
2012a). Although innovation is thriving (Bahaj, 2011) there is some risk that innovation 
may become incremental due to the trade-off between the current consensus and the desire 
for design variety (Jeffrey et al., 2013). In terms of lack of capacity to meet the R&D 
challenge, Jeffrey et al. (2014) suggest that multi-agency interactions have led to a lack of 
investment in test facilities for devices at TRL 5-6 stages. A lack of materials 
substitutability for structures has also been noted (LCICG, 2012a). We judge that these 
risks are at the moderate level. 
 The ability to construct sites (Manufacturing) is identified by Mueller et al. (2010) 
with foundations and installation vessels specifically mentioned by LCICG (2012b). BVG 
Associates (2015) recommend that grants are made for this activity. Like Wind (offshore) 
the lack of infrastructure construction (grid connections points for example) can lead to the 
cessation of a project. As the UK is the lead nation for marine renewables, the capacity to 
manufacture components specific to wave and tidal devices is identified by several authors 
(Mueller et al., 2010; Bahaj, 2011; MacGillivray et al., 2014; BVG Associates, 2015). 
LCICG (2012b) specifically mention blade manufacturing capacity as high risk. 
 The Political category of risk causes is broadly similar to that of Wind (offshore), 
however there are key differences stemming from the maturity of the technology. The 
greatest cause of risk is that posed by a changing landscape of policy and regulation. 
General descriptions of the turnover of policy mechanisms are given by Lawrence et al. 
(2013 and BVG Associates (2015) with Corsatea (2014) suggesting that this has a 
disproportionate effect upon financing. Leete et al. (2013) observe that the way policy 
change is communicated as well as predictability is important, however, Iskandarova 
(2017) shows how experience of devices in the water is important for influencing policy at 
this stage of the technology development. We suggest that this risk for both wave and tidal 
will be in the highest category, but as some test devices have been deployed the risk will 
stop short of causing a complete halt to activity. Although the management of the ocean 
space is transparent in the UK, Wright (2016) notes security of tenure for deployed devices 
may be an issue. 
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 The risk of significant public concern varies between wave and tidal. Wave devices 
may not raise a great deal of concern (Stokes et al., 2014) compared with tidal schemes, 
though a case study by Devine-Wright (2011) revealed public cynicism of political and 
planning procedures. Flynn (2015) notes some public concern due to the cost of subsidies 
being added to consumer electricity bills, though notes that the public are broadly 
supportive of wave and tidal. Public concern about marine renewables may be site specific, 
even for wave schemes (Bailey et al., 2011). For certain, high-profile schemes such as the 
Severn barrage have triggered well-organised opposition from special interest groups 
(Flynn, 2015) such as those interested in natural habitats (Jackson, 2011). Therefore we 
judge that this risk for Ocean (tidal) is likely to occur and could result in sustained, but 
recoverable, delays to projects. 
 Operational failure is the main Technical cause of risk. A minor point concerns the 
appropriate design of arrays to avoid shadowing or other interactions between individual 
devices, particularly for tidal stream (Vazquez and Iglesias, 2015; De Dominicis et al., 
2017). The problem, however, is the operability, survivability, and reliability of devices 
(Mueller et al., 2010), which shakes investor confidence (Leete et al., 2013). This is 
recognised as a greater problem for wave than for tidal (Kerr, 2007) with slam loads 
(Bryden, 2006) and maintenance (Gray et al., 2017) identified as especially important. For 
tidal-stream devices Bryden (2006) notes that installation in high-flux streams is extremely 
difficult since slack water may last only minutes to a few hours. 
 Pollution events have the potential to cause harm to human, other animal, and plant 
life. In the context of marine renewables this can also manifest as changing the 
environment in such a way as to disrupt feeding grounds or behaviour patterns. This risk is 
lower for wave than for tidal, but the impact on coastal process is an important impact to 
consider for the siting of each array (Iglesias and Carballo, 2014; Abanades et al., 2015). 
An authoritative study by Witt et al. (2012) note that there may be positive in addition to 
negative effects from wave arrays. The negative effects identified include habitat loss, 
entanglement and collisions, noise disturbance, and electromagnetic fields, whilst the 
positive effects might be the creation of artificial reefs and protected areas. 
 The potential pollution events for tidal stream and for barrages diverges somewhat. 
For barrages, Hooper and Austen (2013) review a wide range of impacts but are optimistic 
that nature and wildlife can adapt. However, there are mismatches in the views of priorities 
and levels of importance of impacts between stakeholders (Mackinnon et al., 2018). The 
impacts identified include the consequences of geomorphological changes (Pethick et al., 
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2009), hydrodynamical impacts (Angeloudis et al., 2018), eutrophication (Kadiri et al., 
2014), and sediment transport (Gao et al., 2013). Water quality issues for both barrage 
schemes and tidal stream are reviewed by (Kadiri et al., 2012). For tidal stream devices 
pollution events may arise from sediment transport (Neill et al., 2009; Martin-Short et al., 
2015), biofouling (Want et al., 2017), and permanent submergence of habitat and rising 
groundwater levels (García-Oliva et al., 2017). Pollution events which receive significant 
attention are those affecting birds (Masden et al., 2013; Waggitt and Scott, 2014; Garcia-
Oliva et al., 2017; Waggitt et al., 2017) and sea mammals (Dolman and Simmonds, 2010; 
Malinka et al., 2018; Nuuttila et al., 2018; Waggitt et al., 2018). Despite the clear evidence 
that a pollution event is likely to occur, we judge that the impact will only be marginal to 
continued operation of a site or array. 
 
Stage 5 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out for stage 5 of Wind 
(offshore) and section 8.1.2. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.1. 
 
4.3 Solar (electric) 
A potted history of PV in the UK is given by Smith et al. (2014) and Gul et al. (2016) 
review the more recent technical trends. We are basing our analysis on pure photovoltaic 
panels, though hybrid thermal systems for electricity, heating and cooling (Ramos et al., 
2017) and with hot water tanks (Parra et al., 2016) are being developed. The same is true 
for coupled battery storage systems whether for residential (Uddin et al., 2017) or 
commercial buildings (Mariaud et al., 2017). An interesting study by Ziyad and Stevenson 
(2018) reveals the complexity of the interactions between all of the stakeholders which 
lead to successful (or otherwise) deployment and operation of installations of all sizes. 
Their study goes some way to explaining why the adoption of PV is patchy and why some 





the UK is available for solar farms, potentially yielding 986 TWh annually. 
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Stage 1 
Solar irradiance levels are very well characterised in the UK (DECC, 2013a; Burnett et al., 
2014; Colantuono et al., 2014) and Palmer et al. (2017) add that understanding the 
distribution of PV in relation to demand is important. We see no significant risks to note. 
 
Stages 2-4 
The only notable cause of economic risk is lack of access to capital (Heiskanen and 
Matschoss, 2017; Curtin et al., 2018). The detailed issues are rate of return (Balcombe et 
al., 2014), installation costs (Balcombe et al., 2014; Balta-Ozkan et al., 2015), and 
subsidies (Allan et al., 2015). Polzin et al. (2015) contend that – for small to medium scale 
installations – FITs provide a better long-term signal of support than grants. However, 
Criscuolo and Menon (2015) caution that too generous FITs may discourage investment. 
Georgitsioti et al. (2014) point out that economic analysis of PV is sensitive to the 
assumptions made. 
 By definition solar energy is variable (quality of fuel), but we raise the impact from 
marginal to operations to short-term because of weather variability and experimental work 
suggesting that dust may have more effect than previously considered (Ghazi and Ip, 
2014). The lack of critical materials may occur (Davidsson and Höök, 2017) with Speirs 
and Roelich (2015) noting that thin-film PV cells are reliant on the availability of gallium, 
germanium, indium, selenium, and tellurium. Candelise et al. (2011) reviewed many 
assessments and found no prima facie evidence that indium and tellurium were likely to 
become scarce. However, their view is the minority, thus we judge that this is a moderate 
risk.  
 A brief timeline of PV innovation is given by Hanna et al. (2015). Although PV 
being relatively mature there remains significant scope for further improvement (Gul et al., 
2016; Moro et al., 2018).  One area noted which is lagging is building-integrated PV 
systems (LCICG, 2016a). Recent developments are introducing non-semiconductor 
materials (substitutability) and for semiconductor cells silver and selenium are potentially 
substitutable (Speirs et al., 2013a). 
The key manufacturing category risk is the insufficient rate of infrastructure 
construction. PV add stress to some parts of the electricity distribution network, but 
improves others where voltage droop is a problem. Large-scale solar farms will need new 
network connection points which have a geospatial distribution (Colantuono et al., 2014) 
which may not match the current network (Palmer et al., 2017). 
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 In the political category, changing policy and regulation is the most important 
cause of risk (Allan et al., 2015; Curtin et al., 2018). Candelise et al,( 2010) and Hammond 
et al. (2012) made the case for increasing the policy support to make PV financially viable 
for householders and commercial developers. However, the sudden downgrade in the FIT 
in 2012 (Muhammad-Sukki et al., 2013) revised downwards the return-on-investment 
(Cherrington et al., 2013) which discouraged householder investment (Martínez Ceseña et 
al., 2018) and consequently many installation companies went out of business (Snape, 
2016; Hanna et al., 2018). Allied to the boom of installations Hanna et al. (2018) suggest 
that standards and codes were unevenly enforced. 
 A second cause of risk in the political category is that of significant public concern, 
or rather resistance in the case of PV and other distributed generation (Allan et al., 2015). 
Willingness to pay (separate from access to capital) is noted by several authors (Faiers and 
Neame, 2006; Scarpa and Willis, 2010), but financial support alone is insufficient to 
increase uptake of PV (Bergman and Eyre, 2011; Fleiß et al., 2017). The difficulty in 
finding trustworthy advice, aesthetics, and the attitudes of neighbours are identified by 
Balcombe et al. (2014). However, Moran and Natarajan (2015) suggest that barriers to 
installation on historic buildings can be overcome. At the community level Clark and 
Roddy (2012) observe that engagement leads to trade-offs during negotiations leading to a 
sub-optimal solution. However, they regard this as a better outcome than outright rejection 
of the plans. We judge this risk to be moderate with short-term impacts only. 
 Although not a serious risk (operational failure) Allan et al., 2015 and Harrison and 
Jiang (2018) note the performance gap between modelled or predicted output and actual 
performance of installations. Also relating to operational failure are accident statistics. The 
figure for solar is 0.019 fatalities per TWh generated and this figure is lower for smaller 
installations (Sovacool et al., 2015). A modest-level cause of risk is the ability to neutralise 
waste at decommissioning, even the modules (Bogacka et al., 2017). For example thin-film 
PV cells exploit cadmium telluride and other hard to treat compounds (Turkenburg et al., 
2012), chalcogenide/silicon cells contains elements such as cadmium, indium, selenium, 
and gallium (Lunardi et al., 2018), and the prospective perovskite cells contain lead 
(Alberola-Borràs et al., 2018). 
 
Stage 5 




We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.1. 
 
4.4 Solar (thermal, water) 
Solar collectors for producing hot water for sanitary use are a set of mature technologies 
(Chaudry et al., 2015), and considered by Turkenburg et al. (2012) to be the simplest way 
to harness solar energy. The number of installations in the UK is modest, though the 
carbon payback time is approximately two years (Allen et al., 2010). A more extensive 
LCA study comparing different water heating technologies (Greening and Azapagic, 2014) 
suggests that solar collectors do not necessarily out-perform other technologies on a wide 
range of environmental indicators. This work was replicated by Piroozfar et al. (2016). 
Recently, thermal systems have been hybridised with PV (Buker et al., 2014; Herrando and 
Markides, 2016), and integrated with facades of commercial buildings (Zhang et al., 2015). 
 
Stage 1 
We consider the risk profile to be identical to that of Solar (electric) in section 4.3 except 
for optimism bias which we judge to be higher since sunlight levels for thermal installation 
are less well characterised and modelled. 
 
Stages 2-5 
The UK market for solar collectors is mature, but with only a modest number of 
manufacturers (Chaudry et al., 2015). Access to capital is a cause of risk as solar hot water 
systems are more expensive than conventional gas boilers (Caird et al., 2008) requiring 
financial support (DECC, 2013b; Connor et al., 2015). Decommissioning costs might not 
be clear since components need to be removed from a roof, rather than a simple 
replacement compared with a gas boiler, however, we judge that these costs are marginal. 
The operation of these installations will be determined by the solar irradiation 
levels (the fuel), therefore the quality of the fuel is variable. The likelihood of variability is 
certain, but we expect this to be at the margins of performance. Unlike most other heat 
sources, snow and high wind (natural hazards) may present a risk. We judge any disruption 
to be short-lived. The technology is less mature than alternative systems, so we suggest 
that further improvements may emerge. Boait et al. (2012) note an interesting trade-off. 
The trend to install gas-fired ‘combi’ boilers (with no storage tank) is encouraging house-
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builders to use the space saved for other purposes in new houses, which may hamper future 
Solar (thermal, water) installations. 
Policy uncertainty is a key issue for heat (Turkenburg et al., 2012; Chaudry et al., 
2015) and place this cause of risk in the highest category. Alongside other low carbon 
heating technologies there is evidence that the public has significant concerns about the 
performance and reliability of this technology (DECC, 2013b; Ipsos MORI and Energy 
Saving Trust, 2013). We judge that the risk is moderate but less severe than for heat pumps 
because the principles of the technology are more similar to conventional hot water 
systems. A pollution event is not relevant for this system. 
 
Stage 6 
We consider the use of onsite heating systems for this fuel and note the following 
deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. Because stages 2-5 are unified, the 
notion of a well-functioning market refers to the installed domestic heating system 
components such as radiators, pumps and storage tanks. For the most part, these are 
common components with firms manufacturing and installing such systems. We note that 
Lowes et al. (2018) suggest that suppliers of such components are at risk in a low carbon 
transition, thus we elevate the likelihood of the risk occurring. The R&D capacity is a 
lower risk compared with gas-fired systems because we are only considering components 
inside buildings. 
As the sun intensity varies and the hot water store is of limited capacity, there may 
be variability in the quality of the heat available. We judge this to be a moderate risk with a 
short-term recoverable impact. We note that as this fuel is tied closely to a single type of 
device located at a site, the public concern is dealt with in earlier stages.  
 
4.5 Thermal (low temperature) 
For our purposes the key technologies are ground source heat pumps (GSHPs) and ground 
water heat pumps (GWHPs). Lucia et al. (2017) give a useful typology of the key variants 
and their characteristics. We exclude air source heat pumps (ASHPs) as in our 
classification (see section 3.1) they are a form of  solar energy (the air is heated mostly by 
the sun) and cannot store thermal energy. GSHPs and GWHPs are acting as a thermal store 
from where thermal energy (the ‘fuel’) can be extracted; the ground temperature (at 1-2 m 
depth) is reasonably constant through the year (Busby, 2015). The use of GSHP close to 
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underground railway tunnels has been proposed as a way to increase heat transfer away 
from the tunnels to reduce overheating for passengers (Revesz et al., 2016). 
The origins of GSHP development in the UK can be traced back to the eighteenth-
century (Banks, 2016). Staffell et al. (2012) given a useful overview of heat pumps for 
residential use. For commercial buildings, an interesting but limited heat pump system 
suitable for heating and cooling exploits seawater (Goodier et al., 2013), and an example of 
GWHP use is the cooling system for the Royal Festival Hall in London (Oldmeadow et al., 
2011). Farr et al. (2017) mapped, for the first time, city-wide groundwater temperatures (of 
Cardiff). There is overlap with the systems proposed for heat recovery from minewater, but 




We consider the risk profile to be identical to that of Solar (electric) in section 4.3. We 
note that improved modelling of ground thermal resources can improve the assessment of a 
site (Herbert et al., 2013; Younger, 2015). 
 
Stages 2-5 
The UK market for GSHPs and GWHPs is not mature with only a modest number of 
manufacturers (Chaudry et al., 2015) and market failure of equipment manufacturers has 
been recognised (LCICG, 2016b). These technologies are complicated to install and, in the 
case of systems large enough for commercial buildings, requiring significant groundwork 
which leads to a high cost. The long period for return-on-investment (Oldmeadow et al., 
2011) may give rise to significant delays or even scupper some projects, however, 
subsidies are available (Connor et al., 2015). Therefore access to capital may be an issue, 
but we do not consider it to be in the highest category. For such large or complicated 
systems the costs for decommissioning may not be wholly transparent, unlike ether onsite 
technologies. 
 The consistent temperature at depth gives assurance of fuel quality, but we note 
that these conditions are localised to the site. We consider natural hazards not to be 
relevant for this fuel. 
The technology is less mature than alternative systems, so we suggest that further 
improvements may emerge. LCICG (2016b) suggest that there is a strong case for public 
sector intervention to drive the required R&D. 
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Policy uncertainty is a key issue (Chaudry et al., 2015) with Vijay and Hawkes 
(2017) suggesting that support needs to be stronger than at present. We place this cause of 
risk in the highest category. There is evidence for some lack of enforcement of rules and 
codes when under-sized GSHPs were installed in new housing developments simply to 
meet the renewable onsite generation target (Rees and Curtis, 2014; Younger, 2015). This 
corner-cutting forms part of the evidence that the public has significant concerns about the 
performance and reliability of this technology (Ipsos MORI and Energy Saving Trust, 
2013) and sectors such as care homes for the elderly are strongly risk averse to technical 
failures (Neven et al., 2015). A study by Delta Energy and Environment (2012) suggests 
that awareness amongst the public contributes to this anxiety, and for GWHP systems the 
lack of precedence contributes to performance scepticism (Oldmeadow et al., 2011). 
Amongst others, Staffell et al. (2012) and Garber et al. (2013) note design-performance 
gaps for installed GSHP systems; we view this as a cause of technical risk. One further 
noteworthy cause of risk is that of overload of the LV electricity distribution network. 
There is significant concern that the widespread electrification of heating will require grid 
reinforcement (Navarro-Espinosa and Mancarella, 2014; Love et al., 2017). 
 
Stage 6 
We consider the use of onsite heating systems for this fuel and note the following 
deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. Like Solar (thermal, water), this 
stage is only concerned with the components required to transport heat around the 
building. For residential systems these will be different from Solar (thermal, water), and 
more complicated. For large systems in commercial buildings, common heating 
components such as radiators may be used. Access to capital is included in earlier stages as 
it is a single integrated system. Decommissioning costs might not be clear since 
components may be non-standard but we judge that these costs are a modest level risk. 
As the components inside the building may be more complicated than for current 
gas-fired systems, we judge that improvements through innovation are likely. We observe 
that there is some optimism about the performance, and we elevate the likelihood of the 
risk accordingly. 
All types of heat pump are slow acting so require buildings to be of sufficiently 
high thermal efficiency. The most important risk facing heat pumps is that of not 
constructing or refurbishing enough buildings to the required standard. Despite this widely 
accepted requirement McMahon et al. (2018) have demonstrated that a so-called 
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‘impossible to heat home’ can have a GSHP designed and installed to operate adequately. 
However, the design and installation process took approximately two years and the 
experimental seasonal performance factor is given as 2.9, which is low for a GSHP. We 
note that as this fuel is tied closely to a single type of device located at a site, the public 
concern is dealt with in earlier stages. However, Boait et al. (2011) and Caird et al. (2012) 
observed that some consumers were dissatisfied with the controls for their heat pumps. A 
pollution event from leakage of one of the heat transfer fluids is unlikely to occur, but 
should one manifest it will only cause short-term recoverable impact. 
 
4.6 Wind (off and onshore) 
The similarities of on- and off-shore wind extend beyond the engineering of the device and 
the infrastructure. The key differences are discussed stage by stage. Wide-ranging reviews 
of wind resources are given by Esteban et al. (2011) and Turkenburg et al. (2012). Gove et 
al. (2016) estimate that only 0.4-0.6% of the UK seabed is available for fixed base turbines 





. However, Gove et al. do not attempt to correlate their estimates with 
likely grid connection points. A useful overview of the issues facing the UK offshore wind 
industry is given by BVG Associates (2016). A comprehensive study of offshore wind 
speed variabilty has been conducted by DNV GL (2016) on behalf of The Crown Estate. 
For onshore wind, Gove et al. estimate that 2.4% of the UK has sufficient wind resource 
and has a low biodiversity sensitivity, potentially yielding 140 TWh per annum. There are 
a wide range of learning curves associated with wind power development, but it is likely to 
be incremental (E. Williams et al., 2017). 
 
Stage 1 
Overall, we consider there to be very little risk or possible impact. However, exploring 
offshore is more expensive than onshore and we consider that lack of access to capital 
might pose a risk, but if it occurred would only delay prospecting for a short period. 
Access to offshore sites is subject to weather conditions and may introduce delays, but not 
have a lasting impact. The risk of a natural hazard occurring is notable at this stage, but is 
only likely to introduce delays without risk to personnel or equipment. 
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Stages 2-4 
The risk of a lack of access to capital for onshore schemes is considered to be low (Bassi et 
al., 2015), in part because cost reductions for onshore installations may be greater than for 
offshore (Wiser et al., 2016). Despite this Allan et al. (2015) suggest that onshore schemes 
still need subsidies, and Curtin et al. (2018) point out that FITs are insufficient to 
overcome the barrier to capital for community-owned schemes. The capital intensity of 
offshore schemes engenders an increased likelihood (Criscuolo and Menon, 2015). The 
level of investment required scales with distance to the shore (cable length) and depth of 
water (Voormolen et al., 2016), but Weaver (2012) suggests that the cost of capital is more 
important than the site to the cost of the electricity generated. Operating costs are also 
greater for offshore installations (Esteban et al., 2011). Wiser et al also consider that the 
learning rates for offshore wind are underestimated, which may help explain why port 
facilities in the North East of the UK have been attracting speculative investment in 
specialist staging facilities (BVG Associates, 2016). Some concern about a lack of 
competition in the offshore turbine market is noted by Voormolen et al. (2016), however 
they consider that this is likely to manifest as increased capital expenditure (rather than as 
delays in production and delivery). Overall our judgement is that the risk of a lack of 
access to capital is moderate in both cases. It is unlikely that the price of permits (offshore) 
cannot be agreed on (by auction), but should it occur a project will be halted. 
 Physical access to offshore sites is clearly an issue with installation and 
maintenance only possible at certain times of the year. The offshore environment can be 
hostile and a severe storm could cause sufficient damage to give a prolonged delay in 
repair. The future variability of wind speed (quality of fuel source) due to climate change 
creates long-term uncertainty (Hdidouan and Staffell, 2017). The lack of critical materials 
may occur (Kim et al., 2015) with Speirs et al. (2013b) noting that rare earth elements are 
the most important. We judge that this is a moderate risk.  
 Wind turbine development has been taking place for in excess of 60 years and that 
industry moved into the commercialisation phase in the 1980s (Hanna et al., 2015). 
Despite this level of maturity Gross and Watson (2015) maintain that innovation for Wind 
(offshore) still requires public subsidy.  
The risk arising from an insufficient rate of infrastructure construction is significant 
for both on- and off-shore wind. We consider the scale of the risk for Wind (offshore) as 
meso because this requires a National Grid HV connection at landfall. Although BVG 
Associates (2016) note that there is sufficient specialist port capacity (a micro scale risk). 
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For Wind (onshore), the connection will usually be made on the distribution network 
owned and operated by a regionally defined DNO. Queuing for grid-connection is 
recognised as a cause of delay in deploying approved wind farms (IRENA, 2012). The 
likelihood of the risk occurring is frequent and the impact would be to cause a cessation of 
the project if permission were denied or delayed beyond the point that investors were 
willing to continue their support. Furthermore, recent UK Government policy changes to 
financial support (DECC, 2015b)  and planning consent have increased the likelihood of 
this risk arising. The UK has lacked domestic industrial base for component manufacturing 
capacity (IRENA, 2012). 
 The changing landscape of UK energy policy and regulation with respect to wind is 
noted a major concern (Allan et al., 2015; Bunn and Yusupov, 2015; Hdidouan and 
Staffell, 2017). A clear overview of recent policy changes given by Curtin et al. (2018) is 
more relevant to onshore wind. Poorly crafted policy may lead to increased costs in power 
generation (Wiser et al., 2016), for example, the CfD mechanism restricts pre-competition 
co-operation (BVG Associates, 2016). 
Disputed landrights is not a particular issue for on- or off-shore wind, but for Wind 
(onshore) access to a site may be controlled by a different or multiple parties which has the 
potential to completely halt a project. The insufficient rates of improvements in codes are 
relevant only to the conversion stage e.g. grid codes for power conditioning and quality 
(such as harmonics) prior to injection into the network; we judge this a low-level risk.  
Significant public concern presents an interesting difference in risk between on- 
and off-shore wind. (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) suggest that public acceptance has three 
elements, namely socio-political, community, and market acceptance. For Wind (offshore) 
both the level of risk and the potential impact are low, though it is interesting to note that 
concern may be raised by the fishing community (Hooper et al., 2015). For Wind 
(onshore), the lack of community acceptance is often articulated as visual intrusion 
(Gibbons, 2015; Jones and Eiser, 2010; Sims et al., 2008). Although not all communities 
oppose wind farms, almost all proposals for onshore wind projects will attract protest. 
Elliott (2003) gives a clear account of the development of public reactions by using several 
UK case studies. Elliott (2003), Breukers and Wolsink (2007), and Clark and Roddy 
(2012) emphasise the need for negotiation at the local level, with Wolsink (2007) 
suggesting that opposition may be driven by equity and fairness in decision-making; 
particularly in relation to the planning system (Haggett, 2011; Krohn and Damborg, 1999). 
The impact on the value of housing is often cited as a reason to oppose wind farm 
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development (Allan et al., 2015). Wilson and Dyke (2016) show that in many 
communities, opposition diminishes over time post construction. However, for Wind 
(onshore) public opposition has indirectly contributed to the removal of support by the 
Government through the Renewables Obligation mechanism (DECC, 2015b) – a lack of 
socio-political acceptance. 
In the Technical category, the most important risk is that of infrastructure failure. 
Although the risk is low, the impact could be sustained (though recoverable). Although not 
an issue in the UK, globally wind power accounted for a third of all accidents at our stages 
2-4 (Sovacool et al., 2015). Using a subset of these data (1950-2014) Sovacool et al. 
(2016) categorise wind as high risk in respect of accidents because the frequency of 
occurrence was relatively high, but the number of fatalities low i.e. low impact incidents.  
Dockerty et al. (2014) give an overview of the impacts on natural capital – broadly 
interpreted as pollution events in the technical category – across all stages. 
Decommissioning in the marine environment presents some difficulties and may lead to a 
pollution event. The main issue is with removing foundations (Kerkvliet and Polatidis, 
2016) which may require the use of explosives (Kaiser and Snyder, 2012). It is not obvious 
that operating wind turbines might be the source of a pollution event – the likelihood of a 
release of lubricants, say, is very small. However, interference with wildlife and noise 
could be considered as ‘pollution’ as the turbine is creating the disturbance. Harvey (2010) 
suggests that there is no evidence of a noticeable problem from operating noise or bird 
deaths due to colliding with blades and towers (Masden and Cook, 2016; Warwick-Evans 
et al., 2018). Regarding onshore turbines, early designs suffered from both mechanical and 
aerodynamic noise (Lago et al., 2015) but mechanical noise has been eliminated and 
aerodynamic noise much reduced (in part through better operating regimes). There is 
evidence that some people have suffered ill health from the proximity to wind turbines 
(Knopper and Ollson, 2011) but this is more due to stress caused by seeing the turbines 
than noise. It has been noted by Kikuchi (2010) that noise from offshore turbine arrays 
may deter fish, though Perrow et al. (2011) suggest that this effect is greater during 
construction, but that there is a knock-on effect for birds as their food source is disturbed. 
However, for impacts on wildlife Green et al. (2016) suggest that the evidence is not clear, 
with Lago et al. (2015) and Langston (2013) considering the impact on birds not to be 
trivial. Lago et al. (2015) suggest four risks: collisions, habitat disturbance (including from 
maintenance), interference with movement patterns, and the reduction of available habitat. 
The scale of deaths of birds from wind installations is of the order of a hundredth that due 
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to cars or pesticides (Erickson et al., 2005). Furthermore, Pearce-Higgins et al. (2012) 
found that the effects on birds were greater during the relatively short construction phase 




The basic description of the risks arising at this stage are discussed in sections 8.1.1 and 
8.1.2. The ability to construct  the infrastructure is a significant difference between on- and 
off-shore. The equipment required for Wind (onshore) is widely used in the construction 
industry. Separate from public concern is the risk from the denial of access to new sites for 
pylons for new Wind (onshore) installations. Individual landowners may withhold rights of 
access for different reasons, as part of negotiations but the impact may be more than short-
lived. Public concern about the (generally) new pieces of network that wind farms require 
is almost always attracts formal objections (Cohen et al., 2014, 2016). Thus we put the 
likelihood at the highest level, but the impact is recoverable. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.1. 
 
 76 
5 Assessing Risks for Renewables (Biofuels) 
We discuss selected decisions in the risk matrix (Appendix A) for the biofuels fuel group 
(all of which are classed as renewable). Mostly these risks are those assessed as having the 
highest risk rating, but also some of those with moderate ratings. We also comment if the 
likelihood score is high, even if the impact is low, if this presents an interesting point. 
Furthermore, the selection is based on some elements in different stages being repetitive 
and some fuels being similarly sharing characteristics.  
 
5.1 Biogas 
There is a wide variety of technologies and routes to produce biogas (Watkins and 
McKendry, 2015a, 2015b). This is in part due to the variety of feedstocks, including farm 
wastes (Oreggioni et al., 2017), sewage sludge (Mills et al., 2014), food waste (Evangelisti 
et al., 2014), and algal biomass (Montingelli et al., 2015). Biomass wastes and residues can 
also be gassified (Faaij et al., 1997; Wang et al., 2008) to produce syngas (Guo et al., 
2015) which can be upgraded to a liquid transport fuel (Patterson et al., 2011). The other 
important source is landfill gas (LFG) (Brown and Maunder, 1994) which must be 
captured (or vented) for safety. Frank et al. (2017) suggest that bacterial stimulation may 
be possible to enhance gas production.  
The technology which we take as the case study for our assessment is anaerobic 
digestion (AD) which is well-established (Styles et al., 2016). Biomethane production 
using AD can meet the specification for direct injection to the gas grid (Fubara et al., 
2018). Technology development has focused on farms (Gowreesunker and Tassou, 2016) 
and shown that bigger units are more efficient (Oreggioni et al., 2017). There remains 
some uncertainty about the merits on onsite use in a CHP unit versus grid injection. Mills 
et al. (2014) claim that grid injection is economically the best option but is poor for the 
environment, whilst Watkins and McKendry (2015b) state that onsite use is always the 
worst option (in part because of the very much higher efficiency of CCGTs). Our view is 
that AD is scalable because it can produce methane at grid specification and will base our 
assessment on this assumption. 
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Stage 1 
We do not see any significant causes of risk at this stage. Though we note that the quality 




Note that this stage includes growing and gathering the fuel source, as appropriate. The 
main risk of the stage occurs in the Environment category and is the quality of the fuel 
source i.e. the variability (Zglobisz et al., 2010; Röder, 2016) e.g. some sources are 
seasonal. The variability in water content is only relevant to Stage 3. Natural hazards such 
as too much rain in the wrong part of the growing season or lack of sunshine will not affect 
the gathering of the crop, only the quality. We judge that this risk may occur and may lead 
to a significant temporary (annual or seasonal) change, but the crop is unlikely to fail in the 
UK. This is a risk which may be sensitive to climate change in the long term. Court (2017) 
suggests that this variability is less of a problem for syngas production.  
 
Stage 3-4 
Access to capital is recognised as a risk for AD whether at the single farm scale or larger 
(Watkins and McKendry, 2015b). Specifically, the rate of return (Tranter et al., 2011) and 
the cost of landfill (Zglobisz et al., 2010) are noted as the main influences. In the past the 
lack of access to capital has been a problem for LFG (Brown and Maunder, 1994). 
Although the water content of the feedstock is an important signifier of the quality 
of the fuel source, it is the carbon to nitrogen ratio which is the principal factor (Divya et 
al., 2015). We consider this to be a moderate risk, but perhaps the most significant for this 
stage. 
Despite AD being relatively mature, there is evidence of R&D potential in, for 
example pretreatment processes (Carrere et al., 2016). LCICG (2012a) note that R&D for 
AD will require continued public support. We suggest that the lack of public support 
programmes may occur, but might only lead to short-term disruption of activity. 
Connectivity of the gas grid (insufficient rate of infrastructure construction) is an issue for 
farms and other installations not located near urban areas, for example landfill sites 
(Brown and Maunder, 1994). 
Although unlikely to occur, some farm tenancies may prohibit the deployment of 
facilities such as AD (Tranter et al., 2011) but if this were to occur it would stop a project 
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completely. A risk more likely to occur is public concern through objections lodged to 
planning applications (Tranter et al., 2011; Clark and Roddy, 2012); this also occur for 
LFG (Brown and Maunder, 1994). Changing policy and regulation is recognised as a risk 
(Edwards et al., 2015; Röder, 2016). The uncertainty in support mechanisms (LCICG, 
2012b) led to fluctuating levels of subsidy compared with PV and wind (Tate et al., 2012), 
which Gowreesunker and Tassou (2016) observe as policy driving technology and not 
environmental considerations. 
In the technical category, pollution events will occur (Röder, 2016). Biogas 
combustion cannot be CO2 neutral even when using wastes. The AD process will generate 
fugitive methane emissions (Adams et al., 2015) including from the storage of digestate in 
open tanks and lagoons (Styles et al., 2016), which also have the potential to leak. 
Operational failures may occur, but should only lead to short-term disruption. Although 
fatalities are rare in the UK they do occur in biogas production (Burgherr and Hirschberg, 
2014; Sovacool et al., 2016), likewise for other accidents (Sovacool et al., 2015). 
 
Stage 4 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 6.2 (Gas). 
 
Stage 5 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in sections 8.1.3 
(pipelines) and 8.1.1 (electricity networks). 
 
Stage 6 
We consider the use of onsite heating systems for this fuel and do not see the need for any 




Here we consider the biomass sources most frequently proposed as suitable for conversion 
and upgrading to liquids, since the discourse has focused on biofuels as a substitute for oil 
(Levidow and Papaioannou, 2013). The key sources are corn (Acquaye et al., 2012), 
macro-algae (Gegg and Wells, 2017; Membere and Sallis, 2018), Miscanthus (Shemfe et 
al., 2016), rapeseed (van Duren et al., 2015), straw (Glithero et al., 2013a; Littlewood et 
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al., 2013),  starch slurry (UKPIA, 2016), sugar beet (Cárdenas-Fernández et al., 2017), 
tallow (RAE, 2017), waste cooking oil (Acquaye et al., 2012), and willow (LCICG, 




 generation) is more concerned 
with better exploiting waste and by-products (Awudu and Zhang, 2012), the tension 
between land use for food versus fuel remains relevant (Kim et al., 2013). The discussion 
is turning to multi-purpose land-use to increase yields (Shortall et al., 2015) and Whitaker 
et al. (2018) give a useful overview of emissions arising from direct and indirect land-use 
change. For macro-algae production at scale, artificial cultivation will be required (Roberts 
and Upham, 2012) and may turn the discussion to inshore waters which are also suitable 
for fish farming. Roberts and Upham suggest that siting seaweed farms amongst offshore 
wind farms is a possibility. 
 Whilst there are some biochemical similarities between sources of biomass, the 
possible processing methods may be very different even for the same source (LCICG, 
2012b). Milledge and Harvey (2016) show that for dry macro-algae direct combustion, 
pyrolysis, gasification, and trans-esterification to biodiesel are all possible processing 
routes, whilst for wet macro-algae hydrothermal treatment, fermentation, and AD are 
feasible. Gassified biomass (syngas) – or other biogas (Patterson et al., 2011) – can be 
liquefied using the Fischer-Tropsch process (Wang et al., 2008). Figure 5.1 summarises 
some general processing routes for biofuels. The hydrothermal liquefaction of biomass 
(Raikova et al., 2017) is a step towards biorefineries (Taylor, 2008a). Using data from the 
historical development of the UK petrochemical sector Bennett and Pearson (2009) make a 
strong case for co-evolving fuel and chemicals production in biorefineries to produce high-
value molecules such as pharmaceutical intermediaries (Cárdenas-Fernández et al., 2017). 
 
Stage 1 
We do not see any significant causes of risk at this stage. Though we note that the quality 
of fuel source will be variable from year to year and Acquaye et al. (2012) note the wide 
variations in potential CO2 savings from different sources both of which add uncertainty to 
measuring the potential.  The geographical location of where crops are grown is an 
important factor (van Duren et al., 2015). 
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There are a few practical differences from Biogas which could arise, however, broadly we 
consider that the risk values are similar. Note that this stage includes growing and 
gathering the fuel source, as appropriate.  
 The quality of the fuel source is not an important risk for gathering of the source, 
though Firrisa et al. (2014) note that the quantity available may depend on fertilizer inputs. 
Water availability is not currently an issue in the UK, but will manifest periodically and 
may become more important in the future (Hammond and Li, 2016). The requirements for 
different sources varies widely (RAE, 2017). 
Growing macro-algae whether inshore of farther out to sea requires a lease to use 
the seabed from The Crown Estate (Gegg and Wells, 2017) and it is coupled with 
obtaining a licence from the relevant maritime regulator. Thus access to sites may be 
denied. Each part of the UK has a different regulator, but each requires potential seaweed 
farms to conduct an environmental impact assessment (Wood et al., 2017). Even though 
Roberts and Upham (2012) consider the impact assessment stage difficult to satisfy we 
judge this is unlikely to occur, but may cause short-term delays in starting a venture. 
(Roberts and Upham, 2012). The capital requirement for starting a seaweed farm, say, may 
pose a risk. The Royal Academy of Engineering note that standards and codes for 
categorising wastes and residues are needed to avoid distorting the market (RAE, 2017). 
Public concern may arise connected with seaweed farms as it may affect marine users 
(Roberts and Upham, 2012). We consider that the use of genetically modified crops for 
fuel production is now very unlikely. 
 For the purposes of this study we classify ecosystem disturbance as a operational 
failure as it results from human decisions. Although difficult to quantify, disruption to 
ecosystem services does occur from growing energy crops (Styles et al., 2015). Land-use 




The scale of capital expenditure required is noted by several authors including Popp et al. 
(2014) and Hodgson et al. (2016). Specific issues which will affect access to capital are 
demand uncertainty (Awudu and Zhang, 2012) with Hammond et al. (2012) suggesting 
that a lack of investor confidence may arise from EV competition and that the established 
oil and gas ‘majors’ have much of the capability to design and operate biorefineries if they 
 82 
chose to do so (presenting a high barrier to new entrants). Criscuolo and Menon (2015) 
classify biorefineries as high-risk technology with high intensity capital requirements. We 
judge that the risk of the lack of access to capital is likely to occur and that it could lead to 
a sustained but recoverable delay in projects. 
 The quality of the fuel source is the main risk in the environment category (Roberts 
and Upham, 2012; Hodgson et al., 2016). Popp et al. (2014) note that meeting tight modern 
fuel specifications is harder with biofuels. Although the chemical or energy content 
variations can be accommodated, they may lower the efficiency of a biorefinery through 
additional process steps. Strong process optimisation is premised on a narrow resource 
input specification. Water use at this stage is not likely to be higher than for most other 
fuels (Mielke et al., 2010). 
 Despite many elements of the process engineering required for biorefineries being 
well understood, there is considerable agreement that there is scope for innovation 
(Hammond et al., 2012; LCICG, 2012a); specific examples are cost reduction (Awudu and 
Zhang, 2012), pretreatments (Littlewood et al., 2013), and advances in biology (Taylor, 
2008a; McLeod et al., 2017). Shortall et al. (2015) note that ongoing public subsidies will 
be required as will policy aimed at supporting a balanced approach to co-production of 
fuels and chemicals (Hodgson et al., 2016). Hodgson et al. also expressed concern that 
there was a lack of co-operation between the key players, including traditional oil and gas 
processors and new entrants; we interpret this as a risk that the R&D capacity may not be 
able to meet the challenge. We consider these risks to be moderate with only short-term 
effects. 
 Changing policy and regulation is noted as a significant cause of risk (Hodgson et 
al., 2016). The Royal Academy of Engineering (RAE, 2017) give a concise overview of 
the liquid biofuels policy landscape and the UKPIA (2016) summarise the recent changes. 
Regulation specifically is noted by Hammond et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2013). 
According to Boucher (2012), in an unclear technological regime creating policy and 
regulation at all generates uncertainty, and may lead to technical lock-in with a 
consequential loss of flexibility for biofuel development (Berti and Levidow, 2014). Poorly 
formed policy allowed petrol and diesel producers to buy themselves out of obligations 
(Swinbank et al., 2011), or more generally may give rise to policy conflicts (LCICG, 
2012b) such as the effect on hydrogen fuel cell funding (Levidow and Papaioannou, 2014). 
We judge that changes to policy and regulation will occur in the future, but are likely to 
only have short-term impacts. Although we do not consider there likely to be a lack of 
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enforcement of standards and codes at this stage, Bailey (2013) contends that the current 
standards for biofuel production do not ensure sustainability. 
 We consider that a pollution event is likely, but may only cause short-term 
disruption. Proposed causes of pollution include increased NOx emissions (Hammond et 
al., 2012), eutrophication (Wang et al., 2013), alteration of sediment dynamics by seaweed 
farms (Wood et al., 2017), and effects on groundwater by spillages from refined products 
(Firth et al., 2014). Globally the accident frequency per TWh at biofuel facilities is similar 
to that of geothermal and solar, but the fatalities per TWh are lower (Sovacool et al., 
2016). For the UK we judge the risk of operational failure to be the same at this stage as 
for oil and gas processing i.e. unlikely, but has the possibility to close a site should a 
severe accident occur. 
 
Stage 5 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.4. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.3, but 
we note that there is evidence that some air passengers are not comfortable with aeroplanes 
using a biogenic fuel rather than kerosene (Filimonau and Högström, 2017). Furthermore, 
the efficiency of modern ICEs is dependent on tight fuel specifications which are harder 
for biofuels to meet (Bergthorson and Thomson, 2015), and if the biofuel is not 100% 
compatible with fossil-derived fuels Popp et al. (2014) suggest that compatibility lists need 
to be compiled. 
 
5.3 Biomass 
We are considering sources of biomass used for combustion in this section. These sources 
include waste wood (Röder and Thornley, 2018), Miscanthus, switchgrass, willow, poplar 
(Robbins et al., 2012). This heterogeneity is in part why estimates of the available resource 
vary widely (Price et al., 2004; Slade et al., 2010; Mola-Yudego et al., 2017; Qi et al., 
2018). Slade et al. (2011) give a clear overview of the problems plaguing estimation 
methodologies including the yield gap confirmed by experiments (Mola-Yudego et al., 
2015). Some estimates of the land available for biomass production are set as high as 40% 
of the total area of Great Britain (Lovett et al., 2014). Some estimates put the total 
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contribution of biomass to UK electricity generation in the 5-10% range (Dommett, 2009). 
A useful summary of the combustion techniques is given by Robbins et al. (2012).  
 
Stage 1 
We do not see any significant causes of risk at this stage. Though we note that the quality 




The discussion for Biomass is similar to that for Bioliquids, though macro-algae are not 
usually considered for combustion. 
 Lack of access to capital is a noticeable risk. The main problem is the return on 
investment compared with other uses of that land (Adams et al., 2011) with many crops 
uneconomic (Warren et al., 2016). Investment in new specialist harvesting machinery is a 
particular concern (Glithero et al., 2013b). Welfle et al. (2014) note that simple cashflow is 
a barrier to investment if crops take several years to mature. Furthermore, the costs of 
transporting biomass is higher than biogas (Wang et al., 2012). 
 There are four other notable points. Like the crops for bioliquids there is scope for 
innovation in crop science (Taylor, 2008b). In the political category changing policy and 
regulation present a risk (Adams and Lindegaard, 2016). And there are two notable sources 
of risk in the technical category, pollution events caused by emissions from changing crops 
(Drewer et al., 2017) and inflexibility introduced by using crops with roots which are hard 
to remove (Warren et al., 2016) which we class as an operation failure. 
 
Stage 3 
We do not see any significant causes of risk at this stage and judge the risk profile to be the 
same as for Coal (Stage 3). 
 
Stage 4 
As the UK has decided to phase-out the use of coal we are only considering the direct 
combustion of biomass which is most likely to be done using CHP plants. We assume 
many of these plants to be grid-connected with a minority powering a self-contained site 
and the heat to be distributed via DH networks. 
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 The risk of a lack of access to capital is principally due to the rate of return on the 
investment (Wright et al., 2014) with several authors noting that subsidies are essential 
(Thornley et al., 2009; McIlveen-Wright et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2017). Also noted is a 
“lottery approach to grant funding” for small organisations, charities, or Councils needing 
support for CHP purchase (Sinclair et al., 2015), though Polzin et al. (2015) are of the view 
that FITs provide a better long-term signal than grants. Bassi et al. (2015) suggest that the 
risk perception of biomass is ‘medium’. To an extent we agree, but interpret the essential 
nature of subsidies (whether by FIT or grant) as that the risk may occur but could halt a 
project entirely. 
 The quality of the fuel source is the main risk posed by the environment as the 
combustion properties vary (Forbes et al., 2014; Baxter et al., 2014; Al-Shemmeri et al., 
2015; Röder and Thornley, 2018) which may affect the CHP plant’s efficiency. The 
seasonal variation (Adams et al., 2011) will affect the efficacy of the unit or its economic 
performance. Thus we judge that the risk is likely to occur and may cause short-term 
disruption. For innovation, it is some evidence that public subsidy for technology 
development is required (Sinclair et al., 2015) even though CHP is moderately mature. 
 The changing policy and regulatory landscape is noted by many authors as a 
problem (Adams et al., 2011; Connor et al., 2015; Sinclair et al., 2015; Adams and 
Lindegaard, 2016; Levidow and Papaioannou, 2016). We judge that this cause of risk is 
likely to occur and that the biomass system is less robust than some other fuels, so we 
consider that the disruption could be sustained though recoverable which places it in the 
highest category. There is also strong evidence that significant public concern will arise. 
This will manifest through objections to planning applications (Thornley et al., 2009; 
Adams et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2014; Sinclair et al., 2015) but have only a short-term 
effect. 
 The burning of (woody) biomass is likely to lead to nett CO2 emissions across the 
supply chain (Brack, 2017) which may exceed those of conventional gas. Biomass 
combustion will lead to other pollution events (Tagliaferri et al., 2018) detrimental to 
human health (Hall and Scrase, 1998). Air pollution is the main concern (Cordell et al., 
2016), principally soot and other particulate matter (Mitchell et al., 2017) and NOx (Olave 
et al., 2017). Whilst this risk will occur we expect it only to have an effect at the margins 
of normal operation. We note that the ash from biomass will be high in potassium and 
phosphorous, which although valuable cannot be discharged directly into the environment 




We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.1/ 
 
Stage 6 
For electricity generation we do not see the need for any deviations from the description 
set out in section 8.2.1. For the use of district heating networks we do not see the need for 
any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. 
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6 Assessing Risks for Non-renewables (Fossil Fuels) 
We discuss selected decisions in the risk matrix (Appendix A) for the non-renewables fuel 
group – coal, gas, and oil – including the unconventional sources. Mostly the risks 
discussed are those assessed as having the highest risk rating, but also some of those with 
moderate ratings. We also comment if the likelihood score is high, even if the impact is 
low, if this presents an interesting point. Furthermore, the selection is based on some 
elements in different stages being repetitive and some fuels being similarly sharing 
characteristics e.g. processing technologies.  
 
6.1 Coal 
The technology to enable the extraction of domestic reserves of coal accelerated the 
industrial revolution in Britain (Wrigley, 2010; Gentvilaite et al., 2014). Most UK mining 
was underground, but the last deep mine closed in 2015. Opencast mining still takes place 
in Scotland. The amount of coal used in UK homes fell from the mid 1970s as the 
introduction of natural gas grew, but the amount used for power generation remained high 
until the 1990s (BEIS, 2017c). The UK Government has stated that it will phase out 
unabated coal plants by 2025 (Rudd, 2015). Furthermore, the withdrawal of funding for the 
carbon-capture and storage (CCS) competition (HCECCC, 2016) has caused the 
cancellation of two demonstration projects. A comprehensive review of CCS has been 
conducted by Boot-Handford et al. (2013). Technology is not the barrier, but the price of 
carbon. For example, some estimates suggest that CCS could be viable at €115 /tCO2 
(Renner, 2014), whilst (Valentić et al., 2016) suggest that it can never be viable in Europe 
without a very significant rise in electricity price. Thus, without a change in policy the use 
of coal in the UK for electricity generation will cease entirely in 2025. 
The introduction of the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) has 
foreshortened the operating life of a number of coal plants in the UK and elsewhere 
(Meyer and Pac, 2017). Some, such as Ratcliffe-on-Soar have been retro-fitted with soot 
particle capture, NOx scrubbers, and flue-gas desulphurisation to meet the LCPD 
requirements. Others such as Didcot ‘A’ and Ferrybridge were deemed uneconomic and 
worked out their remaining licensed operating hours before closing. 
Mechanisation since the 1970s has cut the number of miners required to extract a 
tonne of coal in most developed and developing countries. The three main grades of coal 
(hard, brown, lignite) have differing chemical compositions, with the sulphur content being 
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the main difference. The technologies used for large combustion plants are mature. 
Technologies such as CCS, supercritical systems, and pre-combustion gasification will be 
treated under innovation. 
 
Stage 1 
Coal is geographically widespread. The (global) market functions are in providing 
appropriate equipment and services to assess geologic deposits; we consider there to be 
little risk or possible impact. The denial of access to explore for resources might occur, but 
currently would have only marginal impact. As a non-renewable, the availability of coal is 
finite on time-scales much less than geological. However, the world reserves are 
sufficiently large with projected availability for more than 130 years at current rates of use 
(BP, 2018) such that multi-generation availability can be expected.  
 Some of the nations with reserves have poor ratings on the World Bank governance 
index (World Bank, 2018). This raises the likelihood of disruption to exploration activities 
marginally. The same is true for quality of institutional governance. In some well-governed 
nations there may be public concern if the exploitation of a deposit required opencast 
mining. As this stage is exploration, we judge that the impact is likely to be insignificant. 
 In the exploration phase, most of the required expertise could be provided by a non-
local workforce because the numbers of people required is necessarily small, thus we 
suggest that this poses very low risk at this stage. There maybe a marginal requirement for 
some unskilled local labour in countries where educational standards are poor. 
 The risks from technical sources is very low since exploration operations are small. 
In the case of infrastructure failure, deemed to be not relevant since it is unlikely that 
infrastructure would be in place already. 
 
Stage 2 
The equipment required for coal extraction is used widely in many similar mining or 
quarrying sectors so the market for such equipment is mature. As with all specialised 
equipment, large items are made to order and short delays may occur, but will only have 
marginal impact. For example, in opencast mining large drag lines will take one to two 
years to construct and may cost in the order of $10m. The lack of access to capital is a 
significant risk. The risk may occur, and if access to capital is denied then the impact will 
be of the highest level; the project will not be able to go ahead in most countries. A current 
example is the proposed Carmichael mine in the Galilee basin in Australia which Buckley 
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(2015) states has been refused backing by 11 international finance corporations. The 
proposed project cleared the last major hurdle to permits, but remains dependant on 
infrastructure expansion for rail and shipping. Price volatility (on the world market) is a 
significant cause of risk. Volatility will occur and could cause some short loss of capacity 
since UK coal requirements are dependent on imports. However, as coal is widespread 
across the globe, the market has liquidity. 
 Difficult physical access may occur as a risk, but the impact is likely to only be 
short-term if the level of resource is economic. Although the formation of coal is an 
ecosystem service, the geological timespan is so great that we can consider the total 
reserves as fixed (the rate of new formation is too slow). But falling global extraction rates 
are not yet a problem; the global reserves of coal are large, even at current rates of demand. 
Within the UK is a different matter. The global price of coal has rendered the UK mining 
sector uneconomic, thus the extraction rate of UK coal has fallen significantly, but this 
picture is not reflected globally, thus the current impact is marginal. Mielke et al. (2010) 
estimate that the quantities of water required in mining operations (mainly for dust 
suppression and washing) range between 4-35 l/GJ. At some sites the cut coal is removed 
from the mine by creating and piping a slurry. Much of this water is reused, but the losses 
might double the quantity of water required. Currently this poses a low risk, but in a 
changing climate some regions are likely to experience lower rainfall. If the risk occurs, 
we suggest that it may have a major impact. 
Improvements in extraction technology and methods are likely to only be 
incremental. But as there have been improvements over the last 30 years due to 
mechanisation, the impact of only marginal gains in efficiency or the efficacy of methods 
will only be of the lowest level.  
The impact of policy uncertainty has been variable for coal as a fuel. The 
privatisation of UK coal mining led to consolidation in the industry. Inevitably, 
uneconomic mines closed and marginal ones lost-out to cheaper imports. The risk posed by 
poor institutional governance in coal supplier nations may occur, but as the known reserves 
are widely spread, we consider that it will have only a short-term impact. Disputed 
landrights is unlikely to occur, but if it should the impact could be moderate with sustained 
delays in establishing a site. This is more likely for opencast operations than underground 
mines. 
One source of pollution resulting from mining operations is the emission of fugitive 
methane (Heede and Oreskes, 2016). The tailings from coal extraction contain 
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contaminants, notably heavy metals including Mercury. The risks are well-understood, but 
a pollution event may occur. Minor earthquakes have been traced to underground coal 
mining activities in the UK (Wilson et al., 2015). There is evidence from the US that 
opencast mines present a particular risk to the health of inhabitants through the emission of 
particulates and pollutants (Hendryx, 2015). This could halt operations, but we consider 
that in most cases the situation would be recoverable. Likewise the decommissioning of a 
worked-out or uneconomic site. There are legacy issues for older sites, but for those which 
cease now safe and clean decommissioning should be possible. We suggest that the 
likelihood of not being able to neutralise waste at the decommissioning stage is low, but if 
it were to occur it could have a significant (but not irrecoverable) impact. The risk posed as 
a technical issue is one matter, but the willingness to enforce standards is covered by 
institutional governance. Coal mining has been considered a dangerous occupation, but 
when fatalities are normalised by TWh of electricity production, coal appears to have a risk 
factor of an order of magnitude lower than other power generation methods (Sovacool et 
al., 2015).  
 
Stage 3 
For current pulverised coal plants the processing for coal is straightforward – mechanical 
crushing and grinding to a powder. Some coarse crushing is done at the mining stage, but 
for the purposes of this analysis Stage 3 is only considering the final conditioning 
immediately prior to combustion. Different designs of  combustor will have an optimum 
range of particle sizes. This final processing also takes account of coal coming from 
different sources. Even with modern extraction machinery at the mine cutting face the 
grade and size will vary. The variation from opencast mining will be greater. As the 
storage of coal as fine particles is both impractical and risky, the final pulverisation process 
and mixing is done at the last possible moment. 
 As the operation is uncomplicated, the levels of risks are low in the context of the 
conditioning stage. The UK Government is not permitting any new coal-fired power 
stations to be built, new equipment for the conditioning of coal is on a like-for-like basis 
on existing sites. Therefore, causes of risk such as being unable to agree a price for licence 
or permits, permission to access sites, or difficult physical access we deem not to be 
relevant. Of the political causes of risk a changing regulatory framework may occur and 
have a short-term recoverable impact. There are three technical risks of note. Pollution 
events are unlikely since the storage of coal, mechanisms of leaching, and control of dust 
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are well-understood and subject to legislation. This was not the case in the UK in the 
distant past. If this risk were to occur the impact could be major, but recoverable. This 
inability to neutralise waste at decommissioning may occur, but should only have short-
term impacts on the process. Given the robust nature of mechanical processing, operational 
failure is likely. However, as these are relatively simple mechanical systems any disruption 
should only be at the margins of normal operation. 
 
Stage 4 
This stage encompasses the design, operation, and decommissioning of a thermal power 
plant and its site.  
 Although the equipment is large-scale and specialised, pulverised coal-fired 
thermal plants are a mature market. The risk of delays in the supply of systems and 
components may occur, but the impacts are likely to be short-lived. The two key economic 
causes of risk are the lack of access to capital and the inability to agree on permits. Both 
have the capacity to terminate a project. The costs of building pulverised coal power 
stations has risen significantly  between 2000-2010 (Larson et al., 2012). We suggest that 
both are likely to occur in the light of the UK Government’s decision to close the 
remaining coal-fired plants . Should this decision be reversed, then the risks will lower, but 
will not be eliminated. Even if CCS were to become mainstream the risks will not be 
eliminated. We suggest that CCS might raise the risk of lack of access to capital since it 
would add a significant cost to a project.  The costs of decommissioning should be able to 
be modelled successfully since these are well-understood systems. However, some 
uncertainty exists as aged plant may have incomplete plans or piping and instrumentation 
charts, and unknown quantities of asbestos. There is a possibility of accidents such as the 
fatal incident at Didcot ‘A’ in 2015 when part of the main boiler house collapsed. We 
suggest that even in such extreme circumstances, delays will be short-lived. 
 The availability of water is important for the operation of thermal plant, but the 
quantity required is determined by the cooling method used: once-through, closed loop, or 
dry.  There are no UK data available (Murrant et al., 2015), but two meta-analyses from 
the USA give plausible estimates. The study by Mielke et al. (2010) suggests that the total 
consumed varies between 114-1930 lMWh
-1
, whilst Macknick et al. (2011) suggest 242-
4164 lMWh
-1
. The discrepancy between these studies is due to literature selection with 
Macknick et al. (2011) being more comprehensive for the thermoelectric case, and less 
reliant on older studies by the Electric Power Research Institute e.g. EPRI (2003). What is 
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common to all the studies is that water availability is considered a significant future risk. 
There is limited evidence that UK thermal plant may be abstracting proportionately more 
water, but consuming less (lower losses) per MWh of electricity generated (Murrant et al., 
2015). The UK climate is different to that of the USA for the most part, however, we judge 
that the risk of a lack of water availability may occur and that if it does the impact could 
cause a sustained loss of a power station (but is a recoverable situation). 
 The prospects for technology transfer for coal-related innovations is relatively 
weak.  The UK Government’s aim of phasing out coal-fired generation and the withdrawal 
of support for CCS implies that UK companies creating IPR can only feasibly exploit this 
outside of the UK. Some fundamental work on technologies such as oxyfuel is still 
supported. We judge that the risk is likely to occur and could have a major impact. The 
most significant barrier to deploying CCS is cost (Bassi et al., 2015; USDoE, 2014). 
Projections by Levi and Pollitt (2015) of the near- and long-term LCOE for coal with CCS 
suggest that even by the mid 2030s it will still be higher than the agreed strike price of 
electricity from Hinkley Point ‘C’. Furthermore, it will be significantly above the projected 
costs for offshore wind (CCSCRTF, 2013). For the permanent storage of carbon the main 
risk is leakage. In the early stages of storage site deployment Bassi et al. (2015) suggest 
that a cap on long-term liability be introduced until the risks are better understood and 
private insurance mechanisms develop. However, this misses the point that a price is 
irrelevant if the storage needs to be permanent. The scope of major improvements is low 
too i.e. the risk of  only marginal improvement is likely to occur. The carbon capture 
process is well understood and a standard technique in the gas industry (Markewitz et al., 
2012). Scale-up too is well understood; megatonne per annum plants are operating around 
the world e.g. urea production in Malaysia . This operation is unusual in that it is 
producing a saleable product, the risk faced by nearly all other CCS proposals is that there 
is no paying customer for the ‘product’ (CO2), thus there is little incentive to invest in 
R&D capacity. 
 Coal-fired power stations have been subject to frequent public protests, including 
occupation by environmental protestors, particularly in connection with planning for 
extension or new-build (Kyllonen, 2014). Any plans to revive the use of coal-fired 
generation in the UK will attract opposition and are likely to cause any proposed project to 
be delayed and possibly cancelled – thus we consider this cause of risk to be in the highest 
category. 
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 As it is certain that operating coal-fired stations will emit CO2 (CCS will reduce not 
eliminate CO2 emissions) the risk of a pollution event will occur. The combination of the 
LCPD and the recent UK Government’s announcement demonstrates that pollution events 
will result in plant closure. The pollution risk from fly ash is modest as the processes for 
site clean-up are well understood. For the UK Larson et al. (2012) (and references therein) 
estimate the total health damage costs due to pollution from coal use for power production 
as 38 USD(2007) per MWh. 
 
Stage 5 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.1. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.1. 
 
6.2 Gas 
There are many practical similarities between the supply chains for oil and gas up to the 
distribution stage, and the risk profile reflect this. The gas business is more fragmented by 
region than oil (Mitchell and Mitchell, 2014) because of the relatively high inter-regional 
transport costs due to the basic physics of gases and liquids. They also differ in the final 
products, which require different distribution mechanisms and have completely different 
end uses. The arguments about the maturity and global nature of the extractive stages of 
the industry can be read across from the discussion of oil (section 6.4). The key differences 
are that gas is used for large-scale electricity generation and small-scale heat production. 
The importance of gas for electricity generation was demonstrated in 2015-2016 as the 
capacity gap created by the closure of coal-fired plants was plugged by expanding the use 
of CCGT (BEIS, 2017d). For small-scale heat production, gas is used in 91% in UK 
dwellings (Palmer and Cooper, 2014). Hanmer and Abram (2017) give an interesting 
description of the transition from coal and oil use to gas in residential dwellings. 
 There is a wide variety of methods – using three phases of matter – for transporting 
gas from producer to consumer (Thomas and Dawe, 2003), suggesting that compression 
and solidification might be cheaper than liquefaction. However, it is now clear that 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) became dominant despite its higher capital costs for the 
required processing plants. Floating LNG facilities are starting to appear (Won et al., 2014) 
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which must do the full range of processing. The additional steps of the liquefaction and 
regasification are described by Tagliaferri et al. 2017). Bridge and Bradshaw (2017) argue 
that by decoupling gas supply from pipelines, LNG is changing the geography of the 
global gas market and creating what they term a ‘global production network’. A 
consequence of this is to reallocate economic risk – in part from nation states to 
corporations. 
 In general terms for the oil and gas industries across all stages EY (2013) highlight 
risks such as spillages (technical), access to reserves (political), uncertainty in energy 
policy (political), and human capital (skills). Dockerty et al. (2014) give an overview of the 
impacts on natural capital – broadly interpreted as pollution events in the technical 
category – across all stages. 
 At the conversion stage, the comparison is with Coal. The development of the 
CCGT from the first patent in 1935 is charted by Olumayegun et al. (2016). Watson (1997) 
notes that rapid adoption of the CCGT in the UK was not triggered by success of public 
R&D support, but wider political and economic considerations. Indeed Olumayegun et al. 
note that the development of heat exchangers was crucial to the use of gas turbines in the 
power generation industry. 
For stages 1-3 we discuss below only the differences between oil and gas, and for 
stage 4 only we discuss the differences with Coal. Stages 5-6 are common to many fuels. 
 
Stage 1 
We judge that there are no meaningful deviations to the risks, likelihoods, and impacts 
from that of Oil (section 6.4). 
 
Stage 2 
Produced (raw) gas is a mixture; the exact nature and proportions vary between regions 
and closely located wells (Burruss and Ryder, 2014). Mixtures typically consist of 
methane, ethane, propane, butane, sometimes pentane and hexane, hydrogen sulphide, 
carbon dioxide, water vapour, nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, trace amounts of helium and 
some other noble gases, mercury and some other heavy metals, some other sulphur 
compounds such as carbonyl sulphide, and particulates such as sand. Some of the 
impurities may need to be reduced (or removed) at the well-head, especially the water 
vapour and the heavier hydrocarbons which would otherwise condense out into the 
transmission pipes on the way to shore. All components emerge gaseous due to the 
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elevated temperature deep in the well, but the seabed is only a few degrees above zero 
Celsius. The heavier hydrocarbons are saleable products, so too are the noble gases. If the 
water vapour content is dropped sufficiently, then the acid gas (hydrogen sulphide and 
carbon dioxide) restrictions can be relaxed for transmission to shore. If the acid gases are 
mixed with water corrosion will occur, but their removal presents a technical hazard. 
Minimising offshore conditioning is also important because the processing plant costs 
significantly more than onshore. Fortunately, the UKCS gas is relatively low in sulphur 
content. Once the gas reaches an onshore refinery (Stage 3) it can be conditioned to meet 
the UK domestic distribution specification.  
The transport of gas is more reliant on pipelines than oil. More generally, Thomas 
and Dawe (2003) point out that companies, as well as governments, not only must address 
economic risks but also risks arising from terrorism, politics, and trade agreements. 
Stulberg (2012) notes that the research community has concentrated on utility maximising 
analysis, but suggests that value maximisation is a more useful approach. Stulberg suggests 
that states and other actors involved in pipeline agreements are most interested in return-
on-investment, and this view is supported by Bouzarovski et al. (2015) who recognise that 
the structure of the European pipeline favours market mechanisms. A ‘clash of values’ 
over market arrangements is how Boussena and Locatelli (2013) describe the trading 
problems with Russia. However, the framing Stulberg uses is that of ‘credible 
commitment’ i.e. putting in place good governance measures such as legal transparency, 
thus is more optimistic about pipelines built in the post-Soviet era. The UK has bi-
directional connections with Norway, Belgium and Holland, and an export connection to 
Ireland (Marchant, 1997; BEIS, 2016a). The European gas transmission network has a 
large number of nodes with multiple routes, offering resilience. It also means that the UK 
is not directly dependent on Russian supplies, furthermore, Russia is a transit country for 
gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (BEIS, 2016b). Although some gas reaching the 
UK through the European network will have originated in Russia, it is likely to be 1-2% of 
imports. 
Although according to Burgherr and Hirschberg (2014) the accident and fatality 
rates for natural gas are lower than those for oil, they are not sufficiently different to 
change our assessment. Infrastructure failure is also unlikely, but an example of delays that 
can be caused is if a ship’s anchor snags a pipeline on the seabed (Espiner et al., 2008). 
Although the number of accidents and fatalities for the UKCS has been low for many years 
it should never be forgotten that this level of safe operation came about, in part, because of 
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the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 when 167 men lost their lives (The Hon. Lord Cullen, 
1990; Redmond, 1990; Lyons, 2000). 
There are two deviations from the description for Oil. First, the water requirement 
for the extraction of gas is lower than that for oil, thus we lower the likelihood score. 
Secondly, that we judge that the temporal impact of a pollution event to be lower (with the 
same likelihood) as there is less variety in the pollutants and the immediate clean-up of 
spilled liquids may be more difficult than for gaseous releases. Pollution events may also 
occur from well barrier and other integrity failures (Davies et al., 2014). 
 
Stage 3 
There are eight gas processing sites in the UK. Plus several terminals for LNG which are 
regasification facilities only. The sites are concentrated on the North Sea coast with one in 
Cumbria for the now declining Morecombe Bay field. 
 There are three points of difference with Oil to note. First, the quality of the fuel 
entering a gas refinery is a little more uniform than for oil, thus we lower the impact. 
Secondly, we judge that infrastructure failure is less of a risk as storage facilities for the 
conditioned gas are adequate (Le Fevre, 2013; BEIS, 2016a) i.e. the impact score is lower. 
There has been considerable discussion about the security of supply implications of the 
closure of the Rough facility. The CMA (2017) has decided that Rough can close without 
unduly increasing risk to the security of supply. Thirdly, the manner in which the public 
show concern. It is unlikely that a new site for an oil refinery will be required, but protest 
may occur and could lead to the proposed facility being abandoned. However, there is 
evidence (BEIS, 2016c) that new gas storage will attract protest, especially for 
underground facilities where a risk to groundwater is perceived. We judge that this may 
not actually lead to the proposal being abandoned. 
 
Stage 4 
The starting point for comparison in this stage for CCGT is with the use of steam turbines 
for coal-fired power stations. The basic differences in the process design are shown in 
Larson et al. (2012), which states that CCGTs are the most efficient of the fossil-fired 
technologies for electricity generation, reaching approximately 55% (thermal) at present. A 
gas-fired power station will also use steam turbines to recover thermal energy from the gas 
turbine exhaust gases. 
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 For a CCGT plant access to capital remains possible (the risk is modest), unlike for 
a coal-fired station in the UK. Although the survey by Oxera (2011) suggested that the risk 
perception for CCGT was low, we judge that the risk is not minimal due to the large sums 
required. Furthermore, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015b) suggests that 
costs should be judged on the whole-life including those of emissions, and not solely the 
LCOE, and Qadrdan et al. (2015) note that their modelling of a high Nuclear (fission) and 
Wind (offshore) scenario suggests that investment in CCGTs will be hard to justify. The 
risk for permits is also lower as it is now impossible to obtain an operating licence for 
unabated coal. The decommissioning costs for a gas-fired station are considerably lower 
than those for Coal – there is much less equipment and waste to clean up. 
 Because of the increased efficiency of CCGTs the water requirements are lower, 
though insufficient to alter our risk assessment. Mielke et al. (2010) suggest a range of 
114-795 lMWh
-1
 for the total consumed, and (Macknick et al., 2011)15-1136 lMWh
-1
. 
These figures are low as there will be some additional requirement for the steam turbines 
in the thermal energy recovery system. Variation in gas composition, even within 
specification, has implications for the operation and performance of gas turbines (Abbott et 
al., 2012) which they consider may be exacerbated as a wider range of sources is imported 
in the future. 
 The CCGT is a mature technology (Hanna et al., 2015) thus we suggest that the risk 
of only marginal improvements occurring is likely, but as it is already relatively efficient 
this risk will only have a low impact. Coal combustion carries a greater risk because of the 
need for CCS if it is to continue in the UK. We judge that that the R&D community for 
CCGT to be more vibrant with greater capacity than that for coal combustors, thus suggest 
that the likelihood of the risk of not meeting the challenge is lower. 
 The construction of CCGT power generation sites has not attracted public protest, 
unlike Coal. We judge the likelihood risk of significant public concern to be low, and if it 
were to occur it is only likely to give rise to short-term disruption. There is considerably 
less waste at the decommissioning stage for a CCGT than for Coal; we judge this risk to be 
in the lowest category. 
 
Stage 5 
For gas supplied to end users, we do not see the need for any deviations from the 
description set out in section 8.1.3. For the route describing the use of gas to generate 
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electrical power for distribution, we do not see the need for any deviations from the 
description set out in section 8.1.1. 
 
Stage 6 
For the use of electrical devices we do not see the need for any deviations from the 
description set out in section 8.2.1. For heat we consider the use of onsite systems for this 
fuel and do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. 
 
6.3 Gas (Unconventional) 
Several sources of hydrocarbons are considered as ‘unconventional’. Our analysis 
considers only UK (onshore) shale gas using hydraulic fracturing as it is by far the most 
important in both the near and medium term, but we briefly discuss methane hydrates 
(clathrates), coal-bed methane (CBM), and coal gasification. 
 Shale gas is frequently thought of as a recent discovery in the UK, but this is not 
the case. In his succinct review Selley (2012) charts the first (accidental) discoveries from 
the late 19
th
 century and the more intense academic analysis from the 1980s. Mustanen et 
al. (2017) note that hydraulic fracturing has been used onshore in the UK since 1956, on 
approximately 100 occasions to enhance oil and gas extraction. Globally, research activity 
has been accelerating since 2010 (Wang and Li, 2017), in part because of the amount of 
gas which may be available (McGlade et al., 2013a). The UK’s geological conditions for 
shale gas reserves has been mapped in detail by the British Geological Survey (2014) with 
Scotchman (2016) giving a very clear interpretation of the typical subsurface conditions, 
and Hennissen et al. (2017) discuss in detail the geology of the central English region. 
Hammond and O’Grady (2017) and Al-Douri et al. (2017) give clear overviews of the 
upstream and downstream technologies, respectively. An important difference to 
conventional gas is that production from shale wells falls exponentially with time 
(Middleton et al., 2017). Using US data, Middleton et al. show that production drops by 
approximately two-thirds after two years and by 90% after 10 years. The Royal Society 
and Royal Academy of Engineering (2012) report also gives a good introduction to UK 
specific issues, particularly the regulatory regime. Christopherson and Rightor (2012) 
contend that the full costs of shale gas development go beyond economics and 
employment. Pre-drill assessments, according to McAleenan et al. (2015), should be 
developed using multidisciplinary value-engineering methodology. Hays et al. (2015) point 
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out that there are useful lessons to be learned from the USA where the industry is more 
mature, and that UK policy should be informed by this experience and not by theoretical 
considerations. Cotton et al. (2014) and Partridge et al. (2017) observe that UK 
Government policy for unconventional hydrocarbons is incompatible with other policy 
drivers including the climate change targets. 
Methane hydrates are distributed globally (U.S. Geological Survey, 2018), though 
there are no commercial operations currently. A thorough overview of methane hydrates 
and associated technologies is given by Beaudoin et al. (2014a, 2014b). Waters west of the 
Shetland Isles are deep enough with geology appropriate for methane hydrate formation, 
though it may not exist in great quantities and could be considered as a hazard for other 
conventional oil and gas drilling operations (Long, 2001). Should non-UK sources be 
extracted commercially, they would be sold into the global gas market. Although much of 
the equipment is likely to be similar to conventional offshore gas extraction R&D is 
required to adapt subsurface production processes (Decourt et al., 2015). Currently we 
judge the risk profile to be similar to that of Gas, but with enhanced likelihood and impact 
of lack of access to capital. 
The term CBM encompasses a set of circumstances in which naturally occurring 
methane can be extracted, namely unworked seams, and working and abandoned mines. 
Creedy and Tilley (2003) review the principal extraction methods and Morad (2012) note 
that permeability if the most important factor for unworked seams. The total UK resource 
has long been uncertain (Mitchell, 1991), but there is renewed interest in directly coupled 
CBM-CCGT schemes to exploit deep unworked seams. Sarhosis et al. (2016) carried out 
an economic modelling exercise to ascertain the viability of a site in South Wales. They 
concluded that the site may be commercially viable, noted that many costs are site specific, 
and warned that hydraulic fracturing may be required to increase seam permeability and 
thus gas flowrate. 
Although the UK ceased gasifying mined coal in the early 1970s, underground coal 
gasification (UGC) was first developed in Co. Durham in 1912 but was more widely 
adopted elsewhere. (Younger et al., 2010). UGC carries significant environmental risks 
(Hyder et al., 2016) including subsidence, groundwater contamination, and the release of 
organic and inorganic compounds. Younger et al. (2010) point out that groundwater 
depletion may occur as the hot vapour could be entrained as the syngas is extracted, though 
suggest that UGC could be combined with CCS. There is little current UK interest in this 
source of fuel. 
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The starting point for our analysis across all stages is that of Gas and discuss below 
the differences or other important risks. Some of the differences arise because we have 
chosen to considered UK resources, whereas conventional gas at Stage 1 is considered in 
the global context. Stages 5-6 are common to many fuels. 
 
Stage 1 
Physical access is much simpler as UK shale gas will be extracted onshore. The quantity 
and quality of shale gas can vary from well-to-well  in the same area (McGlade et al., 
2013b) which is much more noticeable than for conventional gas. Speirs et al. (2015) 
suggest that a lack of drilling experience in some countries or regions gives uncertainty 
about the reserves. We judge that this risk is likely to occur and that it could prevent 
further exploration at that site. There is better scope for innovation at this stage than for 
conventional gas. Better understanding of the relevant geology is one area, but also data 
analytics (Middleton et al., 2017). 
 Ownership of subsurface resource is not in dispute in the UK, hence a very low risk 
compared to other nations with conventional gas resources. However, permission is of 
landowners to access favourable drilling sites. Pyhäranta (2017) contends that one reason 
for the slow progress in exploiting onshore shale gas in the UK is the state ownership of 
the subsurface resources which does not give sufficient reward to landowners, and that the 
private ownership of the resources is a strong driver of the US industry. This point is 
supported by Thomas et al. (2017) who highlight the inequitable distribution of risks and 
benefits, and Harleman and Weber (2017) who suggests that this is a contributory factor in 
the level of public protest. Although payments are now be available to communities to 
mitigate this issue (Burns et al., 2016), we judge that this risk may occur, and if it does 
exploration could be halted for a prolonged period. Although much of the regulation 
governing onshore shale gas extraction is the same as for conventional UK gas (on- or off-
shore) (Burns et al., 2016), Stokes (2016) argues that the regulatory requirement for shale 
gas are not exactly the same as for conventional sources, thus needs a new and distinct 
framework. The key question for Stokes is whether existing uncertainties due to the 
inadequacies of the current regime outweigh the risk caused by a wholesale change to a 
bespoke framework. Burns give three further examples of recent policy uncertainty: 
1. the withdrawal of blocks in Scotland and Wales part way through the 14th licensing 
round (in 2014) because it was decided to devolve powers for onshore petroleum 
policy, 
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2. the majority of the blocks licensed were then made subject to further (previously 
unannounced) assessments, and 
3. the creation of the Oil and Gas Authority as the new regulator. 
 
UK citizens see more risks than benefits (Whitmarsh et al., 2015), with a modest 
majority opposing  shale gas development (Andersson-Hudson et al., 2016), and recent 
activities have attracted significant public concern leading to protests e.g. Lancashire 
(Bradshaw and Waite, 2017) and Balcombe in East Sussex (L. Williams et al., 2017). The 
polarised nature of the unfolding debate in the UK print media is examined by Jaspal and 
Nerlich (2014). The pro-gas lobby are seen as lacking ‘trustworthy messengers’ (Bomberg, 
2017) and despite government and industry rhetoric influence of the public is minimal, 
leading to distrust (Whitton et al., 2017). Distrust leads to the withdrawal of the ‘social 
licence to operate’ (Bradshaw and Waite, 2017), however, activities can proceed as the 
social licence to operate has no legal standing; the Institute of Directors (IOD, 2013) 
down-play the level of this risk. Howell (2018) shows that greater knowledge leads to 
more polarised views (both positive and negative), though Williams et al. (2017) suggest 
that the debate is not just about objective risk but the ability and willingness of institutions 
to be flexible. In a US-UK deliberative study of public perceptions Thomas et al. (2017) 
found a common signature of risk, but they and Evensen et al. (2017) warn against 
translating US experience – including the level of importance placed on particular issues – 
directly to the UK. As a result, we suggest that the risk of significant public concern is 
likely to occur and that it will lead to significant but recoverable disruption. 
We consider that the risk of a pollution event occurring at the exploration stage is 
not only greater, but in the highest category; if the risk occurs it may lead to a complete 
cessation of activity e.g. the seismic tremors in Lancashire (Prpich et al., 2016). As a 
result, calls have been made for baseline monitoring prior to exploration and exploitation 
of seismic activity (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012; Wilson et al., 
2015), groundwater conditions (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012), 
methane emissions (Boothroyd et al., 2017), and naturally occurring radioactive material 
(NORM) such as radon (Daraktchieva et al., 2017). Fugitive emissions of methane will 




Like gas from conventional wells, there needs to be some processing at the well-head to 
remove solids, water and any other liquids before it can be transported elsewhere (Last and 
Finn, 2015a). Transporting the produced gas to the main processing site is part of this 
stage. 
 Access to capital for unconventional gas carries an increased level of risk. UK 
shale gas is twice the cost of LNG imports and three times that of US production (Cooper 
et al., 2018), and Yuan et al. (2015) call for improved cost modelling to understand the 
capital requirements. Another part of the problem arises from a lack of economy of scale 
due to the licensing arrangements (Roberts, 2017), which leads Cooper et al. to suggest 
that the US success may not be replicated n the UK. However the UK Government offers 
subsidies (Bast et al., 2015). 
 Physical access and natural hazards are only a minor risk for onshore shale gas. 
However, the quality of the fuel source will be more variable, and predictions based on 
experience from previous wells may not extrapolate to a nearby well (McGlade et al., 
2013b). Unlike conventional gas production, the water requirement for shale gas is 
concentrated during the drilling and well completion phase (Mielke et al., 2010). Estimates 




 per fracking event (Hammond and O’Grady, 2017). Some 
more remote sites may be more difficult to supply, however we consider that this will only 
introduce a short-term disruption. 
 The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (2012) call for a 
programme of research, thus we judge that the lack of public subsidy for innovation is a 
risk which, if manifests, could cause major but recoverable delays to developments. 
Although there are good opportunities for tech-transfer from the offshore gas industry, the 
differences which exist suggest that there is significant scope for innovation. Some key 
areas have been identified: improved understanding of the effects of seismic events 
(Westaway and Younger, 2014), understanding the physical mechanisms and 
microstructural characteristics of hydraulic fracturing processes (Middleton et al., 2017; 
Striolo and Cole, 2017), transport properties of fluids and other materials (Striolo and 
Cole, 2017), process design and simulation (Gao and You, 2017), the application of 
various data analytical methods for modelling production data (Middleton et al., 2017), and 
the exploitation of ICT for operations management (Hassani et al., 2017). As a result, we 
suggest that optimism bias is likely to occur and that it would have a significant impact. 
We judge that the risk of insufficient capacity to construct sites might have a short-term 
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impact, and that an insufficient rate of infrastructure construction would have a major 
impact. 
 The risk from the denial of permission to access sites is mostly dealt with in Stage 
1, but we note here that until the 2015 infrastructure act a landowner could prevent drilling 
under their land even though they had no resource ownership rights (Burns et al., 2016). 
Some of the key regulatory differences from the US are drawn out by Roberts (2017), but 
the key points are dealt with in Stage 1. We note that some consider the current UK policy 
and regulatory framework to be inadequate  (J. Cooper et al., 2016) suggesting that there is 
an increased likelihood of change in the future. A consistent concern raised by several 
authors is the risk of an insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, 
standards and codes for technical operations (Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2012; Hays et al., 2015; J. Cooper et al., 2016). Davies et al. (2014) state that 
the monitoring regime for abandoned wells is weak.  
The risk of significant public concern is also mostly dealt with at Stage 1, 
principally because very few UK operations have gone beyond exploration at present. We 
judge that any well developed for exploitation will attract protest. We note also at this 
stage that participants in the study by Cotton (2015) cited increased road traffic and 
reductions in house prices would be a major issue at the gas production stage. Objections 
by the public to applications for planning consent is seen as a high level risk (IOD, 2013). 
From the literature we identify five principal groups of pollution event (Table 6.1). 
The likelihood of pollution event is identical to conventional gas i.e. it will occur because 
of fugitive emissions, but we judge that because of public sensitivity an event could halt 
activities at that site completely. Although the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering (2012) state that seismic events are very unlikely to be noticed, the two small 
earthquakes recorded near Blackpool (the Preese Hall drilling site) in 2011 triggered the 
Government to call a moratorium on further drilling across the UK and not just at that site. 
Mustanen et al. (2017) dispute that hydraulic fracturing triggers earthquakes and claim that 
the Preese Hall incident was an exception. The cocktail of gaseous emissions affect local 
air quality (Ahmadi and John, 2015; Peischl et al., 2015) with a consequential effect on 
human health (Saunders et al., 2018). The substantial review by Saunders et al. identifies 
approximately 350 separate chemical compounds used in the drilling, completion, and 
maintenance of shale gas wells. Exploiting US data Reap (2015) estimates that an increase 
in the incidence of cancer will occur in the UK if hydraulic fracturing goes ahead. Overall, 
we suggest that the impact has the highest possible potential. 
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Potential Pollution Event Key References Recognising the Risk 
Seepage into groundwater or 
aquifers 
Vengosh et al. (2014) 
Scotchman (2016) 
Bell et al. (2017) 
Surface disposal and spills of 
fracking and drilling fluids and 
wastewaters 
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 
(2012) Cooper et al. (2014) 
Vengosh et al. (2014) 
Clancy et al. (2018) 
O’Donnell et al. (2018) 
Gaseous  emissions, principally 
fugitive methane 
Cooper et al. (2014) 
Ahmadi and John (2015) 
Peischl et al. (2015) 
Prpich et al. (2016) 
Boothroyd et al. (2017) 
Seismicity Clarke et al. (2014)  
Wilson et al. (2015)  
Prpich et al. (2016)  
Westaway (2016a) 
Naturally occurring radioactive 
material 
Almond et al. (2014) 
Garner et al. (2015) 
O’Donnell et al. (2018) 
Table 6.1 The principal references describing the potential pollution events. 
 
Technical failure is one route by which a pollution event may occur with well integrity is 
identified as the main potential mechanism (Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2012; Prpich et al., 2016; J. Cooper et al., 2016; Hammond and O’Grady, 
2017). Prpich et al. (2016) also highlight well design and cementing as important. The 
statistical analysis of reported failures by Davies et al. (2014) shows that pollution events 
caused by failures are not common. In part because of being onshore, we judge the risk of 
technical failure for unconventional gas to be moderate and lower than that for 
conventional gas. By the same token, we consider that the likelihood of infrastructure 
failure also to be lower. 
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Although we judge the risk of being unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning 
to be the same as for conventional gas production facilities, there are two important 
differences. The geology of conventional oil and gas wells allows for the re-injection of 
wastewaters in underground formations, so although not treated the waste can be stored; 
shale formations do not allow for this. Contaminated wastewaters cannot be sent to 
landfill, but currently would be considered as mining waste by the UK environment 
authorities (O’Donnell et al., 2018), though the case for permitting the use of deep disposal 
wells has not yet been tested. In addition, Lewis et al. (2014) point out that each site (or 
pad) is small and adjacent licence blocks might well have different licensees and on that 
basis they advise that waste be treated at a central (or regional) facility to gain economies 
of scale and draw together sufficient technical expertise. 
 
Stage 3 
The technical processing is the same as natural gas (Last and Finn, 2015b). Although shale 
gas typically has a similar composition to that of natural gas, the exact proportion of the 
constituents varies not only between different geological conditions, but from well to well 
in the same area (Al-Douri et al., 2017). Depending upon location and the characteristics of 
the produced gas, processing may be done on site at the pad (or a shared small-scale 
regional facility) and injected directly into the distribution grid if the correct calorific value 
can be obtained (Lewis et al., 2014). For so-called wet gas, processing at an existing large-
scale facility will be required, since the steps are significantly more complex. For the 
proposed wells in the North of England, the current gas processing facilities could be used. 
But wells in the South of England it is likely that at least one new processing site will be 
required. The analysis reflects the worst case i.e. new gas processing facilities are required. 
If the quantity of shale gas produced exceeds current processing capacity, then new 
facilities will be required. Only if the Northern fields (alone) are producing within the 
current processing are the risks minimal at this stage. Instead of decommissioning a shale 
gas site, there are proposals to reuse the subsurface infrastructure for low temperature 
thermal energy storage (Westaway, 2016b). 
 
Stage 4 
We judge this to be the same as for conventional gas (section 6.2). 
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Stage 5 
As the distribution of gas is likely to be independent of the origin we suggest that the 
description of the gas distribution network set out in section 8.1.3 will be valid for Gas 
(unconventional), and we do not see the need for any deviations from the description for 
electricity distribution set out in section 8.1.18.1.1. 
 
Stage 6 
For the use of electrical devices we do not see the need for any deviations from the 
description set out in section 8.2.1.  For heat we consider the use of onsite systems for this 
fuel and do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. 
 
6.4 Oil 
A synthesis report by Larson et al. (2012) suggests that global reserves are increasing, but 
there is a significant mismatch between the locations of supply and demand. Control over 
these reserves rests with state actors. Over 90% of the proven and probable reserves are 
owned by nations or national oil companies (Heede and Oreskes, 2016). 
Exploring for, producing, processing, and supplying oil and its derivatives is a 
mature global industry. Technically and logistically complex projects requiring expensive 
equipment characterise the supply chain, leading to high impact at micro and macro 
economic levels (Fernandes et al., 2010). By the same token, this exposes the industry to 
risk with Fernandes et al. (2010) suggesting that the key areas of risk are from business 
operations, technical operations, and finance. The capital intensive nature of the oil 
business is exacerbated by the need for frequent reinvestment. Mitchell and Mitchell 
(2014) describe the industry as being in perpetual crisis. The UK became a net importer of 
petroleum in 2013 (BEIS, 2017c), therefore the scale of the causes of risks arising from 
elsewhere are important. It should be noted that the security afforded by trading 
internationally is a separate discussion from whether risks arise from the UK’s use of oil as 
a fuel. 
The production of fuels for vehicles is relevant for passenger and light goods 
vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, buses, locomotives, aircraft, and shipping. Each requires a 
different grade of refinery product, but the supply chain is identical. In Stage 6 (Use) we 
will concentrate on road vehicles and principally passenger and light goods vehicles. 
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One notable variation for vehicles is the production of marine bunker fuel for 
shipping, but it forms a small proportion of the UK market. Bunker fuel has a wide range 
of molecular weights and is mostly the residual from the oil distillation process. Although 
marine diesel engines are relatively efficient due to the low rate of revolution and long 
crank length, the emissions standards are much weaker than for road vehicles. Thus there 
is little incentive to process bunker fuel into a cleaner fuel. 
 
Stage 1 
The exploration for oil is more capital intensive than many other fuels, particularly in the 
off-shore environment where wells are moving to deeper water (greater than 150m). 
Although the risk is elevated, delays are most likely only to be short-term. Likewise for the 
cost and availability of the specialist equipment required. The UK oil industry receives 
investment allowances and other financial support for geophysical surveys which in part 
reduce the costs of exploration (Bast et al., 2015). 
The move to deeper water or other less accessible sites suggests that the risk of 
difficult physical access is manifest, however, the impact remains short-term and 
recoverable. The quality of the fuel source is a recognisable risk; less accessible deposits 
are more difficult to assess accurately. Should a test well prove to be too poor quality, the 
well will be abandoned, thus we judge the impact major in such a case. Oil is an 
exhaustible resource (Bentley, 2002; ITPOES, 2010) and the UK is no exception with 
discoveries on the continental shelf getting progressively smaller. Despite this, the 
mechanism for reaching peak oil remains in debate. Hubbert (1956, 1981) suggested that 
the ability to extract and supply will peak, Brecha (2012) prefers a hybrid approach of 
logistics curves and cost, whilst Verbruggen and Van de Graaf (2013) suggest inducing 
‘peak demand’. Bentley and Bentley (2015) and Sorrell et al. (2009) warn of the pitfalls in 
data sources and Speirs et al. (2015) point out the use of incommensurate methodologies 
for classifying resource availability. 
Although oil deposits are geographically widespread, not all grades of crude are 
equally distributed, requiring oil to be a globally traded commodity. However, many 
producer nations score poorly in the World Bank governance index (Table 6.2). At the 
exploration stage the risk presented by the variability of social stability (e.g. Khatib, 2014) 
and of poor institutional governance is moderate since withdrawal could be fast. On-going 
military action (e.g. Yenikeyeff, 2008) would prevent even initial exploration. The risk 
posed by on-going threats of disturbance or disruption once a large scale production 
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facility has been established (Stage 2) is considerably greater. Chatham House (2016) 
suggest that even at the exploration stage there is risk in selecting the most appropriate 
partner, particularly for nations as ‘emerging producers’ with previously uneconomic small 
oil deposits (Patey, 2015). Disputed landrights or ownership are a risk which would 
prevent an exploration project from commencing, but usually would not arise during a 
project. Analysis by Wegenast (2016) suggests that the onset of civil unrest with 
production is statistically significant where the extraction is carried out by state-owned 
companies. We have assessed this risk as moderate as disputes are more likely to arise with 
emerging producer nations (Butcher, 2013). 
 









1 Venezuela 47.3 17.9% -1.40 Yes 
2 Saudi Arabia 36.6 15.7% 0.25 Yes 
3 Canada 27.2 10.0% 1.85 No 
4 Iran 21.6 9.3% -0.19 Yes 
5 Iraq 20.1 8.8% -1.27 Yes 
6 Russian Federation 14.5 6.3% -0.08 Yes 
7 Kuwait 14.0 6.0% -0.17 Yes 
8 United Arab Emirates 13.0 5.8% 1.40 Yes 
9 Libya 6.3 2.9% -1.77 Yes 
10 USA 6.0 2.9% 1.55 No 
11 Nigeria 5.1 2.2% -0.96 Yes 
12 Kazakhstan 3.9 1.8% 0.01 Yes 
13 China 3.5 1.5% 0.42 Yes 
14 Qatar 2.6 1.5% 0.74 Yes 
15 Brazil 1.9 0.8% -0.29 Partial 
† Estimate of governance, ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). 
Table 6.2 Countries ranked by total proven (currently economic) reserves as of 2017 end. 
Sources: (BP, 2018; World Bank, 2018). 
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Stage 2 
At this second stage, exploit encompasses production and transport. Following the location 
of an oil reservoir there is a significant amount of skilled work preparing it for production, 
more so than many other fuels. Then the oil can be brought to the surface by drilling wells, 
but this may require the use of water or steam, and CO2 (re-)injection. The produced oil 
usually requires on-site conditioning by removing water, separating any sand and other 
solids, and reducing the vapour pressure by separating any light fractions. Acidic 
components are also separated, though UK crude contains very little sulphur. Then the oil 
can be shipped or piped for refining (Stage 3, conditioning). 
The UK supply chain strategy (OGA, 2016a) recognises lack of access to finance 
as a risk. Despite the high level of investment required, we judge that risk caused by a lack 
of access to capital to be moderate. The principal mitigating factors being the size and 
distribution of the demand for petroleum products and that the investment is spread over a 
long period. However, Hilton (1992) warned of a “credit crunch” with the availability of 
financing being more important than the price of the money (borrowing costs). The UK oil 
industry receives ‘field allowances’  and reduced taxation which lower the costs of 
operating off-shore (Bast et al., 2015). Upstream capital expenditure follows the market 
price for any particular weight of crude (Humphries, 1995) with syndicated debt as the 
most widely used financing instrument. When considering financing (Stages 2 and 3) the 
investment is often based on projections of NPV which arises because of a mismatch 
between planned and actual investment at implementation (Vianello et al., 2014). 
According to Salameh (2000) there is also risk in over-investment giving rise to excess 
capacity, whilst Tempest (1993) noted that a lack of investment leads to a lower rate of 
return. These points are encapsulated by Carruth et al. (2000) in considering the 
irreversible nature of large-scale investment. In the long-term, Bentley (2002) maintains 
that the main risk to investment is peak oil. Being unable to agree a price for permits is 
also a moderate risk (Stroebel and van Benthem, 2012) which may occur but should only 
lead to short-term delays. An associated risk for the licensee is the bidding process which 
may lead to paying more than the profit-maximising value (Kretzer, 1993). The costs of 
decommissioning are usually subject to legislative constraints at the end-of-life of the 
installation rather than construction. Ekins et al. (2006) describe well the complexities of 
decommissioning which give rise to uncertainty in the costs. Salter and Ford (2001) 
recommend a holistic assessment, but recognise that cost-benefit analysis cannot capture 
the full value of the ecosystem. For onshore wells, there is a possibility to defray 
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decommissioning costs by repurposing wells for geothermal energy extraction (Gluyas et 
al., 2018), however, Nian and Cheng (2018) suggest that only fields with multiple wells 
would be economic. The UK decommissioning delivery strategy (OGA, 2016b) recognises 
cost uncertainty as a risk. Whilst the costs are not likely to be insurmountable, they could 
cause delays. 
As the ‘easy’ oil is gradually exhausted, physical access is already becoming more 
difficult, for example drilling in deeper waters and/or in climates of extreme cold 
(Henderson and Loe, 2014). The industry has already demonstrated that operations can be 
carried out in extreme conditions, so we judge that sustained delays may occur but 
probably will not prevent a project from starting. A consequence of operating in such 
conditions is that the risk from natural hazards is greatly increased. Between 2004 and 
2008 five hurricanes only in the Gulf of Mexico destroyed 181 structures (Kaiser, 2015). 
In addition, natural hazards have forced the abandonment of wells (Kaiser, 2015; 
Krausmann et al., 2011; Petrova, 2010). Climate change is likely to affect a wider range of 
existing facilities (Cruz and Krausmann, 2013). Although oil production is intensive in its 
use of water (USDoE, 2014) most geographical areas where oil is extracted are not facing 
water scarcity, with the notable exception of the Middle East (Mielke et al., 2010). 
Although a mature industry where incremental improvements in technologies and 
practice might be expected to be the norm, the oil and gas industries have remained 
innovative. Hassani et al. (2017) group innovations into three categories with (cited) 
examples, namely cost reduction and time-saving, efficiency gains, and sustainable 
growth. The latter category is concerned with lowering environmental impact for the most 
part. Hassani et al. include the development of supercomputing and big data analytics as 
innovations in addition to process engineering improvements. Some of the drive for 
innovation has been dictated by the increasingly physical access to deposits with, for 
example, horizontal drilling and operating in several kilometres of water now being 
common techniques. Further innovation may come from seabed well-head operations and 
robotic techniques. However, Duch-Brown and Costa-Campi (2015) argue that stronger 
environmental policies could enhance innovation in the oil and gas sector. A barrier which 
they identify is that policies tend to be designed and implemented nationally, while the 
level of international co-operation is insufficient. There is also some evidence that large-
scale incumbents across the energy sector inhibit innovation (Costa-Campi et al., 2014). In 
the UK, tax credits are available to companies for R&D on upstream activities (Deloitte, 
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2013). Thus we suggest that this cause of risk is moderate. Likewise for the manufacturing 
of the required systems, the market is large and globalised. 
The next key risks are those in the political category, most notably lack of social 
stability (El-Katiri et al., 2014) and poor institutional governance (Dannreuther, 2015). 
Several oil-producing regions have been subject to social unrest. Sometimes separately, 
producer nations have been involved in, or subject to, military conflict (Lu and Thies, 
2013). A lack of social stability may become manifest through a lack of law and order 
resulting in the sabotage of facilities (Anifowose et al., 2012; Yeeles and Akporiaye, 
2016), the kidnap and ransom of employees (Eke, 2014), or piracy (Liss, 2011). At the 
political level Chatham House (2016) suggest that transparency and accountability are key 
factors. Risk may arise through disputes between nations over the governance of 
transnational infrastructure such as pipelines even though bi- or multi-lateral agreements 
have been reached (Yafimava, 2011). Frynas (2012) found that Government regulation 
played a significant part in oil spill prevention, but that corporate social responsibility had 
a much less significant role. Also of importance are the governance of international 
environmental legislation for shipping (Lister et al., 2015) and the national registration of 
ships (Miller et al., 2015). Putte et al. (2012) suggest that the scale and intensity of 
investment for oil and gas exposes companies to greater political risk, especially those 
operating outside of OPEC. For example corruption through theft of oil (Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013) and the expropriation of assets if product prices rise more than anticipated 
(Stroebel and Benthem, 2012). 
Even in the wake of a disaster such as the Deepwater Horizon (Gulf of Mexico) 
platform blowout, the risk of significant public concern may not be long-lasting 
(Mukherjee and Rahman, 2016). However, they found the statistically significant 
indicators which could give future campaigners starting points for engaging the citizenry. 
The decommissioning of Brent Spar storage buoy (North Sea), whilst a publicly 
controversial episode (Löfstedt and Renn, 1997; Rice and Owen, 1999), did have long-
term effects on legislation (Side, 1997). Chatham House (2016) suggest that for 
community engagement trust is a key ingredient. Conventional oil in the UK does not 
attract significant attention as most is off-shore. Should protest occur, we judge that any 
delays or disruption are recoverable. 
A lack of technicians and engineers is an issue for many nations, including the UK 
(Energy Institute et al., 2008). Many producer countries or regions rely on overseas staff 
and technologies (Khatib, 2014). For the UK we suggest that the basic levels of education 
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required are available, but that a lack of higher levels is occurring with the mismatch being 
made up by importing engineers from overseas. The UK supply chain strategy (OGA, 
2016a) recognises experienced staff leaving as a result of declining production as a risk. 
There is some possibility of redeploying those with drilling experience to deep geothermal 
developments (Gluyas et al., 2018). 
Pollution events not only occur following natural hazards, technical failures (Haney 
et al., 2014), well barrier and other integrity failures (Davies et al., 2014), flaring and 
venting (OGUK, 2016), or day-to-day operations (Baumuller et al., 2011), but also from 
fugitive emissions of various GHGs including CO2 and methane (Heede and Oreskes, 
2016). Incidents also occur during maritime transit (Banks et al., 2008; Goerlandt et al., 
2017; Kirby and Law, 2010; Neuparth et al., 2012), but Burgherr (2007) reports that the 
number of incidents has been falling since 1970. Kontovas et al. (2010) attempt to assign 
costs to spills, though this is controversial. Major pollution events can bring a temporary or 
prolonged cessation to operations, for example the Deepwater Horizon blowout (Douglas, 
2011). For UK operations it is mandatory to report hydrocarbon releases to the HSE and to 
BEIS. The chemicals released (deliberately or accidentally) assist in drilling, production, 
and pipeline operations and maintenance. They include demulsifiers, corrosion and scale 
inhibitors, water- and oil-based drilling lubricants, oxygen scavengers, and  biocides. 
Between 2006-2015 the total number of reported releases (of all severities) has fallen from 
190 to 91, but the rate per million barrels of oil equivalent produced per day (Mboe/d) has 
not declined (HSE, 2016). The rate between 2006-2015 is 69±10 Mboe/d. However, the 
tonnages are high, approximately 103 Kt in 2015, of which 72% was from drilling 
activities (OGUK, 2016). Approximately 3-4 times this mass is returned to shore for 
processing. The majority of these chemical releases are classified as posing little or no risk 
by BEIS. The OGUK (2016) environmental survey claims that 17 t of oil (product) was 
released in 2015, but approximately 2300 t was released in contaminated water as part of 
the production process. We consider the consequence from pollution events as a cause of 
risk to be high. 
The risk of being unable to neutralise waste at the decommissioning stage is likely 
to occur. The oil and gas industry is mature as a whole, but experience of decommissioning 
offshore installations is still growing. Even in jurisdictions with good governance, 
incidents such as Brent Spar (Rice and Owen, 1999) shows that there are gaps in 
understanding the marine environment (Gage and Gordon, 1995) with Salter and Ford 
(2001) suggesting that a multidisciplinary approach must be taken. Analysis of 
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environmental impact statements by Anifowose et al. (2016) shows significant deficiencies 
at the decommissioning stage. Drill cuttings stored on the seabed are noted by Ekins et al. 
(2006) as a difficult residue with which to deal. Even when decommissioning is complete 
Boothroyd et al. (2016) measured elevated levels of fugitive methane in soils above 30% 
of abandoned onshore wells. We judge that the risk of being unable to neutralise waste at 
decommissioning is high, particularly as the knowledge of long-term effects is not 
understood. 
Operational failures may occur, even if with low frequency in well regulated 
jurisdictions. However, should a catastrophic failure occur, such as Piper Alpha 
(Broadribb, 2015) the incident could close their operation completely. Overall, fatalities in 
the oil industry are lower in comparison with other energy industries (Sovacool et al., 
2015). For all UK offshore activities there have been a total of seven fatalities in ten years, 
with the number of other injuries also falling (HSE, 2016). Though exploration and 
production (Stages 1 and 2) are safer than other stages (Burgherr and Hirschberg, 2014) 
maritime transit of oil shows a greater risk. But, according to Lordan et al. (2015) this 
masks the fact that the average number of fatalities is increasing in non-OECD nations and 
decreasing in OECD countries (likewise for the number of severe accidents). In the UK, 
one reason for this is the legislative framework (OGA, 2016c) and inspection regime 
(HSE, 2006). There is evidence that developing producer nations are attempting to follow 
best international practice (Mendes et al., 2014). In comparing the UK and US safety 
regimes and practices Barua et al. (2016) noted that although the philosophies were 




The refining of crude oil is a well-understood industrial process with about 85% going to 
transport fuels and 15% to petrochemical feedstocks for non-energy purposes. Refineries 
are processing and conversion installations thus Stages 3 and 4 are combined. Refineries 
are distributed globally and located near to the market since it is logistically simpler to 
transport the crude only. As of 2017, the UK has six operating refineries with a total 
processing capacity of approximately 232,600 m
3
 per day (1.47 Mbbl per day), providing 
about 85% of UK oil consumption (UKPIA, 2016). The refining process has five principal 
elements each of which require energy and other resource inputs, and produce waste:  
 Distillation (by heating) separates the crude oil into different fractions. 
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 Conversion and reforming which adjust the yields of these different product 
streams. 
 Clean-up processes such as desulphurisation. 
 Blending to meet product specifications and legal regulations. 
 
The newest refineries are 2-4 times larger than the UK installations, with costs into several 
billion USD. This results in the growth of global refining capacity being quantised – the 
demand for the output of a new refinery takes time to become apparent. Domestically, 
UKPIA (2011) recognise that future investment needs to take account of risks posed by 
environmental standards and legislation, tightening product specifications, and what they 
term ‘demand destruction’. Therefore, the risk posed by a lack of access to capital is of 
high significance. Most components and operational units in a refinery are widely used in 
the chemical process industries, however, units such as a catalytic cracker are designed to 
be optimised for a feedstock and may be subject to significant but recoverable delays in 
production and installation. 
Although in the UK we judge the risk posed by natural hazards to be low, we note 
that flooding is a risk (Krausmann et al., 2011) and lightning strikes at crude and refined 
product storage facilities (Wu and Chen, 2016). The only issue of critical materials 
availability is for platinum group elements used in catalytic cracking units (Nieto et al., 
2013) and we judge this as a low risk. However, substituting platinum catalysts is very 
difficult. 
Should a new site for a refinery in the UK be proposed we would expect significant 
public opposition. Although disruption to production occurred, the fuel duty protests in the 
early 2000s were not primarily aimed at the refinery operators. The protest concerned 
prices and is discussed in stage 6. 
The likelihood of a pollution event occurring is high. For example, using Pollution 
Release and Transfer Register data  Gouldson et al. (2014) showed that releases of benzene 
from UK refineries was 3-4 times greater than the rest of the EU15 average. An indirect 
pollution event measured amongst UK oil refinery workers was an increased incidence of 
mesothelioma (Sorahan, 2007). Lekka and Sugden (2011) demonstrate that human error 
and implementing high reliability principles is a key factor in avoiding incidents leading to 
a pollution event, and Jain et al. (2017) suggest that no national legislative or safety 
approach is better than another. Therefore we judge that there is an ever-present risk. In 
terms of operational failures leading to accidents with fatalities, analysis by Burgherr and 
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Hirschberg (2014) suggests that the economic cost per kWh for oil are about twice that for 
renewables. The likelihood of a significant failure occurring is low, but it has the potential 
to close the facility (Jain et al., 2017). Oil refineries generally require steady and 
continuous operation. Thus disruption to the infrastructure for inputs of raw materials, 
water, heat or electricity, and for the outputs of intermediaries or final products, can cause 
short-term (but recoverable) impacts. 
 
Stage 5 
Pipelines in this context are restricted to the national distribution network for aviation 
kerosene to airports, and to petrol and diesel from the Stanlow and Shell Haven refineries 
which are distributed to a small number of regional depots.  
 For pipelines we note a few deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.3. 
We judge that the impact from a lack of access to capital may be more significant than for 
gas networks. This is on the basis that there are fewer oil distribution pipelines and only to 
large specialist sites. It is unlikely that a new pipeline will be built, but maintenance and 
renewal of the current network needs to be conducted. Petrol, diesel, and other petroleum 
products are distributed by road tanker. We suggest that price volatility of steel may have 
greater impact than for polyethylene. As the network is significantly less extensive than for 
gas, we suggest that should a new oil pipeline be required the risk of denial to access sites 
may occur and cause significant (but recoverable) delays. This would be coupled with 
significant public concern. Whilst a pollution event such as the fire at the Buncefield fuel 
depot (Mather et al., 2007) could be significant, the disruption is likely to be recoverable. 
 For the tankering of petroleum products we do not see the need for any deviations 
from the description set out in section 8.1.4. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.3. 
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7 Assessing Risks for Non-renewables (Other) 
The remaining non-renewables are Demand Reduction, Nuclear (fission), Thermal 
(geological), and Waste. Mostly the risks discussed are those assessed (Appendix A) as 
having the highest risk rating, but also some of those with moderate ratings. The exception 
is Demand Reduction, since it is unusual to consider it as a fuel. 
 
7.1 Demand Reduction 
We have defined demand reduction (DR) as comprising two elements: energy efficiency 
through use of or redesign of devices, and change in behaviour by people. This excludes 
small-scale generation technologies (covered in other sections) but does include 
technologies such as a metering and control (Hinnells, 2008). Eyre (2011) notes that one of 
the main difficulties in reducing demand is that the percentage cost savings for the 
individual consumer are often less than the percentage carbon savings benefiting society as 
a whole. The energy efficiency of homes and businesses is in part about the interaction of 
technical innovations and the willingness of people to adopt them, and adapt their 
behaviours. Defrosting a freezer (Shove and Southerton, 2000) is an example of how 
technological innovation changes social practice and aids energy efficiency; automatically 
preventing frost build-up lowers energy use. 
 In their international comparison of measures and policies the IEA (2017) claim 
that energy efficiency has improved the economic competitiveness of energy-intensive 
industries. Other claims made for improving energy efficiency include: reducing energy 
poverty and GHG emissions, and improving thermal comfort, health, well-being, ES and 
economic productivity (POST, 2017). A useful overview of the relevant UK policy since 
the early 1970s is given by Mallaburn and Eyre (2014), and Hanmer and Abram (2017) 
stress the need to learn lessons from previous transitions. Most studies on DR are for 
buildings (Palmer and Cooper, 2014), but also of importance are industrial processes  
(Griffin et al., 2016, 2017, 2018) and heat (Eyre, 2011; Delta Energy & Environment, 
2012; DECC, 2013b). Monahan and Powell (2011) claim that reducing heating demand 
will have the greatest effect on reducing GHG emissions. The third principal source of 
energy demand is transport. According to Upham et al. (2013) low-carbon transport cannot 
be realised by technology alone, yet policy remains focussed on technology innovation and 
not on transport and mobility as a service. Furthermore, the widely discredited ‘predict and 
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provide’ model persists in Government policy albeit sometimes disguised (Goulden et al., 
2014).  
 Shove (2003) contends that the population desires convenience which happens to 
demand energy. Recent detailed studies have shone light on household activities, practices, 
and the enabling products (Butler et al., 2016) which gradually become normalised (Shove 
and Southerton, 2000). As practices change there is a ratcheting-up of demand which acts 
to recalibrate societal expectations (Shove, 2003). In a meta-study for DECC, RAND 
Europe (2012) drew three conclusions that: 
1. programmes combining information feedback on comparative consumption 
alongside energy efficiency advice did lead to residential DR, 
2. knowing pre-intervention consumption had a statistically measurable effect on the 
level of energy saving (independent of other factors), and 
3. the structure and level personalisation of the intervention affect the level of energy 
saving. 
 
Due to the complications of small studies and the constraints imposed by field studies 
Hamilton et al. (2017) make a compelling case for paying special attention to data 
management and the importance of using multivariate statistical methods. We agree with 
Sorrell (2015) that “Reducing energy demand may prove more difficult than commonly 
assumed”.  
The stages for DR are less distinct than for other fuels, and their aggregation can be 
thought of as follows. Exploration (Stage 1, measuring potential) is about public/consumer 
surveying or the theoretical modelling of energy efficiency devices or processes. Stages 2-
3 (exploit and condition the fuel) can be considered as small-scale tests or pilot studies (a 
few households to city-wide), the planning (or modelling) of major activities, or energy 
efficiency devices/processes at the research stage of development. Stages 4-6 (convert, 
distribute, use) are more closely associated with deployment of activities, policies, devices, 
and processes, or the investigation and evaluation of large-scale (national) or mainstream 
energy-using activities. Inevitably there is blurring at the interfaces, reflecting the nature of 
social systems. Furthermore, incorporating explicitly social practices in this assessment 




Although some companies are creating products and services, measuring the potential, for 
the most part, is at the research stage in the UK. The main problem identified is the lack of 
continuity of funding (De Laurentis et al., 2017), interpreted as lack of access to capital. 
For energy efficiency products and services, however, Stiehler and Gantori (2016) report 
that the market may grow by 7-8% p.a. One example of this potential is the comparatively 
poor U-values of the UK’s housing stock (Guertler, 2016). 
In the context of DR, quality of fuel source can be interpreted as a combination of 
the variability of savings gained in trials and the headroom for potential savings. Strictly 
the latter is abundance or resource availability, but pragmatically it does not make sense to 
use this distinction because of the levels of uncertainty in such estimates. From the 
individual studies (modelling and trials) described below, we suggest that the ‘quality of 
the fuel’ as a cause of risk is in the highest category – the risk is likely to occur and that the 
variability may give rise to major delays in exploiting this ‘resource’ i.e. designing and 
implementing effective DR programmes. 
A synthesis report compiled by DECC (2013b) suggests that interventions in the 
home may save between 1-10% depending on the sophistication of the scheme, and 
Rosenow et al. (2018) claim that through a combination of current technologies – 
including energy efficiency – a 50% saving could be made. LCICG (2016a) estimate that a 
total of 64 MtCO2 could be saved in residential buildings. A potential saving of 7% of 
household electricity use could be made by eliminating the stand-by mode of devices 
(Coleman et al., 2012). However, Buchanan et al. (2015) observe that there is little 
evidence that feedback via in-home displays reduces demand. There is some evidence that 
installing residential PV may also reduce demand by raising awareness of energy use and 
cost (Keirstead, 2007). Looking to the second half of this century there is uncertainty in the 
level of demand for cooling in dwellings due to climate change (Gupta et al., 2015). Both 
electricity and gas are used for space heating, though gas is the majority in the UK; city-
wide mapping has been conducted by Gupta and Gregg (2018). A field study by Wyatt 
(2013) suggested that installing a condensing boiler and cavity-wall insulation 
simultaneously might yield a reduction in gas use of 14-20%, but only 8-12% when the 
boiler was in combination with loft insulation. The quantity of hot water use (Allen et al., 
2010) and heat use (Brook Lyndhurst, 2012) vary between similar households. The 
patterns of use of heating vary substantially (Huebner et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Kane et 
al., 2015), in part explained by a wide range of system set-point temperatures (Jones et al., 
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2016). Experiments using zoning of dwellings might save approximately 12% of energy 
for space heating (Beizaee et al., 2015). Usually the size of the DR quoted are what could 
be described as ‘peak’ values. Batey and Mourik (2016) show the difficulty in retaining the 
levels of reductions post-study i.e. the quality of the fuel source can degrade quickly with 
time. 
Commercial buildings have received less interest. Using US data, modelling by Sun 
et al. (2016) estimates that energy demand for cooling, lighting, space heating and water 
heating could be reduced by 15%, 5%, 16%, and 20%, respectively by 2035. Other 
estimates suggest that a total saving of 70 MtCO2 could be made by 2050 (LCICG, 2016d) 
For industry, modelling suggests that by 2050 it may be possible to achieve total 
energy reduction of 77% (Fais et al., 2016) and 500 MtCO2 (LCICG, 2012c). However, a 
case study of a cement production facility showed that a 4% reduction was possible at that 
site (Summerbell et al., 2017), and Mylona et al. (2017) show that using better 
management of the HVAC system in supermarkets a 4% reduction in electricity use may 
be possible. A wide range of savings have been identified throughout the entire food chain 
(Tassou et al., 2014). 
Since 2002 the number of trips shorter than one mile made by motorised transport 
has increased by about 5% and in 2016 the proportion of trips between 1-2 miles made by 
private motorised transport is about 60% (DfT, 2018). Also using modelling Lovelace et 
al. (2011) examined energy savings from a range of scenarios by which short trips could be 
switched from car to bicycle, and Anable et al. (2012) suggest that the distance travelled 
could be reduced by 74% by 2050. The seemingly misaligned theoretical savings and field 
measurements suggests that the ‘quality of the fuel’ as a cause of risk has been 
underestimated. A very under-researched topic is energy use for shipping. Much of the 
discussion would either fall outside the system boundary of our study or be incorporated 
within stages defined as ‘global’. However, Walsh et al. (2017) note the trade-off between 
speed and patterns of demand for goods and services. They conclude that deep 
decarbonisation of maritime transport can only come about by a fleet-wide speed 
reduction. 
Turning to the causes of risk in the innovation category, Hannon and Skea (2014) 
make a compelling case for the necessity of public support for basic research into assessing 
the possibilities and scale for DR. The risk may occur and without public funding many 
programmes would suffer significant disruption, therefore we judge this to be a moderate 
risk. 
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 We consider that the risk of a changing policy and regulatory framework may occur 
and have a short-term effect at this stage, a study by Ó Broin et al. (2015) suggests that 
further policy interventions will be required as price signals will not be sufficient to 
achieve DR. Significant public concern may arise (Brook Lyndhurst, 2012), though at this 
stage it may be more accurately described as resistance to change. Gill et al. (2011) 




The services to deliver behaviour change are not part of a well functioning market because 
the understanding is at the basic research stage. Some energy efficiency products are in a 
mature market, but the design for low carbon homes and some products are not (Heffernan 
et al., 2015). Overall we consider this cause of risk to be moderate, but the impact could be 
sustained if the effects of behaviour change programmes do not prove to be sustained and 
therefore not scalable. Macroeconomic modelling by Figus et al. (2018) suggests that 
reductions in fuel use for private transport will not be achieved through technical 
efficiency improvements, but by either travel mode switching, or wholesale substitution of 
fossil fuel for electric or hydrogen, say. 
 Although we do not consider access to capital a significant problem at this stage, it 
is worth noting that the payback period is important for industry (Eiholzer et al., 2017). 
The expected return-on-investment periods for efficiency projects in industry are short – 
perhaps one to two years. If the payback is quick there is no risk of lack of access to 
capital, but longer than, say, three years will be very difficult to raise the required 
investment. 
 When considering innovation in transport planning to reduce energy use, Banister 
and Hickman (2013) recommend the use of robust scenario methods at all stages of 
decision making and policy planning. However, these principles are not applied universally 
– in the policy context, this can be considered as an example of weak technology transfer. 
Killip et al. (2018) observe technology transfer issues for low carbon in the construction 
industry, specifically for supply chains, designers, and installers. They suggest that these 
are overlooked at the policy level, thus there is not a sufficiently strong driving force to 
enact change. There is strong evidence of the significant scope for innovation in, for 
example, new and renovated domestic buildings (Killip et al., 2014; LCICG, 2016c), non-
domestic buildings (LCICG, 2016d), energy efficiency policy (POST, 2017), and demand 
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management technologies for industry (Dyer et al., 2008). Despite this open R&D 
landscape Gupta and Gregg (2012) claim that public subsidy in housing research is 
essential i.e. a lack of public subsidy is a significant cause risk for future development. 
Likewise, Griffin et al. (2012) showed that the UK’s energy efficiency demonstrator 
scheme was responsible for 25% total industrial DR between 1979-89. 
 The rate of improvement in energy efficiency of dwellings is not only related to the 
rate building at the best current standards but also the rate of demolition of inefficient stock 
(Boardman, 2007a). This lack of capacity in the construction of housing has been prevalent 
for a significant period in the UK (Boardman et al., 2005; Boardman, 2007b). Planning 
also plays a role in the insufficient rate of housing construction (Boardman, 2007a; 
Heffernan et al., 2015) and industrial facilities (LCICG, 2012c). 
In considering the political category of risks, there is some overlap with stages 4-6., 
but this section concentrates on the design of measures and programmes and less about the 
results of market-led products and services. In the policy-making process (Boardman, 
2007a; Heffernan et al., 2015) suggest that the ability to use research feedback requires 
robust assessment of pilot and other schemes, but that such assessments are contextual for 
both consumers and policy-makers. Furthermore, Rosenow and Eyre (2013) note that 
“…UK energy efficiency policy is very fluid…” and remains true currently including for 
road vehicles. The importance of policy on pricing and taxation instruments is emphasised 
by Brand et al. (2013) who conclude that policy design should concentrate on incentive 
schemes with strong signals to prioritise low carbon systems. In their thorough review of 
European community-based behaviour change initiatives (Axon et al., 2018) observe that 
communications are the focus of most programmes with little emphasis on the role of 
fiscal support or regulation and legislation. Modelling work by Figus et al. (2017) suggests 
that it is hard to simultaneously satisfy all targets and expected outcomes, but nevertheless 
Dato (2018) makes the case that not combining policy for energy efficiency and renewable 
energy presents a risk. Boardman (2004) notes that weak efficiency standards have long-
term effects as devices take many years to exit the stock, and there is evidence that 
building regulations are not strictly followed (Boardman, 2007a) though this may in part 
be due to the standard of construction skills in the UK. Stiehler and Gantori (2016) 
recognise that stricter regulation would be a driver to increase energy efficiency and 
increase market opportunities. 
The risk of public concern of energy technologies and services aimed at achieving 
DR has already occurred, for example in smart metering (Buchanan et al., 2016) and 
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dynamic tariffs (Darby and Pisica, 2013). The provision of information alone is 
insufficient (Lange et al., 2014; Busic-Sontic et al., 2017) which is described by Stephen 
Axon (2017) as the ‘information-involvement gap’. An example is that of the Kirklees 
Warm Zone scheme where even though the interventions were free there was less than 
100% take-up (Long et al., 2015), with the main concern being the physical disruption to 
the home. When questioned about the possibility of adopting heat networks members of 
the public liked the idea that someone else would be responsible for the maintenance, but 
disliked the necessarily long contracts and the level of disruption. Trust has emerged as an 
issue in the design of programmes for DR e.g. energy advisors (Owen et al., 2014) and 
Government and businesses (Cotton et al., 2016). However, work by Volland (2017) on 
residential consumers indicates that greater trust in institutions is associated with lower 
energy use and a greater tolerance to risk is associated with higher energy use. 
Within the Technical risk category, we can define the rebound effect as a failure of 
policy design and operation. Using a combination of modelling tools Chitnis et al. (2013) 
suggest that a shift to a low carbon energy system will lead to an increased rebound effect. 
In a small field study, Jones et al. (2016a) demonstrated a rebound effect of space heating 
in social housing. And an example from the long-running smart meter design process 
Pullinger et al. (2014) claim that the developing SMETS smart metering standard will not 
facilitate the best practice and knowledge in consumer feedback techniques. The concept 
of the ‘prosumer’ (producer-consumer) is widely considered as positive for the take-up of 
microgeneration, however, Ellsworth-Krebs and Reid (2016) question whether this is just a 
technical fix which could be considered in opposition to demand reduction. 
 
Stages 4-6 
There is evidence of a lack of well functioning markets. For improving energy efficiency 
Pyrko and Darby (2011) note that the ownership and operations of networks are 
problematic and particularly noticeable in the UK smart meter roll-out programme. The 
energy service company market is noted as having high transaction costs which inhibit 
market entry (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). Two other indicators of a weak market 
structure are “green over-pricing” observed by Heffernan et al. (2015) and low energy 
price elasticity e.g. Eyre (2013). The lack of access to capital is described in general by 
Rosenow and Eyre (2013) and POST (2017). According to Booth and Choudhary (2013) 
risk arises because the benefits are not all measured in the reduction of consumer energy 
bills, but financially unquantifiable improvements such as thermal comfort or health. They 
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claim that only loft insulation and draught excluders show an NPV greater than zero. In the 
residential housing sector there are specific issues for private landlords (Reid et al., 2015), 
social landlords (Liu, 2018), adopting zero-carbon technologies (Caird et al., 2008), and 
renewable energy systems specifically (Dato, 2018). Dato also makes the case that poorer 
households need additional financial support, even for energy efficiency measures. In the 
previous stage we noted that the expected payback periods in industry for energy 
efficiency measures might scupper projects, but even if they go ahead access to capital 
may still be a barrier (LCICG, 2012c). In commercial buildings the rate of turnover of 
tenants and the rate of return for investors is noted by Elliott et al. (2015). We suggest that 
both the lack of well functioning markets and access to capital are moderate. 
Although some areas of energy efficiency are mature, others – including 
retrofitable technologies (Gooding and Gul, 2017) – have plenty of scope. The energy 
efficiency of homes and businesses is in part about the interaction of technical innovations 
and the willingness of people to adopt them, and adapt their behaviours. This led Shove 
(1998) to question whether people really do have technologies “transferred upon them”. 
The somewhat reductionist process assuming that the transfer of energy efficiency 
technologies (for buildings) is simply about overcoming non-technical barriers may well 
be missing the point, and perhaps explains the hit-and-miss nature of the take-up of devices 
and practices. We judge this to be an underestimated cause of risk. The cost of financing 
R&D is widely accepted as requiring public support, but (LCICG, 2012a) add that due to 
the high absolute costs early adopters of industry energy efficiency measures may also 
need subsidies. Analysis of patents by Bonilla et al. (2014) shows the importance of public 
R&D (in addition to oil price) for innovation in diesel engines. 
We suggest that the main risk for innovation in DR is optimism bias. For example, 
so-called smart homes have long been touted as a way to reduce energy consumption, but 
Darby (2018) suggests that this will simply lead to increased parasitic loads. Darby 
considers that smart homes have little to do with energy efficiency or DR. The introduction 
of simpler systems such as heating controls have also not realised projected savings 
(Shipworth, 2011). There is a well-documented performance gap with technologies and 
other interventions. Where this is about new proposed technologies (in the abstract) we 
consider this to be an issue of optimism bias and not the measured failure of installed 
systems or the rebound effect (risk of operational failure in the Technical category). 
Estimates or projections of energy savings carry uncertainty, for example, retrofitting of 
various solutions for dwellings (Loucari et al., 2016), Passivhaus standards (Johnston and 
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Siddall, 2016), the fabric performance of new-build dwellings (Johnston et al., 2015), and 
the performance of non-domestic buildings (Pritchard and Kelly, 2017). Batey and Mourik 
(2016) consider the performance explicitly to be a risk. In the light of the wide range of 
systems and situations where optimism bias manifests, we judge this to be a risk in the 
highest category with an impact that could lead to significant delays in energy efficiency 
improvements and DR. 
The widely accepted changing policy and regulatory framework in the UK is 
acknowledged to extend to energy efficiency and DR in industry (LCICG, 2012c). An 
important, but subtle, observation is that UK energy policy is in conflict with the aims of 
DR (Sun et al., 2016) i.e. the targets are for CO2 reduction, not DR. UK policy is supply-
side dominated, the CO2 target incentivises fuel-switching and increased renewable 
generation. Unstable policy and legislation (including unclear definitions) is hampering the 
ESCO market development (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017), whilst O’Keeffe et al. (2016) 
observe discontinuities in policy and its objectives. O’Keeffe et al. focus on the UK 
Government’s Green Deal scheme, noting that SMEs express concern about the 
Government’s long-term commitment to the programme and the lack of a visible co-
ordinating body. The lack of long-term monitoring of projects (Santangelo and Tondelli, 
2017) can be viewed as not only a problem about measuring the potential for DR, but also 
a failure of regulation particularly as invariably public subsidies were supporting the 
projects. We suggest that this risk lies in the highest category. 
The development and enforcement of codes and standards are a recognised risk in 
several areas of residential (LCICG, 2016c) and commercial buildings (LCICG, 2016d). 
Two examples are the current building regulations (Heffernan et al., 2015) and the 
installation of zero carbon technologies (Caird et al., 2008). The lack of standardisation is 
put forward by Fawkes, (2015) as a deterrent to investment. Finally, Gavin Killip (2013) 
calls for a regulatory body to draw together training, standard setting, and compliance for 
the house-building sector. Hamilton et al. (2014) note that legislation works and in the case 
of annual inspections of gas boilers in the private rented sector, has improved safety and 
efficiency. We judge that this risk is likely to occur, but it is most likely to have only short-
term impacts. 
In the context of DR, significant public concern manifests as lack of engagement or 
willingness to make changes. An important tool available to the Government is taxation 
and although it could be effective at driving policy for DR, it is deeply disliked by the 
citizenry (Eyre, 2013).  Homeowners posses scepticism about the effectiveness of some 
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new technologies (Ipsos MORI and Energy Saving Trust, 2013), and will not even 
undertake all of the easiest efficiency measures (Palmer et al., 2012). The latter may be due 
to the low level of importance they place on energy or the level of disruption caused 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2013), or because of aesthetic reasons (Sunikka-Blank and Galvin, 
2016). Although we have established that communication is a necessary but not sufficient 
criterion Bright et al. (2018) note its importance in deep retrofit of mixed tenure tower 
blocks. Another group of reasons for public opposition of lack of engagement with DR can 
be described as cultural. Conservatism is observed amongst professionals and customers in 
the house-building (Heffernan et al., 2015; LCICG, 2016c), commercial building (Scrase, 
2001; LCICG, 2016d), and the industrial sectors (LCICG, 2012c). A particularly poorly 
understood factor is that of conspicuous consumption (Hards, 2013). Consumers may want 
to avoid the stigma of being labelled as “stingy”, or may use high-use devices such as 
tumble dryers to mitigate the risk of visitors being faced with an unsightly scene. The 
social gains of, say, a new kitchen outweigh those of energy saving measures (Dowson et 
al., 2012). Olaniyan and Evans (2014) suggest that for policies to successfully tackle DR 
they must address behavioural, lifestyle, and cultural factors. Despite a plethora of 
evidence for public concern, we also note that the UK economy’s energy intensity per job 
has been falling steadily since at least 1990 (Roberts et al., 2019), as has the thermal 
demand per unit output (Roberts et al., 2015). This tension between home and work might 
be summed up as a lot of fuss by the public disliking change, but quietly the workforce 
get-on and adopt new technologies and practices without knowing or being bothered in 
practice. Thus we judge this to be a moderate risk with short-term impacts. 
The main risk in the technical category is that of operational failure of which there 
are several components, some are engineering failures others are policy or behaviour 
‘failure’. Many authors identify the split incentive problem, which has several variants 
occurring in different circumstances. We can class this as a policy failure, since it is not 
clear where the responsibility lies between the parties and no policy framework exists to 
guide or instruct them. An example of the split incentive problem is the case of the 
landlord-tenant relationship in a multi-occupancy commercial building (Scrase, 2001; 
Axon et al., 2012; LCICG, 2016d). It is the landlord only who can improve the energy 
efficiency of the building, but it is the tenant who pays the energy bills (without the control 
over the building environment). The problem is similar in the private rented sector 
(Hamilton et al., 2014; Hope and Booth, 2014; Reid et al., 2015; LCICG, 2016c), with 
Dato (2018) investigating household investment in renewable energy systems specifically. 
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A variant of the split incentive problem arises in deep retrofit projects in mixed tenure 
tower blocks (Bright et al., 2018) where the question is whether the private co-owners 
should have to pay the bill for the improvements that can only be justified as wider 
community benefits.  
The performance gap is well-documented and refers to either the modelled and 
measured performance (Marshall et al., 2017) or lower performance due to installation or 
operation issues (Dowson et al., 2012; Watson, 2015; Johnston et al., 2016), for example. 
An important observation is that there is no legal requirement to fix any performance gap 
in the finished building (LCICG, 2016c). Some operational issues of a building will be due 
to human factors (a ‘behavioural failure’), other examples are data visualisation for 
industrial processes (Challis et al., 2017) and installers making engineering errors due the 
heterogeneity of installations (Fylan et al., 2016). Another common failure is retrofitting of 
low U-value cladding leading to over heating (Baborska-Narozny and Grudzinska, 2017). 
The rebound effect (Chitnis and Sorrell, 2015) is also considered as an operational failure 
in the context of DR, with Baborska-Narozny et al. (2016) showing that the marketing of 
PV systems as ‘free green electricity’ undermined DR, creating an unintended rebound. 
Turning briefly to transport, Brand et al. (2014) discovered that the provision of well-used 
cycle routes and increases in active travel did not lead to reductions in transport CO2 
emissions. Furthermore, the passenger vehicle rebound effect (general) is estimated as 26% 
(Stapleton et al., 2017). As this cause of risk has occurred and has the capacity to halt 
projects (particularly the split incentive problem), we place operational failure in the 
highest category. 
 
7.2 Nuclear (Fission) 
The similarities of nuclear fission and fusion are relatively few, thus we treat the two 
supply chains and technologies separately. Greenhalgh and Azapagic (2009) review the 
broad drivers and barriers for nuclear fission, and Taylor (2016) the history, in the UK 
context. An important observation to bear in mind for the UK  when considering risks at all 
stages is how the debate is viewed in the public arena. According to Peoples (2014) the 
framing of new nuclear build as a “security” issue has given the impression that other 
concerns and risks should be overridden or down-played and be thought of as secondary 
considerations only. It should also be noted that the total life-cycle GHG emissions and 
whether nuclear fission is sustainable are strongly contested (Beerten et al., 2009; 
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Verbruggen et al., 2014). Dockerty et al. (2014) give an overview of the impacts on natural 
capital – broadly interpreted as pollution events in the technical category – across all 
stages. A review by DBIS (2013) gives useful high-level statistics about the UK civil 
nuclear industry. 
In this fuel category we consider the well-understood uranium process using U-
235, and the novel thorium (Th-232) process. Although there are proposals for thorium 
reactors which are completely different to those for the uranium-based process, we are 
considering the fuel source alone and not the technologies. Furthermore, as thorium does 
not contain sufficient fissile material to sustain a chain reaction it has to be irradiated in a 
neutron beam to produce U-233. Thus it is a hidden uranium process, but with less and 
different (though still long-lived) fissile products (Revol, 2015).  
Uranium is most often extracted in opencast mines, but insitu processing of 
underground reserves is now technically possible. Some uranium-bearing ores are co-
located with gold, silver, and copper. Thorium is abundant and present in low 
concentrations on all continents. However, the higher concentration (potentially 
economically viable) deposits are present principally in India, Australia, USA, Turkey, 
Venezuela, and Brazil (NEA and IAEA, 2016). The UK has no significant high 
concentration deposits. Thorium is co-located with many rare earth elements (REE) 
leading to significant additional chemical processing. At the aggregated level of this 
analysis there is no reason to consider the uranium and thorium processes separately. The 
main uranium deposits are located in Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia, Niger, Namibia, 
Russia, Uzbekistan, USA, China, and Ukraine (NEA and IAEA, 2016).  
 
Stage 1 
For Stage 1 the (global) market functions are in providing appropriate equipment and 
services to assess geologic deposits of uranium- and thorium-bearing ores; we consider 
there to be little risk or possible impact. Both elements are globally well-distributed (NEA 
and IAEA, 2016), with the largest deposits in Australia and North America. However there 
are significant deposits in Central Asia, West Africa, and the Middle East, thus denial of 
access to explore for resources might occur, but currently would have only marginal 
impact. 
 Some of the nations with reserves have poor ratings on the World Bank political 
stability index (World Bank, 2018). This too raises the likelihood of disruption to 
exploration activities marginally. The same is true for quality of institutional governance. 
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In some well-governed nations there may be public concern at prospecting for uranium and 
thorium resources, since this may lead to opencast mining operations. As this stage is 
exploration, we judge that the impact is likely to be insignificant. 
 In the exploration phase, most of the required expertise could be provided by a non-
local workforce because the numbers of people required is necessarily small, thus we 
suggest that this is not relevant at this stage. There maybe a marginal requirement for some 
unskilled local labour in countries where educational standards are poor. 
 
Stage 2 
Following extraction, a certain level of processing is carried out near to the mining 
operation to minimise the quantity of waste materials being transported. This can be 
considered as equivalent to well-head processing for gas. Furthermore, as it is a distinct 
process from enrichment (Stage 3) we have included the analysis in Stage 2. In some 
mines it is possible to exploit insitu leaching processing using a similar chemical technique 
to that of surface processing. Both pose environmental hazards. If the mine is opencast, 
rock needs to be crushed, and ground to approximately 100 µm. Water needs to be used to 
reduce dust. The next stage uses a strongly acidic or alkaline solution to leach out the 
uranium content from the ore to produce a slurry. The tailings are then disposed of. The 
slurry is then filtered and the uranium extracted by ion-exchange. This concentrate has 
relatively low levels of radioactivity. Thorium being co-located with REE it could be 
considered as a by-product of mining other valuable commodities. Uranium is not so 
frequently co-located with other valuable commodities.. Uranium is a single industry 
resource and therefore entirely dependent on the demand from the nuclear industry. 
The meaning of a well functioning market here is that for the supply of mining and 
processing equipment and components. Underground mining equipment is ubiquitous and 
we suggest presents no issues on availability. However, opencast mining is a large-scale 
operation. For example, the risk arising due to too few manufacturers of draglines or very 
large capacity trucks (a separate issue to manufacturing capacity) may cause short-term 
delays in the supply. The expense of mining operations is so great that if capital is not 
forthcoming a project cannot go ahead. For example, following the Fukushima incident, 
mining operations (Nickel, 2014) and investment in expansion (Komnenic, 2014) have 
been suspended. Thus must be assigned the highest impact level. Uncertainty of the costs 
of decommissioning and site remediation is likely to occur, but it is probable that this 
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would only cause a short-term delay. This may change in well-governed nations if 
environmental requirements were tightened for new sites. 
 The mines are frequently located in remote areas with little infrastructure for power 
or transport. But these obstacles are only short-term and will not usually prevent a project 
from proceeding. The quality or variability of the fuel source is of some concern, 
especially for thorium as it is always co-located with other minerals. The lack of the 
availability of water is a notable risk. As the sites are usually remote, transporting wholly 
untreated ores is undesirable. The current methods for processing uranium ore require 
similar quantities of water to that of coal mining. All are an order of magnitude lower than 
coal (or gas) to liquids and several orders of magnitude lower than biofuels (Mielke et al., 
2010). However, the mines and processing facilities are frequently in arid zones and it is 
likely that water will need to be transported to the site. For some underground uranium 
mines, it may be possible (or necessary) to use an in-situ recovery process. However, this 
requires a very large supply of water, often extracted from underground aquifers. We judge 
that in such cases a shortage of water could have a sustained, but recoverable, impact. 
 Like all other hard rock mining operations, uranium and thorium extraction is a 
mature industry. It does not require public subsidies and the equipment required is widely 
used throughout the world. Interestingly, the technology and processes for exploiting lower 
grades ores are in some cases becoming less complicated. A cost-effective process for 
extracting uranium from lower grade ores is to use heap leaching – it is simply not 
economically viable to use a more complex process on low grade material. Although 
research and development is required, deploying the process is limited more by 
environmental legislation than process innovation. As a mature industry with low margins 
there is little incentive to innovate, thus there is a risk that improving equipment and 
making processes more energy efficient is slow or lacking. 
 The denial of permission to access sites may form part of a negotiation and that it 
may lead to more than moderate delays. It is possible, though not likely, that the nations 
rich in uranium reserves will be subject to social unrest (World Bank, 2018). However, the 
resources are widespread across the globe with a number of well-governed nations in the 
ten largest producer/processors. Any disruption due to social unrest or poor institutional 
governance in a nation will mostly cause a medium-term supply problem. A cause of risk 
with potentially much greater impact is the lack of institutional governance. In extremis, 
this may close a mining operation or force a company to withdraw completely. Disputed 
land rights is an issue carrying risk in some areas, especially those in First Nation 
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territories. Although this occurrence now may be unlikely, its impact could be moderate. 
The global nuclear industry is subject to significant public concern, mostly the location, 
operation, and decommissioning of reactor sites (discussed at Stage 4). Mining operations, 
independent of resource, may attract significant public concern and protest for different 
reasons, frequently environmental impact and employee welfare. But as the resource is 
spread globally, the impact is likely to only be short-term.  Changing environmental 
protection regulations may cause some temporary disruption to supply from one of the 
well-governed nations, but this is likely to be short-lived. A lack of vocational skills in the 
workforce presents a moderate level of risk. 
 It could be argued that a pollution event at a single mine is of little consequence to 
the UK nuclear industry. If one operation is halted the global nature of the industry will 
supply the demand. However, there have been a number of significant episodes including 
in the USA (Voyles, 2015; Hoover et al., 2017). Thorium extraction also poses radiological 
risks (Ault et al., 2016). If sufficient pollution events occur this could affect supply, or an 
ES analysis could place value on avoiding fuel sources which give rise to such events. This 
issue is connected to the inability to neutralise waste at the decommissioning of a mine 
site. Although technology and processes are known for neutralising most of the tailings 
waste (solid and liquid), it may prove difficult to force a company to carry it through 
correctly. Furthermore, there will be items of machinery and concentrated wastes which 
some nations will find hard to manage correctly. With the increase in the use of heap 
leaching, the risk rises. A serious event has the potential to be catastrophic for a site. Thus 
we judge that this risk may occur and the impact may be at the major level. 
 
Stage 3 
The conditioning of the concentrate derived from the extraction operations to fissile fuel is 
more complex than for most other sources. Although there is competition to supply the 
concentrate, there is only one destination for manufactured fuel. There is no competition 
between process routes, since the route depends on the nature of the reactor. This can take 
one of several routes with different chemical and mechanical processing, depending on the 
nature of the reactor type. There are wet and dry chemical conversion routes, but typically, 
the concentrate is gassified and converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6). There are six 
plants globally in: Brazil, Canada, China, France, Russia, and USA. None of the plants 
listed are operating at full capacity; until it closed in 2014 there was a plant in the UK. 
Therefore this operation is separated from pre-processing of the ores (Stage 2), and the 
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isotope separation and fuel manufacturing (Stage 4). Following chemical conversion, UF6 
is cooled and shipped as a solid to separation and fuel manufacturing facilities which are 
nearer to the reactors, including a site in the UK. 
 The meaning of a well-functioning market is that for processing equipment. Many 
components required are similar to that used in other chemical process industries. 
However, specialised equipment for radiation handling might be subject to short-term 
delays in delivery and there could be some price volatility. The key causes of economic 
risk are the lack of access to capital and the uncertain cost of decommissioning. Although 
the site is not as complex as a reactor, it is an expensive operation, most of the plants are 
state-backed. The sites produce low and medium radioactive waste, requiring long-term 
storage. We judge that scope for further significant R&D improvement are limited, posing 
a modest risk. 
 The risks posed by a lack of social stability and a lack of institutional governance 
are at a modest level. Although three of the six nations pose risk, this is mitigated by the 
spare capacity at the three which pose no significant risk. The notable technical risks which 




The production of reactors and their systems is a niche activity, not a mass market. In this 
stage we included the production of the final fuel rods or pellets. Isotope separation in the 
UK plant is achieved by using thousands of mechanical centrifuges, enriching the U-235 
isotope to 3.5%-5%. The enriched UF6 is then converted to uranium dioxide (UO2) (solid 
phase) pellets for manufacturing into fuel rods.  
Some processes to manufacture components, such as the steel reactor vessels, are 
so specialised that only a single company has the facilities and expertise. (LCICG, 2016e) 
state that the barriers to market entry are high, in part because the regulatory requirements 
are stringent. Consequently there is a lack of competition. .Thus the risk posed by the lack 
of a functioning market is significant and may lead to sustained delays. Even for more 
common components, modifications may need to be made to accommodate (even 
moderately) radioactive process streams. 
The cost of building a complete reactor and site is high and hard to quantify (Harris 
et al., 2013; Linares and Conchado, 2013) with Thomas (2005) stating that operators are 
reluctant to reveal their true on-going spend, and Du and Parsons (2009) suggesting that 
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estimates of build costs doubling since 2003. Thomas (2010) observed that institutions 
lending to the then (and still) on-going nuclear build projects considered their investments 
to be at high risk, with Ansar and Flyvbjerg (2016) describing new nuclear build projects 
as ‘fragile’ and Thomas (2015) questioning whether the Generation III+ are any more 
buildable that previous designs. The need for the industry to realise the promised cost 
reductions is highlighted by Watson et al. (2014). Modelling by Green and Staffell (2013) 
suggests that the private sector alone cannot deliver nuclear stations without subsidy from 
a Government. The well-publicised difficulties of raising the finance for, and the total costs 
of, the UK’s Hinkley Point ‘C’ project led the NAO (2016) to raise concerns they term as 
‘value for money risks’. Therefore, we suggest that the risk arising from the lack of access 
to capital is at the highest possible level. The risk is classed as macro as the finance is 
raised from globally distributed investors (including sovereign funds). The risk posed by 
being unable to agree a price for permits or subsidies (by whichever mechanism) is likely 
to occur. Although this impact may cause significant delay, it should be a recoverable 
situation. For example, the negotiations to agree a price for the power generated by 
Hinkley Point ‘C’ were protracted, but a price was settled. 
Nuclear decommissioning costs have an interesting ‘split cost’ problem. The 
owner/operator of the reactor facility receives the benefit of selling the power produced, 
but the nation (and future generations of citizens) pays for the long-term decommissioning 
and storage of the waste i.e. the costs are socialised. Kula (2015), and Freeman et al. 
(2015) report on the effects of the wide variety of both discount rates (private and social) 
and the total lifetime of the complete nuclear cycle.  Thomas (2005) provides evidence that 
decommissioning on a commercial scale is unproven and that forecasts are likely to be too 
low by a significant margin. In the case of Hinkley Point ‘C’ the deal indicates that the 
consortium building and operating the site will set aside some of the revenues to cover 
decommissioning, but Thomas (2005) shows that this is a higher risk strategy. As the value 
of the Hinkley figure is not clear, it is not possible to say whether it will cover all of the 
costs Furthermore, the long-term storage of high-level waste has not yet got an agreed 
technical solution, nor a firm cost (Verbruggen et al., 2014). However, the Government has 
agreed to take responsibility for all of the intermediate- and high-level waste (NAO, 2016). 
Using the UK Government methodology (DECC, 2010c), Harris et al. (2013)  estimated a 
total decommissioning cost of approximately £3 / MWhe. To give commercial investors 
confidence the decommissioning cost is set as the 99
th
 percentile of a modelled figure. 
Thus for the Hinkley Point ‘C’ project DECC state that the financial risk to the UK tax-
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payer due to decommissioning is “very low” (NAO, 2016). We suggest that the risk arising 
from uncertainty in the decommissioning costs will occur and that it will introduce 
sustained delays. But we must assume that however slowly decommissioning happens and 
whatever length of time storage of radioactive wastes require, that the process will be 
carried out i.e. no matter what the cost or uncertainty, progress will be made. 
According to the IAEA (2012) a typical 1 GWe nuclear plant with a once-through 




 of water, depending on the reactor type. These flow 
rates are 20-25% greater than for coal-fired plant due to the lower thermal efficiency of 
nuclear plant. There is a small likelihood that water supply from a river may be inadequate 
but the impact could be moderate, including the temporary shutdown. Grimston et al. 
(2014) give a useful account of how UK policy for radiological protection with respect to 
siting has changed over post-war period. The harsh radiation environment requirements the 
use of (exotic) critical materials. Although there is some demand for silver (Speirs et al., 
2013a), it may be substitutable. 
The risk from a weak technology transfer environment is possible and may result in 
short-term delays. We do not consider it likely that the impact would be more severe than 
minor as nuclear is a high-value low-volume industry and as such can readily procure 
solutions (whether these work or not is a different matter). However, (LCICG, 2016e) 
acknowledge that there has been market failure in all areas of innovation for the nuclear 
industry, with UK spending lagging significantly behind Japan, the USA, and France 
(DBIS, 2013). In the light of a finite supply of uranium Verbruggen et al. (2014) suggest 
that breeder reactors will be required in the last quarter of the 21
st
 century, but that little 
progress has been made since the first generation of this technology. The risk from a lack 
of public subsidy is of the highest level; a plant cannot be developed and built using 
private investment alone (Badcock and Lenzen, 2010; Bradford, 2013; Gross and Watson, 
2015). For safety licensing considerations, improvements to current reactor designs will be 
incremental. But there are many designs for significantly different types of reactor (von 
Hippel et al., 2012; Peakman et al., 2018) suggesting that fission reactors may not always 
be at risk of only incremental improvement. Without a buoyant market for new-build the 
risk of the lack of  willingness to invest to innovate in nuclear technology is high. We do 
not judge this to be at the highest level of risk, since the existing reactor fleets require 
innovation and improvement. In their review of UK R&D capability, Sherry et al. (2010) 
provide evidence from UK and overseas experts that the UK is lacking in several areas. 
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Optimism bias is widespread in the nuclear industry: the ways in which arguments 
for nuclear power are relativised (Teräväinen et al., 2011) to the borrowing costs (Thomas, 
2010), construction times (Harris et al., 2013; Thomas, 2015), construction costs (Du and 
Parsons, 2009), and the operational and maintenance costs (Koomey and Hultman, 2007). 
In the case of Hinkley Point ‘C’, these “fragilities” lead Ansar and Flyvbjerg (2016) to 
suggest that the project should be abandoned. 
The risk of lack of capacity to manufacture components is modest, but not 
insignificant since many subsystems are not mass-market items. Many are required to 
survive in hard radiation environments. The steam turbine side presents no significant risk 
since these are standard for all thermal plant with a worldwide manufacturing base. The 
risk of lack of capacity to construct sites we judge also to be modest, but more significant. 
The techniques required to reach safety standards present more of a challenge with a 
smaller number of construction companies able to take on a project of that scale. 
Of the causes of risk in the political category, a changing regulatory or policy 
framework is by far the greatest. The UK policy landscape since the 1980s has been 
characterised by swings in policy (Connor, 2003; Mitchell, 2007) and institutional change 
(Kern et al., 2014). There is strong evidence to suggest that this presents a risk at a high 
level, though not unrecoverable. Any new nuclear project will certainly attract public 
concern even though the nuclear industry has attempted to relativise the risks (Teräväinen 
et al., 2011). According to Greenhalgh and Azapagic (2009) the responses to the UK 
Government’s white paper ‘Our Energy Challenge’ showed that the three greatest concerns 
were waste disposal, the cost of the electricity generated, and terrorist risk. But as Corner 
et al. (2011) show that there is ‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power we judge that the 
impact will be short-lived. 
The skills shortage in the civil nuclear industry have been discussed widely by 
many commentators including Pitt (2014) and Thomas (2015). Data from across the EU 
(Simonovska and Estorff, 2012) shows that both the technician and engineer levels are 
affected significantly. A shortage of engineering skills also poses a risk in terms of the UK 
acting as an expert customer (LCICG, 2016e). The situation is retrievable, governed by a 
time-constant, through training programmes in Further Education colleges and universities 
(Roberts, 2009; DECC, 2015b).  The NAO (2016) suggest that the lack of specialist skills 
has increased the costs for the Hinkley Point ‘C’ project. 
Technical causes of risk mainly arise from pollution, operations, and 
decommissioning. The likelihood of a radiological pollution event is low, though it may 
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occur. In the UK, licensed sites must report incidents and events to the Office for Nuclear 
Regulation (ONR) using the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) 
ratings of events (Level 0 – level 7). Between 2010-2013 there was a single INES 2 event, 
requiring enforcement action by the ONR. By a large majority events were rated as zero, 
which is within all safe operating limits (ONR, 2013). According to Sovacool et al. (2015) 
incidents in the nuclear industry account for 70% of damages (by cost) caused by energy 
systems globally. This is likely to be a maximum figure since reporting  in the nuclear 
industry is easier to track historically and geographically than in some other sectors. Using 
a subset of these data (1950-2014) Sovacool et al. (2016) categorise nuclear as high risk in 
respect of accidents. 
 However, events occurring on site or externally may result in a shutdown of the 
reactor or whole site whilst remedial action is taken. The risk due to operational failure has 
a medium likelihood as there have been instances of systems failure such as a voltage 
droop which triggered Sizewell B to temporary shutdown (BBC News, 2012; EDF, 2016). 
The risks posed by the inability to neutralise radioactive waste at decommissioning is 
certain; the Selafield site is storing (at the surface) all of the UK’s nuclear waste since the 
1940s (NDA, 2015, 2016). To date, no underground long-term storage facility has been 
built despite several proposals (NDA, 2016). Although, the short-term storage programme 
operates safely, the lack of a long-term solution may have a significant impact on the 
viability of future nuclear build programmes. 
 
Stage 5 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.1. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.1. 
 
7.3 Thermal (Geological) 
Geothermal resources in the UK can be grouped into so-called ‘low enthalpy’ and ‘Hot 
Dry Rock’ types. Estimating the deep geothermal resource of the UK requires modelling 
and fieldwork, and remains uncertain (Busby et al., 2011). Radiologically active geological 
formations are normally expected to offer suitable temperatures, but this is not always the 
case (Busby et al., 2015).  Furthermore, the classification of resource temperature is 
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inconsistent globally. We adopt the classification proposed by Younger (2014, 2015) 
which defines UK resources as mostly ‘very low’ (less than 50 °C) and ‘low’ (51-200 °C). 
The very low grade heat (down to 1000 m depth) has been mapped by Busby et al. (2011) 
observing that the temperature gradient might be 28 °Ckm
-1
, 3 °C greater than previously 
thought. Turkenburg et al. (2012) suggest that applications for very low grade thermal 
energy include heating of commercial buildings, horticulture, aquaculture, timber drying, 
and mineral extraction. Total UK low grade heat (40-100 °C) has been mapped by 
Downing and Gray (1986), and estimated by Barker et al. (2000) as approximately 70 EJ. 
A borehole study in Weardale suggests that a temperature of 100 °C may be achievable at 
depths of approximately 2 km in the right geological formation (Younger and Manning, 
2010) and underlines the uniqueness of every potential project. Modelling well depths of 
5-7 km Busby and Terrington (2017) speculate that temperatures up to 300 °C may be 
possible, which would afford electricity generation. Currently there are no deep geothermal 
sites operating commercially, though one is planned in Cornwall to heat a swimming pool 
complex (Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Growth Programme, 2016). 
For the fuel categorisation to be fully generalised, the definition of Thermal 
(geological) could be split. The nature of the renewability of (deep) geothermal energy 
differs between sites and in different parts of the world. For the highest temperature 
resources Axelsson et al. (2005) and Bromley et al. (2010) consider well lifetimes of 100 
years or more to be renewable. For the UK and the majority of other countries the 
temperatures available are low to intermediate and exhaustible (non-renewable). However, 
for the purposes of analysing risk in the supply chain, this may not be an important 
distinction as the fuel realistically can only be used locally. 
There is potential for heat recovery from minewater (Bailey et al., 2016; Al-
Habaibeh et al., 2018) and deep saline aquifers (Younger et al., 2015). Nian and Cheng 
(2018) review the possibility of using abandoned oil and gas wells for geothermal energy, 
whilst (Westaway, 2016b) suggests that subsurface infrastructure of exhausted shale gas 
sites might be repurposed as borehole thermal energy storage (BTES) in the UK. 
For Stage 1-3 inclusive, the likelihood and impact of the causes of risks are broadly 
similar to those of Gas (unconventional) e.g. the drilling rig required is the same 
(Batchelor, 1987), but there are notable differences. 
 137 
Stage 1 
Younger (2015) points out that access to capital is a particular problem for deep 
geothermal energy systems because of the necessary concentration of expenditure in the 
early stages of the development of a site. Furthermore, projects require significant public 
subsidy (Younger and Manning, 2010; Younger et al., 2016) Although test bores are not 
made to the ultimate working depth, most of the cost is incurred in drilling any bore of 
sufficient depth. This requirement stems from the risk posed by the fact that the quality of 
the fuel – the reservoir geometry and its physical/thermal properties – cannot be fully 
determined without drilling a test well (Nazroo, 1989; Busby, 2014; Younger, 2015; 
Younger et al., 2016). Therefore we judge the ‘quality of fuel’ cause of risk to be in the 
highest category, but even a test bore may not yield sufficient information (Busby and 
Terrington, 2017). We suggest that if the risk occurs it may end the project.  
Also arising from the uncertainty of the quality of the fuel is optimism bias, but we 
judge this to be at a moderate level. Although many fuels at the explore stage are not 
particularly sensitive to a changing regulatory and policy framework, for deep geothermal 
it is more serious. There is the element relating to planning, but particularly as the heat is 
most likely to be used directly rather than for electricity generation. 
Compared with Gas (unconventional) we suggest that there will be little public 
concern, even though the same surface equipment issues may arise. We also suggest that 
pollution event significantly lower. 
 
Stages 2-3 
The capital requirements increase at this stage as according to Augustine et al. (2006) and 
Lukawski et al. (2016) drilling costs scale non-linearly with depth. The main factors are 
depth, diameter, casing design, and site-specific characteristics (Augustine et al., 2006). 
According to Sovacool et al. (2016) drilling for geothermal resources is considerably more 
difficult than for onshore oil and gas. Thus even a technically viable site may not be able to 
raise sufficient funds; we judge this risk now to be at the highest possible rating. We note 
that unlike Gas (unconventional) permit costs are not relevant. In most cases 
decommissioning costs are less of an issue than for Gas (unconventional) as there will less 
contaminated waste of which to dispose. However, worked-out oil and gas wells 
repurposed for geothermal will incur additional decommissioning costs. 
 The precise quality of the fuel source is only discovered once the borehole system 
is completed and it remains a risk that the temperature gradient is not sufficient or the 
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geological conditions are not as predicted; this could be severe enough to terminate a 
project. The range of estimates of water requirements is wide (Mielke et al., 2010) with the 
different thermal grades of resource having intrinsically different needs. For wells in the 
UK Younger (2015) considers water availability not to be a significant problem. However, 
Batchelor (1987) warns that wells away from the coast or an estuary need to keep losses to 
below 5%, and maintaining injection pressure also requires (parasitic) pumping energy. 
 Although some elements for geothermal energy are mature (Turkenburg et al., 
2012) there is good scope for technology transfer from the oil and gas sector e.g. drilling 
techniques (Younger et al., 2012; Busby and Terrington, 2017). Though it should be noted 
that modelling by Mazzucato and Semieniuk (2018) suggests that private companies are 
not likely to fund innovation in such large undertakings. As the risk level is too great, 
public subsidy is likely to be required. Younger et al. (2012) and Younger (2015) suggest 
that there is significant scope for improvements in reservoir modelling, which will assist 
resource management and maintenance. A less obvious cause of risk is the lack of 
materials substitutability. The underground conditions for deep geothermal energy are 
significantly more harsh than for oil and gas extraction (Younger, 2015). 
In comparison with Gas (unconventional) infrastructure is less of an issue since DH 
networks are easier to construct than long distance gas transport pipes. A combination of 
the longevity of geothermal projects and that most sites likely to be workable in the UK 
will produce low-grade thermal energy for water and space heating implies that a changing 
policy environment presents a risk in the highest category because heat policy is very 
uncertain. To lessen this uncertainty Gluyas et al. (2018) are calling for a Contract for 
Difference scheme for heat. Public concern about Thermal (geological) is much lower than 
for Gas (unconventional), but lack of awareness of the potential of UK geothermal energy 
is recognised as a problem (Bromley et al., 2010; Turkenburg et al., 2012). Prior to the 
Infrastructure Act of 2015, landowners in principle could treat geothermal energy 
extraction infrastructure under their land as trespass (Burns et al., 2016), though now 
automatic access is allowed below 300 m.  
 As geothermal systems are inherently low risk (Sovacool et al., 2016) the accident 





 (Burgherr and Hirschberg, 2014),  therefore a low likelihood of catastrophic 
technical failure. Failures which do occur appear to be related to the action of corrosive 
geothermal fluids degrading piping and other process equipment (Sovacool et al., 2016). 
Drilling will require the same drilling lubricants as the oil and gas industry, and opening 
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pathways at the well bottom or horizontal sections may need the high viscosity gels used 
for fracturing shale deposits (Batchelor, 1987). These present some risk from a pollution 
event, however these processes and compounds are well understood. Deep and hot 
geological environments contain a variety of chemical species such as boron, mercury, 
arsenic, radon (radioactive) and hydrogen sulphide (Batchelor, 1987), which will be 
transported to the surface during drilling and operation. Wastewaters will need to be 
treated to remove relatively small quantities, but it does present a risk. An additional 
pollutant released during drilling and routine operation is CO2 (Turkenburg et al., 2012; 
Davies et al., 2014). Therefore a pollution event will occur, though the amount of CO2 
released is less than that for oil and gas production. 
 
Stage 4 
For electricity generation, the Organic Rankine (ORC) (Smith, 1993) and the Kalina cycles  
(Fiaschi et al., 2017) are the most suitable for low temperature sources.  Devices based on 
these thermodynamic cycles are not prevalent and there is no large established market; this 
may lead to some price volatility for the components. Access to capital may be a problem 
as these devices are currently expensive (Nian and Cheng, 2018), but much less so than for 
the drilling phase. We judge this to be of moderate risk. The inability to agree a price of 
permits is not relevant (no carbon credits required), neither are lack of physical access, 
lack of water availability, the denial of permission to access sites, and disputed landrights 
because the borehole and the conversion device are co-located.  
Improvements are likely as it is an immature technology with R&D active on 
system architecture and cycle modification, components (expanders and heat exchangers), 
control strategies, and working fluids (Quoilin et al., 2013; Lecompte et al., 2015). Public 
subsidies are likely to be required as it is always likely to be a niche market, and R&D may 
not be sufficient to meet the challenge posed by the harsh underground environment. We 
judge the optimism bias may arise. The ability to create infrastructure may be an issue for 
some geothermal projects which may generate electricity requiring a medium or high 
voltage grid connection. We suggest that the policy and regulatory environment will be the 




We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.1.
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Stage 6 
We consider the use of district heating networks for this fuel and do not see the need for 
any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. 
 
7.4 Waste 
An overview of the processes for energy-from-waste (EfW) facilities is given by DEFRA 
and DECC (2014). Although most municipal solid waste (MSW) is from households 
(DEFRA, 2018) some commercial and industrial waste can also be used (Lupa et al., 
2011).  
 There are a variety of technologies other than dedicated incineration (DEFRA, 
2013) including co-firing with coal in cement kilns (Garg et al., 2009) and fluidised-bed 
combustion (Yassin et al., 2009). Nixon et al. (2013) have compared the technical details 
of operational performance of a range of incinerators in the UK. Even though the cost of 
landfill is rising the trade-off against incineration is difficult since its operational costs 
remain high (Mills et al., 2014). According to Jeswani and Azapagic (2016) the 
environmental impacts of MSW incineration are less than for landfill. 
 
Stage 1 
Although the UK has programmes to improve recycling rates which might reduce the total 
MSW available, we do not observe any notable risks at this stage. 
  
Stage 2 
The collection of household, commercial, and industrial waste is a well-understood 
process. There are no notable risks at this stage. 
 
Stage 3 
The waste is not considered as a fuel until the recyclates are removed and the moisture 
content reduced (DEFRA and DECC, 2014). The wide variety of the mixed wastes is 
interpreted as the quality of fuel. We note that innovation in recycling methods may also 
improve waste collection and sorting methods. Waste sorting facilities are large and there 
is some risk of accessing capital, though if long-term contracts for appropriate minimum 




DEFRA and DECC (2014) describe raising capital for EfW projects as “challenging” 
perhaps requiring grants (DEFRA, 2013) or other subsidies (Jamasb and Nepal, 2010). We 
consider that this cause of risk may occur, but is likely only to have a short-term effect. 
The only notable risk from the environment is the quality of fuel. It will be highly variable, 
but operating experience (Nixon et al., 2013) suggests that it is unlikely to cause 
disruption. However, the variability will also affect the treatment of the post-combustion 
residues (Shirley et al., 2015). 
 There is a moderate risk of changing policy and regulation (DEFRA and DECC, 
2014). The principal risk in the political category is that of significant public concern (Bull 
et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2013; Phillips et al., 2014; Levidow and Upham, 2017). Public 
opposition will occur with the consultation and planning process causing a major delay. 
 Waste incineration will generate air pollution (Bogush et al., 2015) including heavy 
metals which have been detected in soils in the vicinity of incinerators (Rimmer et al., 
2006). Although we expect environmental standards to continue tightening any facility 
breeching the regulations is likely to have its permits suspended. Incinerator bottom ash 




We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.1.1. 
 
Stage 6 
We do not see the need for any deviations from the description set out in section 8.2.2. 
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8 Assessing Risks for Distribution, Use, and Cross-
cutting Issues 
The distribution and use stages are treated together because the differences between the 
fuels types reduces significantly once the final energy vector is produced. The cross-
cutting issues are those of critical materials requirements, skills, and negotiation. These are 
discussed independent of stages for the most part. Critical materials availability is a single 
cause of risk, but skills are a category in their own right. Negotiation was not listed 
explicitly as a unique risk as it is suffused through almost all public and commercial 
operations at all stages. The decisions should be read across the risk matrix (Appendix A) 
for each stage of each fuel supply chain.  
 
8.1 The Distribution Stage 
As there is a smaller number of final energy vectors compared to the fuel sources, there is 
significant commonality in the modes of distribution. Many of the vectors are using the 
same system directly. Therefore many of the risks, likelihoods, and impacts are identical. 
For brevity, we present a commentary applicable generally, with only exceptions or 
interesting circumstances mentioned individually in each fuel source discussion. There are 
three principal types of distribution: electricity networks (on- and off-shore), pipelines (gas 
and liquid), and tankering of liquid transport fuels for road vehicles. For liquid pipelines 
we consider three discrete systems, namely oil, kerosene, and water. Scott and Evans 
(2007) lament the lack of innovation in electricity networks evident in the 1950-60s upon 
which we still rely. Overviews of energy network regulation and future infrastructure 
needs for the UK are given by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem, 2009a) 
the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC, 2018), respectively. 
 
8.1.1 Electricity Networks 
The distribution of electrical power is a well understood and mature industry. For the 
majority of the identified causes of risk, electricity distribution networks present mostly 
low level risks with mostly short-term impacts were they to occur. The three principal 
groups which share risk ratings are large-scale plant where the site is very unlikely to 
change status, new onshore connections (usually to the medium voltage network), and 
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networks and connections for offshore / ocean technologies. The default description which 
follows is for existing sites which covers the majority of instances.  
The well-functioning market refers to that of network equipment, cables, and 
monitoring and control devices. As this is a mature global market, there are a variety of 
manufacturers from which to select. Therefore the risks are low and any impact short-
lived. Although individual network items may be relatively inexpensive, HV transformers 
for example may cost several millions of dollars apiece. Major projects of replacement or 
new build will require access to significant capital, which we judge poses a modest level of 
risk. Future networks integrated with sophisticated ICT may have a significant capital 
requirement (Leal-Arcas et al., 2017). For a generating plant at an existing site, there will 
not be a need to ask for a new connection point. But to create a new connection point 
requires the permission of the (distribution) network operator. This requirement can pose a 
risk if it is technically or commercially inconvenient for the DNO to allow the connection 
to be installed, the process can be delayed or be costed at an unrealistic level. Although not 
strictly a licence or permit, only the DNO can physically make the connection and sign-off 
the installation. For a fuel category that is exploited by an existing large-scale generator, 
this risk deemed irrelevant. The moderate score associated with the risk of a lack of critical 
materials accounts for grid-scale battery storage (either Li-ion or flow cell). 
There is a modest risk posed by natural hazards such as storms and flooding. There 
are examples of substations being inundated when rivers burst their banks and winter 
weather bringing down power lines, but service is usually restored in a few days or a week 
i.e. short-term disruption only. 
 Industry maturity might suggest that the level of risk that innovation will only be 
incremental is high (Bolton and Foxon, 2015), indeed innovation to improve efficiency and 
to lessen losses is incremental but steady. However, integrating ICT (Taylor et al., 2011; 
NIC, 2016) and data analytics are likely to be the most significant changes, leading to the 
so-called ‘smart grid’  (Balta-Ozkan et al., 2014; Xenias et al., 2014). Thus we consider 
that there is significant space for innovation to occur in electricity networks. Whilst the 
drivers and barriers are well understood (Xenias et al., 2015) there remain risks and 
uncertainties (Connor et al., 2018) including a lack of innovation from under investment. 
For the development and deployment of smart grids, novel technologies exploiting ICT are 
required which are beyond the current core expertise of the power industry (Xenias et al., 
2015). We suggest that this is coupled to a raised level of risk that the capacity to engage in 
R&D in the UK will not meet the challenge (Connor et al., 2014). Ofgem addressed the 
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falling levels of R&D investment (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008b) in the networks industry 
through programmes such as the Low Carbon Networks Fund and incentive mechanisms 
(Ofgem, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b). Although these are not in name a subsidy, it is enforced or 
incentivised spending of income from a regulated market. It is considered that a 
requirement for public support for R&D will be on-going (LCICG, 2012d; Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2015) It is interesting to note that Ofgem consider innovation to encompass 
products and equipment, communications and commercial interactions, and the cultural 
approach to risk (Ofgem, 2009b).  
 A useful overview of the complicated policy and regulation landscape is given by 
(Connor et al., 2014). The National Audit Office reviewed UK planning for infrastructure 
(NAO, 2013) noting that energy networks: 
 are privately owned,  
 are subject to policy formed by (DECC) BEIS, 
 are regulated by Ofgem, 
 have investment needs identified by a combination of private companies and the 
regulator, 
 have investment raised by private companies alone, and 
 are paid for by consumers. 
 
Bolton and Foxon (2015) suggest that the governance of networks (policy and regulatory 
framework) in a liberalised market makes it difficult to align stakeholder requirements in a 
coherent manner, which Leal-Arcas et al. (2017) suggest inculcates a short-term attitude. 
Respondents to surveys and interviews carried out by Connor et al. (2018) observed a lack 
of co-operation between power generation companies and DNOs. We interpret this as a 
risk from a changing policy and regulation. For large-scale generators, whether established 
technologies or in development, the risk is low as the current network is well suited. 
However, new technologies small-scale require a coherent strategy for regulatory change, 
but continual change in policy presents a significant risk. For established small-scale 
distributed generation, the risk lies somewhere in between. Significant public concern will 
arise for new power lines and other infrastructure in sensitive areas (Cain and Nelson, 
2013; Cohen et al., 2014, 2016; Raimi and Carrico, 2016) and could cause major delays. A 
prominent controversial example being the Beauly-Denny upgrade (Ritchie et al., 2013).  
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 The technical causes of risk are not considered to be significant in such as well-
regulated industry. Although pollution may arise through leakage of oils and insulation 
materials, any event is likely to be localised. Alternatives to the most hazardous high-
voltage insulating material – sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) – are being sought (Christophorou 
et al., 1997; Rabie and Franck, 2018). The compound SF6 is the most potent greenhouse 
gas with a 100-year global warming potential (GWP) estimated at approximately 24,000 
(Myhre et al., 2013). 
 
8.1.2 Offshore Electricity Networks 
The risk arising from the lack of a well-functioning market is enhanced for offshore and 
subsea network equipment. Although it is a global market, the number of specialist 
manufacturers is lower. This risk of the lack of manufacturing capacity for some 
components, for example subsea power cables. The likelihood and impact of a lack of 
access to capital is significant for operating offshore. We suggest that the impact is 
recoverable, but would delay projects beyond the short-term. The uncertainty of 
decommissioning costs is raised to being a possible risk, but the impact should still be at 
the margins of normal operation. We consider that the likelihood of equipment price 
volatility to be the same for on- and off-shore networks, but for offshore the impact may 
lead to short-term delays in the execution of projects. 
The offshore environment will for certain present difficulties of physical access.. 
As delays are due to seasonal weather conditions, the impact will only be short-lived. The 
offshore environment will also give rise to natural hazards that are more severe than 
onshore. Although offshore equipment is designed to be robust, if the risk occurs the 
impact on operations could be significant (though recoverable).  
A weak technology transfer environment is a more significant risk for offshore 
networks than for onshore. Although at the deployment stage HVDC networks are 
relatively new technology with significant scope for further development (Elahidoost and 
Tedeschi, 2017). This is reflected by the likelihood of only incremental development being 
lower for offshore systems. The risk arising from the lack of public subsidy also differs 
and the impact for offshore networks will be higher. For the UK, the risk of the indigenous 
R&D capability not being able to meet the challenge for offshore networks is higher. The 
specialist equipment for offshore construction, such as cable laying  barges, has a restricted 
supply leading to delays and a limited deployment rate. Whilst this is a recoverable 
position for any individual project, the impact is felt throughout the supply chain. 
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We judge that the impact of a pollution event offshore has the potential to be 
greater than onshore. However, the likelihood remains low for both cases. The specialist 
equipment required for installing and decommissioning offshore wind infrastructure is 
subject to international demand and therefore delays in securing its services is likely and 
raised with respect to that for onshore networks. Operational failure of installed network 
equipment is no more likely than for onshore, however, we consider that the impact may 
be greater. If a failure occurs in poor weather conditions it may be weeks or months before 
repairs could be made. 
 
8.1.3 Pipelines 
The two main types of pipeline for distribution which we need to consider are for gas(es) 
and oil products. Pipelines for transferring unprocessed gas and crude oil are considered as 
part of Stage 2 (Exploit). At the distribution stage, the pipelines required share many 
characteristics and risks. A third type of pipe network is to transport hot water for district 
heating. This is considered as part of Stage 6 for the relevant fuels for two reasons. First, it 
does not (and cannot) form a national network. Secondly, only Thermal (geological) and 
Biomass would use a heating network exclusively. Systems using gas will require the gas 
to be distributed first and the gas may also be used by households for heating and cooking. 
This is an anomaly, but can be handled within the constraints of the analytical framework. 
 There are two natural gas distribution networks in the UK. One is a high pressure 
(85 atm, 7600 km long) system1 akin to the 400/275 KV electricity transmission network. 
This gas transmission network links the gas import terminals, the UK gas refineries, and 
the large-scale industrial users. There are 23 compressor stations with connections to the 
low pressure distribution system which supplies all other customers. The high pressure 
system requires steel pipes, which the low pressure network (approximately 130,000 km) 
is being replaced with polyethylene pipes. Modelling by Qadrdan et al. (2015) suggests 
that although demand for gas declines out to 2050 it remains significant. Pearson and 
Arapostathis (2017) have described six completed transitions in the development of the 
networks with a seventh in train. Some have questioned the long-term viability of the low 
pressure network e.g. Dodds and McDowall (2013). Their modelling suggests that the only 
viable future for the network is to deliver hydrogen for use in micro-CHP fuel cells. 
However, Ma and Spataru (2015) suggest that a combination of biogas and hydrogen 




would be a sustainable outcome. Lowes et al. (2018) suggest that the widespread 
deployment of decentralised low carbon heat networks may pose a “major” risk to the gas 
distribution networks. In part, this level of risk is driven by their suggestion that if the on-
site and DH networks supply residential and commercial heat demand, the demand for gas 
for cooking would be insufficient to justify keeping the gas distribution grid. However, this 
seems to be at odds with their idea of using bio-derived (low carbon) gas in decentralised  
generators – the gas will still need to be distributed to those units. 
Some of the equipment required is relatively specialised, so we suggest that the risk 
of a lack of a well functioning market is in line with other stages relying on process 
systems manufacturers. Thus the risk may occur, but is likely to only cause short-term 
delays. Likewise for access to capital; networks are thousands of kilometres long, so 
although pipes may be relatively cheap the installation is expensive.  
 Although almost all pipelines at this stage are located on land, physical access is 
not trivial as nearly all are buried. At the level of city streets, delays in accessing sites may 
occur due to scheduling issues to keep the network operating. Despite most of the 
transmission system being buried, some elements and stretches are exposed and will attract 
public concern (Groves, 2015) though delays are not likely to occur. An interesting point 
raised by Groves et al. (2013) is that a different approach is required for public 
engagement about energy infrastructure if that infrastructure is privately owned rather than 
by the state. Intrinsically the levels of innovation for pipelines are low in this case.  
 
8.1.4 Road Tankering 
We consider road tankering to be a low risk activity. There are only two points to note. The 
first is that as a mature technology we judge innovation to be low, thus little room for 
improvement, and secondly that a diesel powered truck always causes pollution during its 
operation (thus a pollution event is a certainty). 
 
8.2 The Use Stage 
There are only three principal ways of exploiting the energy vectors in their final forms i.e. 
electrical power for devices, heat, or motive power (vehicles). Electrical devices and 
vehicles are strongly regulated with internationally compatible standards (less strict for 
marine fuels). This uniformity leads to the causes of risk showing little variation between 
initial fuel types. However, heat has a wide variety of energy vectors (liquids and gases), 
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thus being subject to a wider set of risk causes. The discussion is based on the energy 
vector. 
 A common thread is the treatment of natural hazards which we assign the same 
value regardless of energy vector. Even though we cannot find a reason to distinguish 
between uses, we consider that it is relevant in the sense that it describes society’s reliance 
on complex technology. Accordingly, we draw a distinction between the impact of natural 
hazards on the infrastructure and that which affect the consumer. If a house is flooded 
neither electrical nor heating can be used. But the occupant will be sheltered somewhere 
else and use other devices, so the effect is neutral. For devices used outside of a building, 
natural hazards such as flood events may prevent customers from using vehicles safely – 
EV or conventional. The point is the reliance on powered vehicles. For heat, it is industrial 
use which may be most disrupted. 
 For this stage significant public concern does not refer to the technology in use 
(except for exotic gases and liquids). Technologies allowed into the marketplace in the UK 
are safe (unless individual items counterfeit or illegally imported). We restrict significant 
public concern to the level of action regarding the ‘energy market’ i.e. the sale of 
electricity, gas, petrol, and diesel. Although this could be considered in the economic 
category as a lack of a well-functioning market, it is useful to retain that for the technology 
in line with all of the other stages. The functioning of the energy market has led to protests 
and the formation of charities and pressure groups to lobby the Government. Price 
volatility is the total cost of ownership which includes the purchasing price of the final 
energy vector. 
 
8.2.1 Electrical Power for Devices 
The majority of the causes of risk at this stage arise from the innovation and skills 
categories.  
 We draw a distinction between the impact of natural hazards on the infrastructure 
and that which affect the building in which consumers’ electrical devices are used. Thus 
for devices used within an indoor environment, whether residential, commercial, or 
industrial this cause of risk is not relevant. However, ASHPs are affected which is 
accounted for at this stage. The quality of the fuel source in this context is the quality of 
the supply of electrons i.e. characteristics such as frequency and voltage level or 
variability. For the UK, the risk is low and any disruptions to the supply (impact) are likely 
to be short-term. For most devices, especially semiconductor electronics, critical materials 
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are not an issue. However, electric vehicles require the use of several chemical elements 
for which there are, or are likely to be shortages (Pavel et al., 2017). We judge that the 
level and severity of this cause of risk to be moderate. This risk is linked to the risk of the 
lack of materials substitutability (innovation category) and of the same level. Both are of 
global concern. 
The innovation category has two other causes of risk with moderate concern, 
namely UK R&D capacity/capability and optimism bias. The main issue for optimism bias 
is the rebound effect for energy efficiency (Sorrell, 2009, 2015). We judge both the 
likelihood high and impact to be significant but recoverable. 
For the use of electrical devices we are not concerned about the manufacturing 
capacity of electrical devices as this is clearly a globally successful activity, though 
improving operating efficiency remains important. Instead, we take the cause of risk of an 
insufficient capacity of site construction as the replacement of energy inefficient buildings 
by refurbishment or demolition and new build. The rate is also important and is a matter 
within the control of a national Government. This risk is specifically about the 
(re)electrification of heating. Resistance heating was abandoned many years ago, though it 
was a reasonable alternative to using coal in homes. Heat pumps are slow acting and 
therefore require a thermally efficient building in which to operate. Although the rate of 
new stock built is important, it is the demolition or complete refurbishment of existing 
buildings which is the determinant factor. Between 2006/07 and 2016/17 demolitions of 
residential property fell from approximately 22K to 10K per annum (DCLG, 2017) of the 
26M total dwellings i.e. a rate (unadjusted for stock age) of about 0.04%. As roughly 20% 
of the stock was built before 1919, 55% between 1920-1979, and 25% 1980 or later 
(MHCLG, 2018) less than 2% of older dwellings will be demolished over the next 30 
years, assuming that only pre-1980 stock is demolished. This means that 98% of the 
dwellings in 2050 are extant in 2018. With low demolition rates of inefficient buildings, 
high efficiency electrical heating cannot replace gas boilers. We judge this cause of risk to 
be highly likely with a sustained impact. 
The political category presents three relevant risks, and they are moderately high 
and have components within and outwith the system boundary. A changing policy and 
regulatory regime brings uncertainty. In the European context the change is slow and well-
signalled, thus any adverse impact is likely to be recoverable in the short-term. In contrast, 
slow changing legislative mechanisms may not be able to react to innovations quickly 
enough to mandate energy efficiency products or processes. The enforcement of any 
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standards and codes are a matter for a national Government. We judge these to have equal 
status. However, an insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, 
standards and codes has greater impact for buildings. 
The risk of significant public concern arises from the functioning of the energy 
market due to the number of electricity retailers (commercial, industrial, and residential). 
Ofgem sets the rules by which consumer interests are protected whilst promoting a 
competitive market for the sale of electricity and gas. The need for a regulator 
demonstrates that it is not a natural market so must carry an elevated likelihood of the risk 
occurring. Following a consultation exercise Ofgem decided that there were sufficient 
grounds to refer the matter to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (Ofgem, 
2014). The CMA levelled a number of criticisms which might adversely affect competition 
(CMA, 2016). As there is reasonable grounds for suspicion that this risk will become 
manifest, we assign the highest likelihood level. For the commercial and residential 
consumer, price volatility is low. The retailers hedge against wholesale price volatility as a 
means of levelling costs for small consumers and making extra margin where possible. 
Residential consumers in particular see prices move up more frequently than down which 
formed part of the CMA investigation. Industrial consumers have different arrangements 
including time-varying tariffs and demand response. For small consumers the low risk of 
price volatility has an impact on prices i.e. low volatility carries a negative impact (prices 
ratchet upwards over the long term). 
The only notable technical cause of risk may arise with the inability to deal with 
electronic waste. Although European standards and legislation exists innovation and the 
use of new materials and processes may present difficulties. It is the processing and 
disposal of this electrical and electronic waste that may present the risk of a pollution 
event. We consider this risk to be low in the UK as this is a well-regulated sector. 
 
8.2.2 Heat 
As an end-use energy vector – usually a molecule of water – heat encompasses a wide 
variety of scales and users, namely domestic hot water (including for space heating), 
communal (intra-building) heating, district heating networks, and industrial process heat. 
The technologies required are very different too. A clear overview of all uses of heat is 
given in DECC (2013a, 2013b), whilst CCC (2016) deal with heat use in the residential 
and commercial buildings, MacLean et al. (2016a, 2016b) focus on residential only, and 
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Griffin et al. (2016) on industrial use. Boait et al. (2012) compare the efficiencies of five 
technology combinations for producing domestic hot water for sanitary use. 
Surveys of evidence and practice for policy development have focused on the 
provision of heat and improved efficiencies. This results in a complicated technical and 
policy landscape for ‘heat’ (Hanna et al., 2016) which in part explains why relatively little 
progress has been made in the decarbonisation of the supply of thermal energy. We are 
analysing fuel sources which requires the data and categorisation used in the 
aforementioned references to be sliced in a unique way. For example, for our purposes we 
treat ASHPs solely as an electrical device (demand) because they cannot act to store 
thermal energy (see section 3.1) – rejected heat during the summer is lost to the 
atmosphere. The ‘source’ of fuel for an ASHP is the sun (by various mechanisms) heating 
the air. On the other hand GSHPs and GWHPs are acting as a thermal store from where 
thermal energy (the ‘fuel’) can be extracted, even though the near surface is heated by the 
sun directly. Therefore we need to briefly distinguish between the mechanisms for the 
seven fuels delivering heat as an end use (Table 8.1). Arguably Waste (EfW) could also 
deliver heat, but we consider this as a by-product of the waste management. EfW will 
always be a small number of units (incinerators), primarily generate electricity, and likely 
to have a bespoke heat recovery system with long-term contracts with industrial customers. 










Biogas  *  
Biomass   * 
Gas  *  
Gas (unconventional)  *  
Solar (thermal, water)  *  
Thermal (geological)   * 
Thermal (low 
temperature) 
 *  
* Denotes implementation as the Stage 6 example in the risk matrix (Appendix A). 
Table 8.1 Potential destinations of heat as the final use. 
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For the purpose of this study, we will assess only the dominant use for each fuel 
source. In most cases this will be onsite self-contained systems, but for Biomass and 
Thermal (geological) we will assume district heating as the main use; the differences in 
terms of the risk levels are marginal. Separately we will briefly address some aspects of 
industrial process heat. It is worth noting that the deployment is more mixed than the 
coarse-scale (Error! Reference source not found.) process descriptions suggest. For 
example, the dual nature of CHP using Biomass is not completely captured. 
 For heat, equipment used inside buildings will not be affected by natural hazards 
and the quality of fuel source refers to the variability in temperature of the final energy 
vector. 
The DH water distribution network ought to be considered as part of Stage 5, but 
this can only be done for Thermal (geological) and Biomass. An expanded, more detailed, 
and non-unified analysis of single fuel may allow the framework to accommodate this 
anomaly. However, we do not consider that the outcomes of our aggregated analysis are 
unduly affected.  
 
Industrial Process Heat 
Companies with high industrial process heat use (e.g. steel production, petrochemicals, and 
electronics fabrication) have always had an incentive to reduce demand and improve 
efficiency. As such, any risks identified for the provision of heat for industry will not be 
central in our assessment at this stage. 
According to Hammond and Norman (2012) UK industry has reduced it CO2 
emissions by an average of 20% annually between 1990-2007, which they ascribe to 
improved efficiency and a falling carbon intensity of electricity. The same authors 
estimated that the maximum recoverable heat surplus heat was 52 PJ/yr (Hammond and 
Norman, 2014). Arguably, in a low carbon future, the use of gas (conventional, 
unconventional, or biogas) could be reserved for industries operating high temperature or 
heat intensive processes because of their contribution to GDP and employment. There is 
some evidence (Atkins et al., 2010; Eiholzer et al., 2017) that low temperature industrial 
processes, particularly in the food, beverage, and textile industries, can be supplemented or 
perhaps fully supplied by solar thermal (see section 4.4). Cooper et al. (2016) point out that 
industrial waste heat could be made substantially more useful if the maximum range for 
heat transmission could be doubled from 16 to 32 km, and residential district heating (DH) 
networks could be the main beneficiary. In a synthesis report, DECC (2013a, 2013b) 
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identify some barriers which policy and industry face. We interpret these as risks. Access 
to capital was cited in respect of short payback terms i.e. a project requiring capital would 
go ahead if the payback time was longer than two years in some cases. Other barriers 
identified were skills gaps, lack of long-term policy signals (interpreted as changing policy 
or regulatory frameworks), misalignment of requirements for sharing infrastructure. This 
last point was set out as different customers needing (or generating) heat at different or 
irregular times and we interpret as a risk of technical failure i.e. the heat service might be 
unavailable when required. It was noted that although heat processes are well understood, 
there was good scope for innovation. 
 
District Heating Networks 
District heating has a chequered history in the UK (Russell, 1993) and not had widespread 
use, though it is a mature technology (Hawkey, 2012). Self-evidently DH is considerably 
simpler to install in new developments than to retrofit. But Russell makes a more subtle 
point that it is the lack of a national co-ordinating body for heat that is the key to low 
deployment rates; compare this with the nuclear industry. The reasonability for DH was 
devolved to local authorities, which were under the financial control of central 
Government. Frequently, DH schemes were considered as marginal, but Russell asks who 
was the beneficiary of a narrow (economic) assessment, and casts doubt on whether other 
energy sources were treated in exactly the same way. Indeed, Russell noted bias in the 
economic assessments depending on the contributing organisations and the constraints 
under which they operated. Despite these barriers, successful examples are schemes in 
Aberdeen (Webb, 2015), Woking, Milton Keynes, and Birmingham (Hawkey et al., 2013), 
and the Sheffield region (Finney et al., 2012).  
Lowes et al. (2018) also associate the risks of creating DH networks with different 
actors such as consultants, manufacturers, installers, and fuel suppliers. Their aggregation 
of activities implies that we can only link their work to our risk categories or a subset of 
fuels. For example, manufacturers of biomass, gas, and oil boilers, and micro-CHP units 
are considered to be at a “major” risk, but the nature of the risk is indeterminate. 
A study commissioned by DECC and conducted by BRE et al. (2013) examined the 
barriers to deployment of DH networks by surveying and interviewing actors involved in 
local authority and property developer led schemes which were completed (N=34, of 
various sizes), planned (N=7), or had failed (N=3). A total of 17 risks were identified. It is 
notable that for both impact and prevalence (number of times mentioned) only the local 
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authority led schemes generated risks with the potential to halt a project. We consider that 
impact and prevalence are correlated, thus we only use the impact ranking. Furthermore, it 
is unclear whether there was bias in the way the two groups of respondents viewed risk. In 
Table 8.2 the risks identified are grouped and compared with our categories and risks. The 
range of risks identified by BRE et al. is narrow, only four of our seven categories. The 
three high-level risks were all about financing. Both the medium- and low-level risks are 
characterised by policy and regulation, and the lack of specialist skills. 
 Kelly and Pollitt (2010) BRE et al. (2013), Chaudry et al. (2015), and LCICG 
(2016b) recognise that the upfront infrastructure costs are a barrier, increasing the risk of a 
lack of access to capital. Therefore we judge that the risk will occur and may cause a long-
term disruption to a project. LCICG (2016b) also recognised a lack of innovation of 
installation methods as a significant risk to greater deployment. As systems can still be 
installed, the impact is minimal, but the risk does occur. In considering DH, Webb (2015) 
notes that technical and economic feasibility are insufficient to enable a project to go 
forward. 
Considering manufacturing at this stage, Roberts (2008) notes that any district 
energy scheme should only be considered in the context of improving building energy 
efficiency, but we judge this as less critical than for electrical heating using heat pumps 
(air or ground source). An extra consideration for this case is that a site for the combustor 
has to be constructed, but this does not present a notable risk. One notable point is that we 
distinguish infrastructure as the hot water distribution pipes and not that required to deliver 
the fuel to the boiler or CHP unit. We judge this to be in the highest risk category. As most 
of the urban environment is privately owned the risk of a lack of access to sites is relevant 
for DH at this stage (unlike electrical devices), though we expect that any negotiations 
would only lead to short-term delays. 
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Level Barrier Category and Risk 
High Obtaining money for 
feasibility/viability work  
Economic: lack of access to capital 
 Paying the upfront capital cost Economic: lack of access to capital 
 Obtaining money for independent legal 
advice 
Economic: lack of access to capital 
Medium Identifying internal resources to 
instigate scheme and overcome lack of 
knowledge  
Skills: lack of specialists in the  
local workforce 
 Identifying and/or selecting suitably 
qualified consultants 
Skills: lack of specialists in the  
local workforce 
 Lack of generally accepted 
contract mechanisms 
Political: changing policy or 
regulatory framework 
 Inconsistent pricing of heat Political: changing policy or 
regulatory framework 
 Concluding agreement with energy 
services provider including obtaining a 
contribution to the capital cost 
Political: changing policy or 
regulatory framework 
Low Customer scepticism of technology Political: significant public concern 
 Persuading building occupants to 
accept communal heat (mandated by 
the planning authority) 
Political: significant public concern 
 Uncertainty regarding longevity and 
reliability of heat demand 
Political: changing policy or 
regulatory framework 
 Uncertainty regarding reliability of heat 
sources 
Technical: operation and/or 
infrastructure failure 
 Correctly interpreting reports prepared 
by consultants 
Skills: lack of specialists in the  
local workforce 
 Up-skilling local authority procurement 
team 
Skills: lack of specialists in the  
local workforce 
Table 8.2 Summary of the barriers identified by BRE et al. (2013) for DH schemes and 
translated to the categories and risks identified here. 
 156 
Change in the policy and regulatory environment is a risk for many fuels and 
stages, but for heat it is a lack of policy which is the risk (Hawkey et al., 2013). The 
international comparison study conducted by Hawkey and Webb (2014) shows that a key 
feature of success in exploiting heat networks in Norway and the Netherlands was 
regulatory alignment of business interests. Without such direction, localised markets for 
heat could not form. More recent work reiterates the problem of policy responsibility in the 
heat sector historically tracked by Russell (1993). Hawkey and Webb (2014) and Bolton 
and Foxon (2015) contest that the policy and regulation risk is driven by a disconnect 
between national and regional actors. Ways of bridging this divide are examined by Bush 
et al. (2017). They consider the role of intermediaries such as hospital energy managers 
(embedded in a national organisation, the NHS) and Local Enterprise Partnerships (with a 
regional remit). A changing policy or regulatory framework can be characterised as a lack 
of generally accepted contract mechanisms or  inconsistent pricing of heat (BRE et al., 
2013). As the situation for heat is more fragmented than for electricity, we assign a higher 
risk. We note too that this is occurs within the system boundary.  
Both BRE et al. (2013) and Chaudry et al. (2015) recognise that public perception 
as a risk; we judge this to be a short-term risk. As a technical risk, uncertainty regarding 
reliability of heat sources has been flagged by BRE et al. (2013). We judge too that an 
infrastructure failure is more likely for DH. 
 
Onsite Self-contained Systems 
Residential space and water heating demand is principally met using gas-fired boilers 
(Kane et al., 2015) though use patterns vary considerably (Huebner et al., 2015; Jones et 
al., 2016). Modelling by Li (2017) and Vijay and Hawkes (2017) suggests that even under 
optimal policy conditions gas boilers are likely to remain dominant until at least the mid 
2030s, and perhaps remain so in anything other than strong policy conditions.  
For commercial-building scale equipment there is some evidence that access to 
capital is a risk (DECC, 2013a). For residential systems, a study by Ipsos MORI and 
Energy Saving Trust (2013) for DECC yielded some evidence that purchase of a boiler 
was delayed because of the need to raise capital. This led to distress purchases when the 
equipment failed, thus we judge this risk to be marginal due to their ubiquity (Hanmer and 
Abram, 2017). The quality of the fuel source in this context is the quality of the supply of 
heat i.e. characteristics such as temperature and variability. 
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Small-scale boilers are a mature technology with an already high (factory) 
efficiency of around 90%, therefore we judge that the risk of only incremental 
improvement will occur. Any further CO2 reductions will need to come from Demand 
Reduction (section 7.1) or the substitution by a gas with a much lower carbon content. 
Alternative combustion technologies such as micro-CHP have faltered (Hudson et al., 
2011) although some devices were at the market stage. Therefore although capacity for 
R&D advances exists, it is currently not meeting the challenge. 
In addition to the lack of capacity to construct sites (homes) to the required energy 
efficiency standards set out in the building codes affecting the heating efficiency (Eyre, 
2011; LCICG, 2016b), a further problem is the lack of understanding of how buildings are 
used which leads to poor design. For example, a post-occupancy evaluation by Burzynski 
et al. (2012) of 200 flats in the UK showed that hot water use could be over-estimated by 
90% on average. However, like DH networks, the impact of housing quality to deliver heat 
is impaired only at the margin of normal activity. 
The enforcement of any standards and codes are a matter for a national 
Government; there are two elements to consider for heat. First is the building regulations 
for insulation standards which can be considered as a trade-off with affordable housing 
(DECC, 2013a). We judge this to be moderate that will have a long-term impact because of 
the longevity of buildings, thus has the potential to have a greater impact than for electrical 
devices. The second element is that of the required standards for boiler design and 
manufacture. DECC (2013a) state this as a lack of certainty in future standards. The 
transition from using manufactured (‘town’) gas to natural gas in the late 1960s into the 
1970s (Arapostathis et al., 2013) is a good example of how the risk of significant public 
concern can be mitigated for a nationwide project. A current aspect of public concern is 
raised by Mitchell and Mitchell (2014) who suggest that there is a lack of a well-
functioning wholesale market, which can lead to price volatility in the domestic market. 
Other evidence of public concern manifest as undervaluing energy efficiency and savings 
in replacing equipment, and awareness and the perception of technologies i.e. a lack of 
reliable data (DECC, 2013a). 
As we are considering combustion of a gas, there will certainly be a pollution 
event, but this will not cause a system to cease operating. The neutralisation of waste at the 




8.2.3 Motive Power for Vehicles 
Liquid fuels are the most widely used globally for transport applications, but we restrict the 
discussion to passenger and light goods vehicles. There are a relatively small number of 
aircraft and ships, most of which will cross our system boundary; considering multi-
destination vehicles is beyond the scope of this study. 
The only sector with any appreciable proportion using electricity is the railway. For 
the purposes of this study, pure-electric cars and vans are considered as ‘electrical devices’ 
and discussed in section 8.2.1. Hybrid vehicles with an internal combustion engine (ICE) 
and battery configured in series (including buses) are single (liquid) fuel use; whereas 
parallel plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) are discussed separately below. In this 
study we are not considering exotic gases and liquids, thus we omit vehicles exploiting fuel 
cells, though if they use a home electrolyser, they are considered an electrical device. 
The ICE for road vehicles using petrol or diesel has been dominant since the early 
twentieth century. The growth in the number of vehicles globally has been delivered 
through advances in manufacturing and increasing GDP (Gilbert and Perl, 2010). In the 
UK the numbers in all classes of road vehicle have grown, but passenger and light goods 
vehicles have increased the most in recent years (DfT, 2017). Some efficiency gain is due 
to PHEVs as they are dual fuel vehicles; the electrical power demand is considered in 
section 8.2.1. Currently, the  number of PHEVs is very low and will remain so even with 
high annual growth. As time progresses there are implications for the sources of the 
electrical power.  
It is notable that the use of liquid-fuel powered vehicles presents little risk, with 
none in the highest category. There being a similar number of passenger and light goods 
vehicles to the number of adults in the UK population, the cost of owning and operating a 
vehicle is not prohibitive. The most significant risk was found to be that only marginal 
improvements to the technology were likely to occur. Martin et al. (2017) show that fuel 
efficiency of light duty vehicles improved by 26% between 2001–2011. However, they 
show that this improvement could have been better if the acceleration capability of 
vehicles remained the same as that in 2001. Furthermore, most of the ‘quick wins’ have 
been made, thus future improvements will be harder to come by. Using the product 
generational dematerialisation (PGD) indicator (Ziolkowska and Ziolkowski (2015) 
suggest that between 2000–2010 the UK transport sector (in general) is showing a clear 
trend of higher energy efficiency and lower energy consumption. An extensive study by 
Bishop et al. (2012) created a unique set of well-to-wheel (WTW) estimates by combining 
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well-to-tank (WTT) estimates for current and future fuels for road vehicles coupled with 
tank-to-wheel (TTW) estimates for different engine technologies. They show that the port-
injected and the direct-injected spark ignition technologies have the potential to meet EU 
emissions standards into the 2020s, but unless emissions are reduced in the fuel supply 
chain the total GHG emissions are unlikely to reduce beyond that point. However, the 
record of the industry to innovate has been sustained over a long period with continuous 
improvements, especially in emissions reductions technologies (Bonilla et al., 2014) 
pushed by regulation and publicly-funded R&D. Privately-funded R&D levels in the 
automotive sector are not known exactly, however, a PwC study (Jaruzelski and Hirsh, 
2016) suggests that total spending rose from $70 bn to $109 bn between 2005-2015. 
 In the political category, significant public concern rates as a medium risk. It is 
interesting because motorists who show concern are both the recipients and generators of 
impacts (Smith et al., 2013a). Thus it is clear that factors such as the utility of vehicles are 
more important than, say, fuel price or environmental and health impacts. The so-called 
‘fuel duty protests’ in 2000, 2005, and 2007 were primarily about the price of fuel, but 
disrupted operations and supplies at oil refineries and distribution depots (Noland et al., 
2003; Robinson, 2003). Although these protests were led by hauliers and not aimed at 
refinery operations directly, the consequence was to cause short-term loss of activity. 
There have not been protests since, but unlike for gas and electricity prices the concern has 
manifest itself as short-term disruption. With the same level of risk is the changing policy 
or regulatory framework. The mass-market vehicle manufacturers are global in nature and 
specify vehicle platforms to meet simultaneously several country codes.  
 For petrol and diesel vehicles there is by definition a pollution event at every use, 
with attendant risks to human health (Smith et al., 2013b; Brand, 2016). It is noteworthy 
that although decommissioning does not present a risk, the nature of the risk will shift with 
time as more electronics components and non-metallic body panel are built into mass-
market vehicles. 
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8.3 Cross-cutting Causes of Risk 
8.3.1 Critical Materials Availability and Substitution 
These two risks are linked, but straddle the environment and innovation categories. Many 
renewable conversion technologies exploit chemical elements which are either rare, 
expensive to produce, or are concentrated geographically. The level of dependence varies, 
but the use of critical materials improves efficiency or efficacy of such items as generators, 
solar cells, high-power electric motors, and high-density batteries. The UK Energy 
Research Centre handbook gives a quick guide to the main elements in question, their 
properties and some statistics (Speirs et al., 2013a), a list which extends well-beyond the 
rare earth elements. Speirs and Roelich (2015) review the case for critical metals. 
Estimates of the total recoverable quantities (resource availability) are disputed. Speirs et 
al. (2015) point out the use of incommensurate methodologies for classifying resource 
availability as a key problem. With respect to the rare earth elements Speirs et al. (2013b)  
suggest that there is no clear evidence of future shortage, despite recognising the paucity of 
estimates for supply and demand. However, this view is supported by Nassar et al. (2015) 
who consider the supply risk to be moderate in the near- to medium-term and low in the 
long-term. A number of mitigation mechanisms have been discussed and modelled 
(Sprecher et al., 2017), but they all take time to implement. We concur and judge this as a 
moderate risk. We note, however, that there are a number of other elements and alloys 
which are important to other fuels, for example platinum group elements as catalysts in oil 
refining. These are discussed in the relevant sections. 
 Substitutability is a more broad matter. For example, the use of steel in the offshore 
environment is not an issue of materials availability, but there are no plausible alternatives. 
Likewise for zirconium alloys in the nuclear industry. Some rare earth elements can be 
substituted (Speirs et al., 2013a) though Tkaczyk et al. (2018) point out that cobalt is very 
hard to exchange. We consider substitutability to be a harder technical problem as there 
may be hard ‘physics limits’ with which to contend. Thus we judge that the risk may 
occur, but that it may create a sustained (but recoverable) delay to innovation.  
 
8.3.2 Skills   
There are many examples of the media proclaiming that the UK has a skills shortage 
(Wall, 2014; Chapman, 2017; Pozniak, 2017) usually based on surveys from various 
industry or trade bodies (UKPIA, 2011; Engineering UK, 2018), professional bodies 
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(Energy Institute et al., 2008), or from modelling (Wilson et al., 2016a, 2016b). Similar 
reports appear in the specialist press (Hines, 2017; The Engineer, 2017). But hard data 
supporting these claims is lacking and it is likely that many studies are double-counting 
and not allowing for the phasing of major projects i.e. some or all of the workforce can 
move from one project to another successively. There is a paucity of academic studies, 
fewer still focussing on the UK.  
One noteworthy academic study is that by (Jagger et al., 2013) which considers 
skills for the low-carbon transition though not the whole energy sector. They note that a 
key problem is the uncertainty of which technologies (and pathways) will be deployed i.e. 
it is hard for citizens (and companies) to invest in training if they see a risk that it will be 
wasted. Jagger et al. also consider that most studies and reports are too general for 
Government to interpret and act on in a detailed or effective manner. This in their view 
leads to increased costs of current staff, increased time to complete projects, reduced 
competitiveness and capabilities, and reduced employment. 
As the UK has a well-organised school education system, we consider that the risk 
of a lack of basic education levels in the workforce is low. However, the lack of trained 
and skilled operatives and engineers is highlighted for some specific areas. Where there is 
some evidence of a skills shortage or knowledge gap in one fuel with installation, for 
example, we assume that other fuels requiring similar skills at the same stage will also be 
experiencing shortages. Broadly, the greatest concern is with a lack of vocational 
(technician level) skills and principally at stages 2-4. The distribution stage, mostly 
electricity networks, has specific shortages. In general terms, many segments of the 
renewable energy industry is thought to be at risk of recruitment difficulties in the future 
(JRC, 2014). 
The installation and operation of AD is noted as lacking the availability of technical 
skills (Tranter et al., 2011). For biofuel processing, surveying by Hammond et al. (2012) 
recorded the lack of high-level biofuel expertise particularly in biochemistry, chemistry, 
and automotive engineering, noting that industry instability made it unattractive to skilled 
people of all levels.  (Hodgson et al., 2016) technical level skills are lacking. 
Demand Reduction has a wide variety of skills gaps. In the industrial sector there is 
a lack of energy management professionals, with the food and drink industry considered as 
critical (LCICG, 2012c). For commercial buildings , the installation, commissioning, and 
operation of building services has been identified as having a skills shortage (LCICG, 
2016d; Engineering UK, 2018). In the residential sector Pitts (2017) and Heffernan et al. 
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(2015) recognises that designers lack knowledge to create dwellings to passive house and 
zero-carbon standards (respectively), Glass et al. (2008) that specifying and estimating 
skills are a problem, and that technical skills for retrofit are lacking (Killip, 2013; Fylan et 
al., 2016; LCICG, 2016c; Gooding and Gul, 2017). According to Fylan et al. installers lack 
the knowledge of the technologies and products to make good adaptations, which is less of 
a problem in volume new-build. There is also some evidence of a lack of facilitators in the 
ESCO market (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). 
A lack of installers or poor quality installation was noted for PV (Baborska-
Narozny et al., 2016; LCICG, 2016a; Curtin et al., 2018; Hanna et al., 2018) and 
specifically the handover from installer to owner/operator (Baborska-Narozny et al., 2016). 
Ziyad and Stevenson (2018) report a lack of detailed understanding about PV amongst 
architects, designers, and project managers. There is evidence of technical level skills 
being in short supply for the installation of wind turbines (Curtin et al., 2018). 
The decline of the UK civil nuclear industry lead to a well-documented shortage of 
staff at all levels once a renaissance started (Roberts, 2009; Cogent, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; 
DBIS, 2013; JRC, 2014). The importance of the experience embodied in the aging 
workforce is recognised (DECC, 2015c) and that training for many roles takes a long time 
(LCICG, 2016e). Subsequent to a parliamentary inquiry (HLSCST, 2011) the Nuclear 
Skills Strategy Group  formulated a plan (NSSG, 2016) for skills development. In a recent 
report (NSSG, 2017) they identified the current most important occupations with skills 
shortages, namely: safety case preparation, control and instrumentation,162 reactor 
operation, site inspectors, project planning and control, commissioning engineers, 
emergency planners, quality assurance staff, and chemists. 
For fossil fuels, there is a risk that as the industry declines, as has been seen for 
Nuclear (fission), there will a gradual loss of expertise as people retire but too few new 
people enter the industry. There are reports of skills gaps in the UK refining and 
downstream oil and petrochemical industry (UKPIA, 2011). For the burgeoning shale gas 
industry Lewis et al. (2014) report that the UK has very few onshore technical specialists. 
In particular technical people for drilling operations, planning, and environmental 
monitoring, though the Institute of Directors (IOD, 2013) suggest that this is a moderate 
risk. Gluyas et al. (2018) express the hope that people with oil and gas drilling expertise 
can redeploy to geothermal operations. 
Turning to the distribution stage, the power systems industry (electricity networks 
especially) has a recognised staffing shortage (Energy Institute et al., 2008; Engineering 
 163 
UK, 2018). Whilst it may be possible to recruit engineers from outside the system 
boundary, the national grid codes require specialist knowledge which can only be gained 
through in-country training. The industry response was to set up scholarship under the title 
of The Power Academy (IET, 2018).  
 The provision of low-carbon heat devices, services, and infrastructure is recognised 
as having skills shortages (Wade et al., 2016). At the residential scale this includes 
technical level installation skills for thermal solar panels for hot water (Connor et al., 
2015), heat pumps for low temperature thermal water and space heating (LCICG, 2016b), 
and micro-CHP (Hudson et al., 2011), though we do not consider the latter more than a 
moderate level risk. Perhaps more important, though, is advice for homeowners and 
industry regarding low carbon alternative heating systems (DECC, 2013b).  Concerns have 
been raised about high-level skills gaps for DH (BRE et al., 2013; LCICG, 2016b). 
 
8.3.3 Negotiation 
Negotiation is not a stage in its own right as it occurs throughout the whole supply chain. 
Moreover,  negotiation is not a risk which can be attached to a single category. We have 
taken account of the risk that ‘a negotiated agreement cannot be reached’ in context where 
appropriate. In Table 8.3 we have grouped fuels by four common signifiers of perhaps the 
most important – though not the only – negotiation hurdle or phase. Each signifier could 
occur at different stages for each fuel and will have a different level of importance. The 
examples we discuss raise interesting questions about how negotiation affects the overall 
risk profile for a stage or a fuel and is a topic for further work (section 11.4). 
 
Key Negotiation Phase / Hurdle Source of Fuel 
Access to distribution Biogas, Wind (offshore), Wind (onshore) 
Access to suppliers Bioliquids, Biomass (solids), Waste 
Legislation and regulation Coal, Demand Reduction, Gas (unconventional), 
Solar (electric),  
Access to capital Gas, Hydro, Nuclear (fission), Ocean (tidal), Ocean 
(wave), Oil, Solar (thermal, water), Thermal 
(geological), Thermal (low temperature) 
Table 8.3 The main classes of negotiation occuring at different stages for the sources of 
fuels. 
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The most widely considered use of negotiation is the development of viable 
projects, but it is not the only use but incorporate several interesting elements each with an 
attendant risk. Project development includes issues such as the social licence to operate, 
identifying technology and staff, business planning, accessing capital funding, obtaining 
licences / permits / contracts, and environmental impact assessment. The upfront 
negotiation of long-term contracts may be important for some major investments. For 
example, companies proposing EfW facilities will need to negotiate with Councils or other 
local authorities for a minimum tonnage supply rate of MSW (DEFRA and DECC, 2014). 
Another example, discussed by Thomas and Dawe (2003), Stroebel and van Benthem 
(2012), and Stulberg (2012), is long-term contracts for gas transportation. 
Whilst we have used evidence of objections to planning applications as a measure 
of public concern, planning is a form of negotiation at the community level for several 
sources of fuel. Objections to planning applications and subsequent compromises for 
Biomass combustion, Biogas production using AD, Solar (electric), and Wind (onshore) 
may lead to non-ideal solutions. But Clark and Roddy (2012) contend that this is a better 
outcome than plans being rejected. For LFG, Brown and Maunder (1994) also found 
obtaining planning consent to be difficult, which they considered as a negotiation rather 
than as a manifestation of public concern. A specific issue for LFG which they noted was 
the need to negotiate rights to exploit the gas if multiple parties were stakeholders in the 
site. This is also a risk for EfW facilities. 
Several risks occur for DH networks (BRE et al., 2013) which, although classified 
as Political (Changing policy or regulatory framework), could be considered as an example 
of negotiation. We see the key negotiating hurdle as regulation and legislation to create a 
level playing field with supply-side activities. 
Because ownership of subsurface resources resides with the Crown, shale gas 
extraction has a particular regulatory problem stemming from the geological dispersion of 
the gas (Roberts, 2017). Companies exploring for unconventional gas in the UK need to 
negotiate with landowners to gain access, but there is little return to the landowner as they 
do not own the subsurface resources. Roberts suggests that shale gas licencees need to 
collaborate to enable economies of scale. 
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9 Observations and Analysis of the Matrix 
The objective of the risk analysis is to give an evidence base for policy discussions in ES. 
We describe some characteristics of the risk profile of the UK’s energy provision, modelled 
as a number of supply chains. As a further example of how the method can illuminate 
policy discussion we estimate risk profiles for some existing respected future UK energy 
scenarios. Detailed policy discussions are beyond the scope of this work, but we will note 
some implications in the Conclusions. 
There are 3114 separate risk estimates for 34 risks across six stages, for 19 fuels, 
and five final energy vectors. Therefore the number of possible ways to slice the data set 
are greater than can be practically presented in a single document. Indeed, not all views of 
the data set yield statistics which are likely to be useful and therefore selection is 
imperative. We note that because the categories of risk have some fuzzy boundaries, they 
can be considered to be of secondary importance. For ease of comparison, we present most 
data in a normalised form, which illustrates differences and trends. The raw risk scores are 
not meaningful in themselves. The interesting questions to ask are which are the most and 
least riskiest fuels, which risks (or types) are most important, and whether there are any 
patterns to the stages or scales at which these risks are located. The combined risk profiles 
for future energy systems as they change over time are also interesting. 
In approaching analysis of such a complicated risk matrix the aim is to find a useful 
indicator for overall comparison of stages, fuel types, risk categories, or for building risk 
profiles for different transition pathways to a low(er) carbon economy. The question is 
whether to cascade a risk impact value through all subsequent stages, or use a simple, but 
transparent, additive method. A difficulty with the first method is that if one high barrier is 
overcome, subsequent stages may be very low risk, thus the effort expended to mitigate the 
high-level risks may pay dividends that would be poorly represented. This is why statistical 
methods should only support expert discussion and not replace it. Given that these causes 
of risk are generic and the analysis is at a high-level, a simple method is preferable to 
maintain confidence of interpretation. 
 
9.1 Assessing Fuels by their Overall Risk 
In devising a method to reach a composite score which is fully representative of the overall 
risk several characteristics of the whole fuel supply chain need to be taken into account, 
namely: 
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 five fuels branch at different stages into pathways which produce different energy 
vectors (Biogas, Biomass, Gas, Gas (unconventional), and Thermal (geological)), 
 the 19 fuels share only five different distribution systems (electricity networks, 
road tankers, and pipeline for gas, oil, and water), and 
 four different end-use types. 
 
It is not reasonable to attribute the full risk score to every fuel, indeed this would be 
a form of double-counting. Furthermore, shared infrastructure and end-use type suggests 
that using a new fuel which produces an existing energy vector presents only a marginal 
increase in risk (and cost) for its introduction. It is a separate matter whether this reduces 
system resilience.  
Stages 1-4 are independent for each fuel thus can be simply summed for each fuel. 
At stage 4 the branching points score zero. We assume that the risk for end-use type (stage 
6) is shared equitably, but there are some minor deviations for some distribution systems 
(stage 5), e.g. the offshore network portion for marine and wind technologies. These fuels 
then share the onshore electricity networks with other fuels. We assume that the common 
elements are shared, but we need to account for the unique risk associated with some fuels 
over and above that of the common elements. The total (composite) risk score (TRS) for a 
fuel f can be expressed as 
    
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where: 
Si = sum of the risk score for the ith stage, 
Uj = risk score of the underlying distribution jth infrastructure type, 
mj = number of fuels sharing the jth infrastructure type, 
nk = number of fuels sharing the kth use type. 
 
We consider this approach to be reasonable since it supports the marginal risk 
element of shared infrastructure. This also explains and why nations find introducing a fuel 
(or new use of an existing fuel) so difficult when it requires a new dedicated distribution 
mechanism. 
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 In Table 9.1 we show the total risk score calculated using Eq. 1 and the normalised 
risk score (0-100). From this point forward we will usually only show normalised scores as 
it is the relative differences which are more meaningful and/or  easier to comprehend. 
 





Gas (unconventional) 436 100 1 
Gas 430 99 2 
Oil 427 98 3 
Nuclear (fission) 409 94 4 
Thermal (geological) 351 80 5 
Biomass (solids) 285 65 6 
Coal 283 65 7 
Biogas 264 61 8 
Bioliquids 209 48 9 
Ocean (wave) 205 47 10 
Demand reduction 195 45 11 
Waste 189 43 12 
Ocean (tidal) 183 42 13 
Thermal (low temperature) 162 37 14 
Wind (offshore) 149 34 15 
Wind (onshore) 139 32 16 
Hydro 136 31 17 
Solar (electric) 111 25 18 
Solar (thermal, water) 88 20 19 
Table 9.1 Overall risk ranking for the fuels (most risky at the top of the table). 
 
Non-renewables appear towards the top of the table (conferring more risk on the 
energy system) and renewables towards the bottom. There are seven fuels in the centre 
which are a mix of renewable and non-renewables. The mean raw total for renewables is 
175 and for non-renewables 340, approaching a factor of two greater. It is noticeable that 
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the top four are all non-renewables and score much more highly than the main group (rank 
6 onwards). There is a factor of five between the most and least risky fuels.  
The bio-derived fuels are higher ranking than might be judged at first sight. For 
Biogas and Biomass stages 4-6 all carry significant risk, and for Bioliquids it is stage 3. 
Thermal (geological) is also a fuel source which would be perceived as low risk, however, 
all stages present significant risks. The scale of the operations and the high likelihood of 
failure account for these levels of risk. 
It is perhaps surprising that DR is not at the bottom of the ranking since it is often 
described as ‘the first fuel’ (Rosenow et al., 2017) i.e. it should have the lowest risk 
profile. But it does not, which ties with the evidence that DR appears to be difficult in 
practice and never delivers the supposed levels of saving, even accounting for the rebound 
effect. The lens of risk brings into focus the elements which are integral to the relative lack 
of success of DR programmes. In comparing this negafuel with other fuel sources it is 
clear to see that meeting demand with supply from Solar (electric), Wind (offshore), and 
Wind (onshore) is a more straight-forward task.  
 
9.1.1 Error propagation and uncertainty estimation in the risk scores 
In any multi-step calculation it is possible to estimate the compound error (Squires, 2008; 
Hughes and Hase, 2010). Estimating the uncertainty in the final risk total gives a handle on 
whether and by how much the spread in risk scores overlap for different fuels. Uncertainty 
arises from incorrect estimates of the likelihood or impact of a cause of risk. As it is likely 
that the broad level of the risk (low, moderate, high) will be estimated correctly, the error 
in any consequence score is most probably 1 and at worst 2 (termed uncertainty in the 
risk, ∆R). An uncertainty analysis serves two purposes 1) to see which fuels have 
statistically significant similar scores, and 2) to gain understanding of whether reappraisal 
of the likelihood and impact scores in future analysis will significantly affect the ranking. 
The precise ranking of different fuels is not important for ES policy discussions, but broad 
groupings may be a useful shortcut. 
In Eq. 1 nk, mj, and U in the elements for stages five and six are constants which 
have no uncertainty, therefore Eq. 1 is of the form 
jijif SSSSSSSS ,6,6,5,54321   TRS      (2) 
where S is the sum at each stage. The general form of the uncertainty for a sum is 
     222 BA Z           (3) 
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Thus the uncertainty in the composite risk score can be expressed as 
         
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But as ∆R is an integer we can state that 
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where N = number of relevant (non-zero) risks at the ith stage. If we take ∆R=1, then 
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Therefore the uncertainty in the composite risk score for any fuel f  (Eq. 4) is: 
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Eq. 7 can be described as the uncertainty in the total risk score for a fuel is the 
square root of the sum of the number of relevant (non-zero) risks for that fuel. Similarly, if 
the error ∆R=2 on each risk then the uncertainty is multiplied by 2. In Figure 9.1 we show 
the effect of assuming the worst case i.e. that all individual consequence scores (likelihood 
* impact) carry an uncertainty of 2. This is the practical outer limit of misattributing 
likelihood and impact values. Figure 9.1 also shows which groups of overall risk scores 
can be considered unique (a form of simple clustering). The four riskiest (non-renewable) 
fuels have such similar scores that they can be considered to be in any order. Biomass, 
Coal, and Biogas have indistinguishable scores, as too does the group encompassed by 
Bioliquids and Ocean (tidal). Thermal (low temperature) to Hydro form a cluster, with 
Solar (electric) and Solar (thermal, water) forming the least riskiest pair. Thermal 
(geological) is difficult to attribute as it is located equidistant from two groups, but for 
convenience we make it part of the Biomass group.  
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Total Risk Score (a.u.)
 
Figure 9.1 The total risk score for all fuels with a worst-case error of ∆R=2 for each 
individual cause of risk for each fuel at every stage. In this case it is more intuitive to use 
the raw risk score rather than the normalised score as it keeps the uncertainty in the risk 
(∆R) in native units. 
 
We suggest that the groupings (Table 9.2) are unlikely to switch membership 
without radical changes in at least several categories of causes of risk. This implies that the 
risk scores we have calculated are sufficiently robust to project using sets of scenarios into 
the medium-term – 20 years hence, say. There is evidence from the slow-moving nature of 
national economies that 20 years is a reasonable time-constant (Roberts et al., 2016). 
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Group Members Average Normalised Risk 
Score (a.u.) 
Gas, Gas (unconventional), Oil, Nuclear (fission) 97 
Biogas, Biomass, Coal, Thermal (geological) 68 
Bioliquids, Demand Reduction, Ocean (tidal), Ocean 
(wave), Waste 
45 
Hydro, Thermal (low temperature), Wind (offshore), 
Wind (onshore) 
33 
Solar (electric), Solar (thermal, water) 23 
Table 9.2 Cluster memberships which are unlikely to switch, though the ranking of 
individual fuels may change over the medium-term. 
 
9.1.2 Summary of Risk Characteristics by Fuel Type 
We have categorised fuels as either renewable or non-renewable; in Table 9.3 we give an 
overview of some important characteristics of the risk matrix. 
 
Characteristic Non-renewable Renewable 
Average total normalised risk score (a.u.) 78 40 
Most significant cause of risk Lack of access to 
capital 
Changing policy or 
regulatory 
framework 
Most significant risk category (sum) Political Innovation 
Most significant stage (sum) Stage 2: Exploit Stage 2: Exploit 
Total number of high-level risks 75 45 




Fuel carrying the lowest risk Waste Solar (thermal, 
water) 
Table 9.3 Significant characteristics for the renewable or non-renewable fuel categories. 
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9.2 The Relative Importance of the Causes of Risk 
As we have used a consistent set of causes throughout all stages of the supply chain, we 
can compare how important different risks are at different stages. There are three possible 
approaches. The first is that we can calculate a rank order of these risks by summing the 
individual consequence scores across all fuels. Secondly, we can count the number of risks 
which fall into the high-level group. Thirdly, we can examine the pattern of distribution of 
micro, meso, and macro scale risks as these are assigned independent of the likelihood and 
impact evaluations.  
Table 9.4 ranks the risks by the sum of their scores across all fuels and stages. We 
can see that the categories of risks are well-spread through the ranked list (Table 9.4).  
Although the spread is not completely even, this shows that the causes of risk selected 
represent a range of levels of importance. It is likely that these levels will differ from 
country to country. All seven categories of risk appear in the first 10 places demonstrating 
that both the selection of risks is appropriate and that important risks are spread widely in 
their nature. 
An unexpected top 10 risk is the lack of specialists in the local workforce. It 
appears that this may be driven by the electricity distribution industry. The available (grey) 
literature may be subject to double-counting and over emphasising this risk. It is not 
surprising that the lack of access to capital is at the top, since this affects both large and 
small projects. A residential-scale installation may cost six orders of magnitude less that a 
power station, say, but it is the cost relative to the income of the buyer which is important. 
Furthermore, the availability of capital tends to be framed as a ‘go / no go’ question. This 
capability to force the cessation of an activity places this risk at the highest level. 
It is notable that the five causes of risk (Table 9.4) with the number of high-level 











); two of these are in the Political category. Outside of the top risks, only 
quality of the fuel source has an appreciable number of high-level individual consequence 
scores. The correlation between the sum of the scores for each cause of risk and the 
number in the high-level category is modest (R
2
=0.4488, Table 9.5) and indicates that the 
ranking of all other causes of risk is driven by the frequency of which they occur. 
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Rank Cause of Risk Micro Meso Macro 
1 Lack of access to capital 13 25 46 
2 Changing policy or regulatory framework 0 87 2 
3 Significant public concern 55 39 0 
4 Lack of vocational training of the local workforce 0 99 0 
5 Insufficient capacity to construct sites 42 27 6 
6 Optimism bias  0 61 32 
7 Lack of specialists in the  local workforce 0 97 0 
8 Pollution event 82 0 4 
9 Operational failure 86 10 0 
10 Natural hazards 87 0 0 
11 Only marginal improvements likely 0 12 73 
12 Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning 81 7 0 
13 Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components 
or conversion devices 
0 8 79 
14 R&D capacity or capability does not match the 
challenge 
0 44 40 
15 Quality of fuel source 44 28 4 
16 Lack of a well-functioning market 0 22 77 
17 Lack of public subsidy 0 56 0 
18 Weak technology transfer environment 0 35 49 
19 Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of 
enforcement of, standards and codes 
0 80 0 
20 Price volatility 14 12 69 
21 Lack of material substitutability 0 0 72 
22 Denial of permission to access sites 58 10 0 
23 Lack of critical materials availability 0 0 65 
24 Difficult physical access 57 0 0 
25 Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction 4 37 0 
26 Specialist equipment unavailable 19 34 18 
27 Uncertain decommissioning costs 66 1 0 
28 Infrastructure failure 42 24 0 
29 Disputed landrights or resource ownership 50 7 0 
30 Unable to agree a price for licence or permits  7 30 0 
31 Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce 0 76 0 
32 Lack of water availability 23 0 0 
33 Lack of social stability 0 26 0 
34 Poor institutional governance 0 26 0 
Table 9.4 Rank order of the causes of risk with the prevalence of the different scales. The 
categories to which risks are associated are colour-coded as: 
Economic Environmental Innovation Manufacturing Political Skills Technical 
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We note that comparing renewables and non-renewables across all stages the score 
for individual causes of risk, renewables score higher than non-renewables in 44% of the 
assessments. Intuitively this appears high, but progress in developing and deploying some 
renewable technologies is slow. 
There are no correlations between the number of risks classed as macro-, meso-, or 
micro-scale with the total score for the causes of risk (Table 9.5). This result is expected 
and confirms that the causes of risk are not defined in such a way that introduces any form 
of bias. 
 
 Micro Meso Macro High-level (number)  
R
2
 0.0046 0.1116 0.0170 0.4488 
Table 9.5 Correlation coefficients for the number of micro-, meso-, and macro-scale risks 
with the scores for each individual cause of risk and total number of high-level risks. 
 
Constructing the risk matrix revealed areas for which there is relatively little 
understanding of the risks to the fuel supply chain, and by extension ES. These blindspots 
have received little academic attention in this context e.g. manufacturing for energy supply 
chains. Although concern is shown by Government, the assessment is not in terms of risk 
to ES. We note that it proved difficult to be consistent with interpreting Optimism bias. 
Although a detailed analysis of systemic risks is beyond the scope of the current 
work, we can look at the risks that are common and widespread in the fuel chains 
examined. Using the tables in Appendix A we can show that only two causes of risk occur 
at every stage for all fuels: ‘lack of a well-functioning market’ (Economic) and ‘lack of 
vocational training in the local workforce’ (Skills). If we set an arbitrary cut-off point of a 
risk appearing in 90% or more fuels (at all stages) then a further seven risks (from five 
categories) may be consider ‘systemic’ (the complete list is shown in Table 9.6. Looking 
at the overall rank (Table 9.4) the lack of vocational training in the local workforce is 
 highly ranked, but the lack of a well-functioning market is ranked mid-table. Furthermore, 
the other cause of risk with a prevalence higher than its ranking might indicate is ‘Price 
volatility’ – also in the Economic category. This result supports our suggestion that the 




Prevalence Cause of Risk Risk 
Category 
Overall 
Rank (of 34) 
100% Lack of vocational training of the local 
workforce 
Skills 4 
100% Lack of a well-functioning market  Economic 16 
98% Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills 7 
97% Operational failure Technical 9 
96% Price volatility Economic 20 
96% Significant public concern Political 3 
95% Optimism bias  Innovation 6 
91% Changing policy or regulatory framework Political 2 
90% Unable to neutralise waste at 
decommissioning 
Technical 12 
Table 9.6 The most prevalent causes of risk occurring in the matrix across all stages for all 
fuels. The overall rank is that given in Table 9.4. 
 
A further four causes of risk have a prevalence of 89% and this captures the 
remaining two risk categories (Manufacturing and Environmental). However, there is a 
clear gap between ‘Optimism bias’ and ‘Changing policy or regulatory framework’ 
suggesting that only the first seven causes of risk might be consider to be characteristics 
consistent with being systemic. 
 
9.3 Risk Variation by Stage 
We consider the type and size of risks not only for individual fuels, but also by fuel 
category and cumulative score. Disaggregating the process into stages in particular 
highlights the differences between renewables and non-renewables. The total risk score is 
dominated by whether stages are merged or not. This lowers the overall scores for 
renewables, in general. The distribution of the score of a particular cause of risk across 
stages may not be the most important outcome, however, where the risk occurs and at what 
scale will be for policy considerations. At the level of individual fuels, we visualise how 




















































Figure 9.2 Four examples (two renewable, two non-renewable) of how the stage total risk 
score varies for a) Bioliquids, b) Wind (offshore), c) Gas, and d) Nuclear (fission). The Gas 
(electricity) chart shows how this method distinguishes fuels with branching points. Gas 
used for electricity generation yields a risk pattern different from gas used for heating. 
 
The cumulative total risk score across stages for an individual fuel gives an 
indicator of whether there is an especially high hurdle to overcome along the supply chain 
(Figure 9.3). A step-change in the profile may indicate the need for attention to policy or 
regulation. The size of the step or the ratio of the upper to lower value do not appear to be 
important, but only by drilling down into the causes of risk which give rise to the jump in 
cumulative risk score can a meaningful picture be drawn. The profiles of the cumulative 
total risk scores for renewables, non-renewables, and all fuels combined is shown in Figure 
9.4. When considering the full range of fuels, the profile for renewables flattens more 
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quickly that for non-renewables. This shows that risk continues to accumulate in stages 











































Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6
 
Figure 9.3 Four examples (two renewable, two non-renewable) of how the cumulative 
total risk score profile changes with the process stages for a) Biogas, b) Demand reduction, 
c) Gas, and d) Nuclear (fission). 
 
This point is amply demonstrated by looking at the average risk score at each stage 
(Figure 9.5). The average score for renewables at stages one, three, and four is very much 
less than that for non-renewables. At stages 5-6 the scores are similar and higher for 
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Figure 9.5 Average risk score at each stage for renewables and non-renewables. 
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 The number of relevant risks at each stage (for all fuels) follows a similar pattern to 
Figure 9.5 i.e. fewer risks at stages three and four and there is strong correlation between 
this number and the stage risk score (R
2
=0.8284). However, the distribution of the number 
of high-level risks does not follow the same pattern (Figure 9.6). We observe that stages 
two and four are the most prominent, with stage two having double the number of high-
level risks of stage four. The split of these high-level risks with respect to their scale is also 
shown in Figure 9.6. As expected, there is no pattern to their distribution, but it is 
interesting to note that stages one and three do not have any high-level meso-scale risks, 






















Micro Meso Macro Total
 
Figure 9.6 The distribution of high-level risks, and their scale, for all fuels by stage. 
 
 These statistics combined reveal the overall order of the stages by risk score (Table 
9.7). The exploitation stage is the most risky because Oil, Gas, and Gas (unconventional) 
have high scores and many of the renewables have stages 2-4 combined (exploiting, 
conditioning, and converting the fuel are co-located) and accounted for in this stage. Stages 
five and six score highly in part because every fuel supply has these stages. Although 
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interesting, this ranking does not give useful detail by which to analyse the reasons i.e. the 
important causes of risk. 
 
Rank Stage Risk Score (a.u.) 
1 2: Exploit 1768 
2 6: Use 1439 
3 5: Distribute 1418 
4 4: Convert 872 
5 1: Explore 769 
6 3: Condition 652 
Table 9.7 Rank order of the stages by their total risk score across all fuels. 
 
 The complete list of causes of risk which account for more than half of the risk 
score at each stage are set out in Table B.1 and summarised in Table 9.8. Stages 1-3 and 6 
each have a risk which is significantly more important that the second most important. 
 
Stage Cause of Risk  Category Score (a.u.) 
1: Explore Quality of fuel source Environmental 87 
2: Exploit Lack of access to capital Economic 121 
3: Condition Lack of access to capital Economic 59 
4: Convert Pollution event Technical 66 
5: Distribute Lack of access to capital Economic 102 
6: Use Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing 153 
Table 9.8 Summary of the most significant risk at each stage and the category to which it 
belongs. 
 
9.4 Scale and Risk Location 
The scale is our indicator by which we judge at what level the risk is concentrated i.e. at 
the level of the individual company or organisation (or household), a national Government, 
or diffuse and driven by international regulations or markets. This may be interpreted as 
which type of organisation has most control or is more directly affected by the cause of 
risk in question. The number of micro, meso, or macro risks is not important, but the 
proportions for each fuel are interesting (Figure 9.8). The scale indicates whether, or what 
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type of, policy instrument may be appropriate for mitigating or minimising a cause of risk. 
There is no obvious strong pattern to the distribution of the number of each scale, though 
Figure 9.7 shows the renewables and non-renewables classes exhibiting a similar pattern in 
that for both meso-scale is the most frequent and macro-scale the least. This pattern holds 
for the distribution of high-level risks amongst the three scales i.e. meso has the most and 
macro the least. We assessed the correlation between the number of risks at each scale and 





























Micro 0.6993 0.1701 
Meso 0.7720 0.0305 
Macro 0.5302 0.5788 
Table 9.9 Correlation coefficients for the number of risks at each scale and the total risk 
score for the renewables and non-renewables. 
 
Figure 9.8 [next page] The number of micro-, meso-, and macro-scale risks for each 
source of fuel. The branching points are split out for each use end-point (energy vector) 
where appropriate). 
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Oil (UK road tanker distribution)












 When considering scale at each stage, the distribution pattern is not so clear-cut 
(Figure 9.9). The meso-scale risks are most prominent except for Stage 3 (Condition) 
where macro are the most important (though all three scales were similar).  At Stage 4 


















Figure 9.9 The number of micro-, meso-, and macro-scale risks at each stage. 
 
9.4.1 Crossing the System Boundary 
Whilst constructing the matrix and recording the scale of risk, we noted whether the 
principal location of the risk was within or outwith the system boundary (the UK territorial 
border). With respect to the number of risks at each of the three scales of risk we 
performed a chi-square test to ascertain whether there is any statistical difference between 
those inside (labelled as UK) and outside (labelled as Global) the system boundary (Table 
9.10). Only stages 1-3 have any risks located outside of the system boundary; for stages 1-
2 the fuels are Coal, Gas, Nuclear (fission), and Oil, and for Stage 3 only Nuclear (fission). 
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Stage Scale Global 
(#) 





2 p Stat Sig. 
1 Micro 35 102 137 35 0.00 0.95 N 
 Meso 25 118 143 37 3.72 0.10 Y 
 Macro 28 35 63 16 8.67 0.01 Y 
2 Micro 48 156 204 48 0.00 0.95 N 
 Meso 42 170 212 50 1.16 0.50 N 
 Macro 40 100 140 33 1.61 0.50 N 
3 Micro 7 78 85 10 0.96 0.50 N 
 Meso 13 74 87 10 0.68 0.70 N 
 Macro 12 85 97 12 0.02 0.95 N 
Total Micro  90 336 426 91 0.02 0.95 N 
 Meso  80 362 442 95 2.26 0.30 N 
 Macro  80 220 300 64 3.88 0.10 Y 
Table 9.10 Chi-square test results for the three risk scales inside and outside of the system 
boundary. This data has two degrees of freedom.  
 
The chi-square test shows that mostly there is no statistical difference between the 
prevalence of each scale inside and outside of the system boundary. However, there are 
two marginal cases, namely at Stage 1 (Meso) and the Total (Macro). There is one clearly 
significant case which is Stage 1 (Macro), showing that risks located outside of the system 
boundary attract more macro-scale risks than expected. This can be interpreted as the fuels 
which the UK uses as having causes of risk for exploration more frequently subject to 
global pressures and markets; a possible explanation for which is that the fossil fuel 
industry is globally distributed (low density) requiring very large levels of investment to 
create a viable project. This is not altogether surprising. What is more curious is that the 
meso-scale causes of risk (Government level) were not clearly different inside and outside 
of the boundary given that many sources of fossil and nuclear fuels are located in countries 
with poor governance records. 
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9.5 The Categories of Risk  
Although the division of the causes of risk into the seven categories is convenient, but to 
some extent arbitrary, it is interesting to see the risk scores. The disparities are in part a 
function of the varying number of risks in each category; the largest has twice as many 
risks as the smallest. Table 9.11 shows the effect that scoring by total and per risk has on 
the perceived importance of categories. 
 
Rank Category Normalised Risk 
Score per Risk (a.u.) 
Category Normalised Risk 
Score, Total (a.u.) 
1 Skills 100 Political 100 
2 Manufacturing 98 Innovation 97 
3 Innovation 96 Economic 77 
4 Economic 91 Technical 74 
5 Technical 88 Environmental 63 
6 Political 85 Skills 50 
7 Environmental 75 Manufacturing 50 
Table 9.11 The rank order of the normalised risk scores by total and on a per cause of risk 
basis. 
 
We note that the Skills, Manufacturing, and Political categories shift significantly. 
We note too that ratio between the high and low rank for each group is significantly 
different – 1.3 for the per risk basis, and 2.0 for the total risk. We note too in Figure 9.10 
that the average score does not vary greatly between categories. We conclude that ranking 
by category is not a useful statistic. However, as Figure 9.10 also shows that each category 
has a significant variation in the minimum and maximum scores, it is valid to examine how 
the score for a category varies across stages (Figure 9.11). This shows that no category has 
a uniform profile, implying that detailed analysis for policy action for any cause of risk 



























































Figure 9.10 The average score per cause of risk in each category (absolute values) across 

























Economic Environmental Innovation Manufacturing Political Skills Technical
 
Figure 9.11 Risk scores for each category at each stage showing the variation of the profile 
along thee process supply chain. 
 187 
9.6 Projections of Risk in Future Energy Scenarios 
Using the total (normalised) risk score for a fuel, we can calculate the total comparative 
risk for a portfolio of energy sources for future energy systems. In this way, we can assess 
how the total system risk changes with different mixes of fuel sources over time. Such a 
projection of risk allows us to see effects of policy options other than on GHG emissions. 
For this UK case study we select two of the more well-considered sets of long-term 
scenarios, namely those produced by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) (Ekins et 
al., 2013) and National Grid (NG) (National Grid, 2017).  
There are a number of pre-processing operations which need to be conducted 
before a risk analysis can be performed, or to allow comparison between scenario set 
created by different organisations. Experienced developers specify and generate their 
scenarios to address specific issues or questions. The NG scenarios examine installed 
capacity on the electricity system, which makes these scenarios technology-driven, not 
fuel-centric. However, we can discern or judge which fuels correspond to which 
technology. NG do not account explicitly for heat or transport, though electrified transport 
is accounted for in the installed capacity figures. The work by UKERC mixes primary 
fuels and technologies, meaning that we must devise a method of rationalisation for 
compatibility with the fuel supply chains we have used throughout. The definitions of fuels 
may also differ. Finally, differences in the basis of the time-series used or of the end-points 
need to be reconciled. 
 
9.6.1 UKERC 2050 Scenarios 
We are using the 2013 UKERC scenario set (Ekins et al., 2013), which are updated from 
the original set (Skea et al., 2011). UKERC developed four scenarios, but we will consider 
only the reference scenario (henceforth REF) and the most aggressive low carbon scenario 
(henceforth LC). These are the two most widely differing scenarios. For both scenarios we 
have calculated the temporal risk profiles for primary energy demand, final energy demand 
by fuel, and installed electricity generating capacity. We use the term ‘portfolio’ to denote 
the list of fuel groups (or categories) used by UKERC. The fuels in each group (G) used by 
UKERC are comprised of a subset of the individual fuels we have analysed. Therefore, 
each UKERC fuel-group (G) has a different set of pre-processing steps. At each timestep, 
the normalised total risk calculation can be generalised in the following manner.  
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Let the average risk for a fuel group (G) be Rfuel. If G is the set of n fuels which 
comprise the group of individual fuels each with a normalised risk score (NRS) then 







       (8) 






         (9) 
Therefore the total risk T for the portfolio in each year is the proportional demand eG for 



























      (10) 
We apply this method to several ways of grouping the portfolio of fuels. 
 
Primary Energy Demand 
The groups of fuels used by UKERC are: renewable electricity, biomass and waste, natural 
gas, oil, imported refined oil (IRO), coal, nuclear electricity, imported electricity, and 
imported hydrogen. The pre-processing steps are: 
1. Hydrogen use is zero for all years, thus is removed from further analysis. 
2. The item ‘imported electricity’ is treated as 50:50 renewable and non-renewable, 
for all years. This is reasonable since the UK is connected to Ireland which supplies 
surplus wind power and to France which has mostly nuclear generation. 
3. Until 2050 UKERC’s modelling shows IRO as a net export. Therefore we subtract 
IRO from the oil time-series (except 2050) as our analysis is about the UK reliance 
on fuels. Even though the stages 2-4 infrastructure is needed for the IRO 
component, it is marginal to domestic use because the UK would not create the 
infrastructure solely for export purposes. For all years, IRO is a small proportion 
which will have little effect on the risk profile. 
4. UKERC have paired biomass and waste in their modelling; we take the compound 
risk as the average. 
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5. UKERC have a collective entry of ‘renewable electricity’. For 2000-2020 for this 
item we calculate risk score as the average of Hydro, Solar (electric), Wind 
(offshore), and Wind (onshore). For 2025-2050, we calculate the average of the 
aforementioned plus Biogas, Ocean (tidal), Ocean (wave), Solar (thermal, water), 
Thermal (geological), and Thermal (low temperature). This calculation assumes 
that all are equally demanding of the distribution networks. 
6. We interpret UKERC’s modelling of energy conservation as demand reduction in 
our terms. This is not an exact equivalence as our definition is wider. We add the 
‘conservation’ time-series to the primary energy demand since that energy would 
otherwise have to be produced. 
 
In Figure 9.12 we see that the primary energy demand in the REF scenario drops 
until 2025 (8500 PJ) and then rises to 2050 (9800 PJ). Meanwhile, the risk profile falls, 
except for 2020-2025 when UKERC assume that new-build nuclear will come on-stream. 
The deployment of Nuclear (fission) increases the risk before the remaining coal-fired 























































Normalised risk score Total Primary Energy Demand
 





























































Normalised risk score Total Primary Energy Demand
 
Figure 9.13 The risk profile of primary energy demand by fuel for the UKERC LC(2013) 
scenario. 
 
For the LC scenario (Figure 9.13) the primary energy demand falls until 2025 ( 
7500 PJ, approximately 1000 PJ per year less than the REF scenario) and remains at about 
that level out to 2050. The risk profile shows a smooth decline, unlike the REF scenario. 
The normalised risk score for the LC scenario in 2050 is 81, compared to 84 for REF. 
 
Final Demand by Fuel 
The fuels used by UKERC in their modelling of final demand are rationalised into end-use 
groups compatible with our fuel set (Table 9.12). 
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UKERC Fuels  End Use Group Constituent fuels 
Ethanol / methanol, 
bio diesels, bio-oil 
Bioliquids Bioliquids 





Energy conservation Demand reduction Demand reduction 
Electricity, others Electricity Coal, Gas, Gas (unconventional), Hydro, 
Nuclear (fission), Ocean (tidal), Ocean 
(wave), Solar (electric), Thermal 




Gas Biogas, Gas, Gas (unconventional) 
Heat Heat Gas, Gas (unconventional), Solar (thermal, 
water), Thermal (geological), Thermal 
(low temperature) 
Fuel oil, petrol, 
diesel, jet fuel 
Oil Oil 
Table 9.12 The fuels modelled by UKERC in their Final Energy Demand by Fuel scenario 
are mapped on to end-use groups which consist of one or more of the fuel supply chains 
analysed. 
 
The remaining pre-processing steps are: 
1. Allocate the total energy (PJ) for bio-solids / waste as 50% each to Biomass and 
Waste throughout the time-series. 
2. Allocate the total energy (PJ) for bio-oil / fuel oil as 50% each to Bioliquids and 
Oil throughout the time-series. 
3. Derive the value for Heat from the branches in the specified fuel chains where 
thermal energy is the final form. 
4. For the LC scenario, the hydrogen demand is added to gas because UKERC assume 
that the hydrogen is generated by steam reforming methane. 
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Figure 9.14 shows that the risk profile for final energy demand by fuel falls 
steadily. The final energy demand falls steeply until 2010, then more gently until 2035. It 
is interesting to note that the sharp increase in final demand anticipated by UKERC in this 
scenario has only modest perturbation on the risk score. This is due to the switch from oil 





























































Normalised Risk Score Final Demand
 
Figure 9.14 The risk profile of final energy demand by fuel for the UKERC REF(2013) 
scenario. 
 
For the low carbon scenario (Figure 9.15) the demand drops until 2025 when it 
levels off, similar to the total primary energy supply by fuel. Likewise the normalised risk 































































Normalised Risk Score Final Demand
 
Figure 9.15 The risk profile of final energy demand by fuel for the UKERC LC(2013) 
scenario. 
 
Installed Electricity Generating Capacity 
In this scenario UKERC have included carbon capture and storage (CCS) for biomass, 
coal, and gas, plus for the co-firing of coal and biomass. Storage is also added to this 
scenario explicitly. The pre-processing steps are: 
1. Incorporate the co-firing and CCS entries into their principal fuels i.e. coal and gas. 
As the normalised risk scores for coal and biomass are the same, we can simply add 
them together. 
2. Treat ‘bio-waste and others’ as biogas. 
3. As ‘storage’ is not a fuel it is removed from further analysis. We define storage as a 
distribution system attribute only. Any risk associated with storage is included in 
stage 5 for electricity networks. Keeping storage as an explicit entry would be 
double counting that portion of risk. 
4. ‘Imported electricity’ is treated as 50:50 renewable and non-renewable, for all 
years, since the UK is connected to Ireland which supplies surplus wind power and 
to France which has mostly nuclear generation. 
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5. UKERC do not split wind into on- and off-shore. We assume the risk is equally 
split. 
6. Marine is not disaggregated by UKERC, we share the projected generating capacity 
equally between Ocean (tidal) and Ocean (wave). 
 
The installed electricity capacity is level until 2010 from when it steadily rises to 
2050 (Figure 9.16). The risk profile, however, follows a completely different pattern. The 
quasi-sinusoidal profile rises a little to 2010, falls until 2030 when it bottoms out at a value 
of 74 (a.u.). This fall is mostly due to falling use of gas and oil, and rising capacity of wind 
























































Normalised Risk Score Installed Capacity
 
Figure 9.16 The risk profile of the installed electricity generating capacity by fuel for the 
UKERC REF(2013) scenario. 
 
In the LC scenario (Figure 9.17) the installed capacity also rises at a faster rate than 
the REF, but shows signs of levelling off after 2040. The final installed capacity is 
approximately 15 GW greater than REF, and the normalised risk score is somewhat lower 
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Normalised Risk Score Installed Capacity
 
Figure 9.17 The risk profile of the installed electricity generating capacity by fuel for the 
UKERC LC(2013) scenario. 
 
By plotting the risk profiles for the REF and LC scenarios (Figure 9.18) we can see 
more readily how they diverge. We note that even though the risk associated with the LC 


































Reference  Low Carbon
 
Figure 9.18 A comparison showing how the UKERC REF and LC scenarios diverge for 
installed generating capacity. 
 
Transport fuel demand 
The UKERC scenarios examine transport in detail with one element of their modelling 
being fuel demand (in PJ) in terms of the final energy vector. The fuels which UKERC 
consider are petrol, diesel, electricity, hydrogen, jet fuel, bio-diesel / kerosene, and ethanol 
/ methanol.  
 To make the UKERC transport fuel use figures compatible with our framework, we 
need to account for the way in which UKERC have implemented their assumption that the 
total energy used by transport falls continuously over the modelled period. The UKERC 
figures show the use of petrol, diesel, and bioliquids all decreasing, but that the demand by 
transport for electricity remains constant. This can only be achieved if efficiency (Demand 
Reduction in our terms) increases significantly – this is a strong assumption. UKERC’s 
methodology incorporates the efficiency figure into their model of ‘Conservation’ and is 











 DR Total   transport todue DR of Proportion
   (11) 
The remaining pre-processing steps are: 
1. Petrol, diesel, and jet fuel are grouped and given the risk score for oil. 
2. Bio-diesel / kerosene, and ethanol / methanol are treated as bioliquids. 
3. Electricity is given the mean risk score for electricity from all sources. 
 
For the REF scenario the fuel demand for transport falls until 2030 after which it 
levels off (Figure 9.19). The normalised risk score also falls gradually, until 2050 when 

















































Normalised Risk Score Final Demand
 
Figure 9.19 The risk profile of the fuel demand for transport for the UKERC REF(2013) 
scenario. 
 
Figure 9.20 shows that the LC scenario demand profile is similar to REF i.e. 
decreases steadily and then levels off after 2030 to almost the same value (1300-1400 PJ). 
However, the risk profile is smoother with two distinct parts: 2000-2025 and 2030-2050 
with the slope of the latter stage being steeper. Despite the total energy demand being the 
same for both REF and LC, the normalised risk score for the LC pathway is significantly 
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lower at 60 a.u. (compared with 81 a.u.). As a proportion of total demand, the LC scenario 
has transport making up a slightly larger part than for REF. This is to be expected since the 
overall LC scenario has demand falling across all sectors of use. These statistics are 
summarised in Table 3.1. By plotting the risk profiles for the REF and LC scenarios 






















































Normalised Risk Score Final Demand
 
Figure 9.20 The risk profile of the fuel demand for transport for the UKERC LC(2013) 
scenario. 
 
Statistic  REF(2013) LC(2013) 
Energy demand, annual (PJ) Initial 2066 2066 
 2050 1345 1393 
Normalised risk score (a.u.) Initial 97 97 
 2050 81 60 
Proportion of total demand (%) Initial 30 30 
 2050 18 22 
Table 9.13 Summary to compare the demand and risk profile statistics for the transport 

































Reference  Low Carbon
 
Figure 9.21 A comparison showing how the UKERC REF and LC scenarios diverge for 
transport energy demand. 
 
9.6.2 National Grid (NG) Future Energy Scenarios 
Like UKERC, NG created four scenarios. We note that the UKERC Reference scenario is 
not formally termed as ‘business as usual’ (BAU), though it functions as such. The NG 
‘Steady State’ scenario is described as “…current levels of progress and innovation 
continue.” which implies BAU. However, according to Roberts et al. (2019) neither 
scenario is a true BAU case. The two most extreme NG scenarios are ‘Two Degrees’ 
(henceforth 2DEG) and ‘Consumer Power’ (henceforth CP). The 2DEG scenario  
represents a pathway to meet the Paris agreement commitments and is comparable with 
UKEC LC i.e. the fastest to reduce carbon emissions. The NG CP scenario, like UKERC 
REF, is the worst case in the set i.e. the slowest to reduce carbon emissions. 
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Fuel CP Scenario 2DEG Scenario 
2030 2050 2030 2050 
Gas 71% 45% 98% 89% 
Gas (unconventional) 28% 48% – – 
Biogas 1% 7% 2% 11% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 9.14 The percentage of the three gas groups for the single ‘gas’ entry for the NG 
electricity scenarios. These are calculated from the NG gas model. 
 
The NG modelling also goes out to 2050, but they only provide data for one 
intermediate year (2030). Neither does NG explicitly incorporate energy efficiency (or 
demand reduction) in their modelling. The NG scenarios are best suited to examining 
installed capacity for electricity.  
NG have separate calculations for the supply of gas for residential and industrial 
on-site heating. This element of their modelling gives projected figures for the split 
between natural gas from various sources (UKCS, Norway, European continent, LNG, 
other imports), shale gas, and ‘green gas’2. In our terms the NG definitions translate to 
Gas, Gas (unconventional), and Biogas. The figures for gas used in electricity generation 
give the envelope, thus using the splits suggested by the gas modelling, we can calculate 
the proportions used for electricity generation. Each scenario has separate a gas model and 
the proportions we calculate are shown in Table 9.14. These proportions are then applied 
to the risk scores to calculate the compound risk score for gas in the NG electricity time-
series. In doing this we are assuming that the proportions are the same regardless of the 
end use of gas. This is a reasonable assumption because once a source of gas is determined 
to have reached the specification for chemical composition it will be injected into the share 
distribution system (stage 5) and simply used as required. The remaining pre-processing 
steps are: 
1. CCS is added to gas since coal is assumed to be zero in both 2030 and 2050. 
                                                        
2
 The gas model time-series are available in the Data Workbook (v2 updated 17 July 2018): 
http://fes.nationalgrid.com/fes-document/ 
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2. ‘Interconnections’ (imported electricity) is treated as 50:50 renewable and non-
renewable, for both years, since the UK is connected to Ireland which supplies 
surplus wind power and to France which has mostly nuclear generation. 
3. ‘Storage and ‘vehicle to grid’ are removed since the power has already been 
generated. 
4. Treat the entry ‘Other renewables’ as bioliquids and biogas. 
5. Treat the entry ‘Other thermal’ as Solar (thermal), Thermal (geological), and 
Thermal (low temperature). Consider this entry as renewable, since this group is a 
small proportion of the total installed capacity. 
6. Marine is not disaggregated by NG, we share the projected generating capacity 
equally between Ocean (tidal) and Ocean (wave). 
 
The final computed risk scores for the NG scenarios are shown in Figure 9.22. This 
shows that the differences are small between the two most extreme scenarios created by 
NG. Both show a continued decrease in risk from 2017 to 2050, and as expected the 2DEG 
scenario is a little less risky than CP. We make three suggestions as to why this is the case. 
First, fuels for transport and heating are excluded. Fuels for these tend to have higher risk 
scores, and these sectors are considered the hardest to decarbonise. Solely electricity 
scenarios will be relatively similar if some measures of decarbonisation are enacted e.g. 
nuclear replacing gas, both of which have similar risk scores. NG as a private company 
acting as the transmission system operator might be expected to be risk averse. Secondly, it 
is possible that the electricity generating system is becoming less diverse in its technical 
nature. Thirdly, the assumptions chosen by NG are too similar and their scenario building 


























Figure 9.22 The normalised risk scores for the NG scenarios in the three years specified. 
 
9.6.3 Comparing Scenarios 
In addition to comparing the UKERC and NG scenarios, it is helpful to compare elements 
of the UKERC scenarios since there is annual time-series data. 
 The risk profiles for the UKERC REF and LC scenarios for total primary energy 
demand by fuel, final demand by fuel, installed electricity generating capacity, and 
transport fuel demand are compared in Figure 9.23. The main point is to show that there 
are differences depending on which measure is used to examine the energy system. For 
example, the difference between total primary energy demand by fuel and final demand by 
fuel is the efficiency of the conversion technologies (stage 4) and the losses in the 
distribution systems (stage 5).  
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Figure 9.23 Summary of the risk profiles for total primary energy demand by fuel, final 
demand by fuel, installed electricity generating capacity, and transport fuel demand for a) 
the UKERC REF scenario, and b) the UKERC LC scenario. 
 
The only measure allowing comparison of the UKERC scenarios with those created 































































the more optimistic scenarios (LC and 2DEG, respectively) have lower risk scores than the 
more pessimistic (REF and CP, respectively), and this holds true for both 2030 and 2050. 
Also, in all cases, the NG scenarios have lower risk score than those of UKERC. Indeed, 
overall the NG CP scenario still scores considerably lower than any of the UKERC cases. 
These values are summarised in Table 9.15. This shows a systematic bias in the way the 
assumptions have been drawn-up and modelled. The NG assumptions are transparent and 
published, but the assumptions UKERC built into MARKAL are not transparent. We note 
too that the risk score for the UKERC scenarios are the same or higher for 2050 than 2030. 
This demonstrates that UKERC scenarios show that there is no ‘free lunch’ when it comes 
to decarbonisation of electricity generation – the trade-off is severe. It should be noted that 
risk arising in fuel supply chains was not part of their considerations when constructing 
their models; this is an emergent property of their results. We note that the NG scenarios 
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Figure 9.24 Comparing installed electricity generating capacity in 2030 and 2050 for the 
UKERC and NG scenarios. These represent the fastest and slowest rates of 




Scenario Normalised Risk Score (a.u.) Change in Risk Score (%) 
2030 2050 
NG 2DEG 55 49 -8% 
NG CP 59 55 -11% 
UKERC REF(2013) 74 77 4% 
UKERC LC(2013) 69 70 1% 
Table 9.15 Summary of the normalised risk scores for the comparison of the UKERC and 
NG scenarios for installed electricity generating capacity. 
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10 Expert Verification Workshop 
In work requiring expert judgments, validation is an important stage. Usually, the approach 
is to convene a workshop to test methods or outcomes, or to offer specific input (Johansen 
and Rausand, 2014). The exact approach to take will depend on time available, scale of the 
project, maturity of the topic or method, or the type of information being sought (see for 
example Chang et al. (2014) or Eskandari Torbaghan et al. (2015)).  
To test the results of our novel approach and assessment we convened a panel of 
experts to elicit opinions and implicit knowledge not commonly put into the public 
domain. The aim was to uncover why industry experts consider something to be important. 
Inevitably, statistics and the literature offer only part of the landscape for a research area 
such as ES. Academic studies may model sets of restricted or closely defined 
circumstances (scenarios) but cannot properly incorporate the professional experience of 
experts. Dagonneau et al. (2017) observed from their national-scale environmental policy 
workshops that compared with the literature, experts gave a narrower range for impact 
severity for environmental risks, a higher median severity for economic risks, and a wider 
spread of severity impact scores for societal risks. The energy industry is mostly in the 
private sector, but as a public utility it is strongly regulated with significant policy and 
legislative guidance. Therefore the interface between government and industry is 
interesting and pertinent to understanding how different sets of sector experts view the 
relevant risks, and according to Duijm (2015) any risk evaluation should reflect the 
common understanding of the stakeholders.  
 There are hurdles to running such an exercise. Participants need sufficient 
experience beyond entry level, but organisations can be reluctant to give time of senior 
people, there is little incentive to participate beyond meeting some new people, 
participants may be reticent about speaking freely in case important information is 
accidentally given away to rivals, and there are limits to what can be achieved in a short 
event and how much preparation participants are willing to undertake. There are actions 
which may be taken to mitigate some of these difficulties, with running the event under the 
Chatham House rule3 is of primary importance. The most difficult mitigation task to 
                                                        
3
 Participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the 
speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.  
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execute is selecting invitees from different organisations with differing job functions, 
levels, or sectoral specialisation to ensure that potential clashes of interest are avoided. 
However, no matter how careful the planning, workshop organisers are at the whim of 
those who are prepared to attend. Furthermore, invitees sometimes offer substitute 
colleagues – sometimes less senior. These people may be unknown to the organisers, but 
courtesy dictates that the organisers trust the invitee’s judgment that the substitute is 
appropriate. 
 
10.1 Workshop Details 
Our aim for the event was to consider the relative importance of causes of risk for a subset 
of fuels, and to suggest how policymakers can account better for risks when developing 
energy policy. We opted to hold a 2½ hour workshop with 15-18 participants. Although 
this number could not cover all of the possible combinations of technology or job function, 
we considered that it was a realistic number which would cover the main areas. As the 
literature on which we had relied was predominantly academic, we chose to invite mostly 
those with private sector experience. We took the criterion for expertise as ten or more 
years relevant experience and were chosen to reflect the categories of risk and/or process 
stages. We made 38 invitations of which 19 were accepted (four were substitutes suggested 
by the invitee). A further five people were unavailable and unable to offer a suitable 
alternative attendee. Sometime after the invitations had been made, the UK Prime Minister 
announced that a general election and this placed the civil service into purdah. Although 
this legally only prevents policy announcements from being made, government 
departments withdraw from even attending events, even as observers. This brought the 
final number of participants down to 16; one person did not attend on the day. We agreed 
to maintain the anonymity of the participants, but Table 10.1 gives a breakdown of their 
expertise in relation to our categories of risk and stages. 
 The subset of fuels that we used were selected using as they met one or more of 
the following criteria: 1) having importance in the current energy system, 2) considered as 
having priority in future energy systems, or 3) showing interesting properties in our initial 
analysis. If the invitees who agreed to participate had a lack of knowledge of one of the 
fuels we would have withdrawn that fuel from the discussion. The final list of fuels for 
discussion  was: bioliquids, demand reduction, gas (unconventional), nuclear (fission), 
ocean (tidal), oil, solar (electric), and wind (offshore).  
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Job Title Expertise Stage(s) Main Risk 
Categories 
Partner Investment 3, 4, 5 Economic 
Consultant Oil 1-5 Environmental 
Manager Nuclear fission 1-4 Innovation 
Consultant Renewables, investment 2-5 Manu, innovation 
Research Fellow (academic) Public acceptability 1-6 Political 
Chief Executive Demand 6 Political 
Manager Markets 1, 2 Economic 
Senior Engineer Nuclear fission 3, 4 Technical 
Research Fellow Demand 5 Environmental 
Deputy Director Shale gas 1, 2, 3 Economic 
Director Infrastructure 4, 5 Technical 
Policy Analyst Coal and renewables 4 Political 
Research Fellow Investment 3-6 Technical 
Senior Lecturer Heat 5, 6 Political 
Advisor Gas 2-4 Political 
Company Director Markets, investment 3-6 Economic 
Table 10.1 Characteristics of the workshop participants. 
 
Participants were split into three pre-ordained groups, each with a facilitator.  
Groups were formed based on specialist fuel knowledge and each group discussed three 
fuels. Membership of the groups (and facilitator) were kept constant. Although we had 
working definitions of the causes of risk, to give flexibility we allowed participants to 
interpret these or to add (or condense) them. Any deviations were recorded and explained. 
Participants were sent briefing notes on the project, the definitions of fuels, risks, and 
categories. All notes were written by the facilitators. We chose not to use audio recording 
devices as this can inhibit some people and inevitably some speech is lost if people speak 
over each other. There were three tasks as follows: 
Task 1: The task for each group was to identify the most and least important causes of risk 
in each category for each fuel. The key point was to extract the reasoning why 
each expert had come to that conclusion. The discussion of differences in opinion 
was also important to record. Facilitators were instructed that if that proved too 
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contentious or difficult then to prioritise the stages with which the group was most 
confident, though this did not prove necessary.  
Task 2: In open session with all groups together, participants compared and contrasted 
these and prioritised the causes of risk across all eight fuels. 
Task 3: Also in open session, participants discussed what policy measures or instruments 
BEIS (or other Government dept) could enact to mitigate the most important risks 
occurring. Originally this was to have input from the departmental representatives 
giving useful direct feedback as part of the discussion. Without the departmental 
representatives present this task was somewhat muted, but opinions were noted. 
 
The open session also enabled facilitators to check whether a strong opinion was common 
or pertained only to an individual. We explicitly asked for criticism of our method of 
assessing risk in the open session. 
 
10.2 Group One 
This group was facilitated by Colin Axon (Department of Mechanical and Aerospace 
Engineering, Brunel University). 
 
10.2.1 General Comments 
One participant made a general point that the risk list does not sufficiently emphasise 
socio-technical issues, particularly elements which relate to civil society, for example, 
equity. This was about how perceived fairness is a risk when developing energy policy. 
[Clarification: This could relate to access to energy tariffs or financial fairness more 
generally, but really concerns any sort of energy policy. Social theory tells us of at least 
three different – but equally legitimate – views on fairness: parity (everyone is strictly 
equal), proportionality (those who are more deserving) and priority (everyone has equal 
opportunities). The risk is that energy policies are not ‘fair’ in plural senses of the word. 
This feeds into the broader point that causes of risk are rarely objective measures and that 
potentially any one of the categories could be perceived quite differently. For example, the 
risks of ‘natural hazards’ can equally plausibly be seen as catastrophes to avoid, 
uncertainties to manage or opportunities to exploit. Similarly, ‘institutional governance’ 
where discretion is given to firms is as equally legitimate as that where discretion is 
handed to regulators or where there is no discretion permitted at all. From any one of those 
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perspectives, the others would be considered ‘poor’ governance. The point being decision 
makers need to account for different perceptions of risk in order to make energy policies 
more socially robust.] It was suggested that this could be encompassed as a new risk of 
‘lack of equity’. 
 
10.2.2 Solar (Electric) 
A general comment made was that the important issue for PV is a need for the storage of 
power to reduced (power) cost volatility. It was suggested that this could be interpreted as 
a new risk of ‘lack of storage capacity’. However, this could be accommodated in the 
current fuel chain ‘Grid-scale storage’ if the definition is broadened to ‘Distributed 
storage’, say. The group chose to concentrate on innovation and political risks for stages 2-
4 (exploit, condition, convert).  
For the innovation category two participants considered optimism bias as a 
significant risk. One person considered it as a general risk, one specifically as price 
optimism i.e. the price of electricity generated from PV as not falling as fast or as low as 
expected. It was broadly accepted that power production in the wrong place at the wrong 
time, thus presenting a risk (the storage problem). We interpreted this as a technical risk, 
rather than innovation. Weak technology transfer was considered as not reducing costs of 
installation. This could be considered as a lack of capacity or capability in R&D to meet 
the challenge. Weak technology transfer was also considered in the context of building 
integrated systems, for example. There are many systems proposed or trialled, but 
relatively few types deployed as their cost is too great. This can be treated as a piece of 
evidence for weak technology transfer. 
For the Political category, significant public concern (‘NIMBYism’) was 
considered by four participants as a key risk. In particular one participant suggested that 
public engagement with energy issues is too narrow in practice making it more of a risk 
than usually considered. One participant suggested that better public engagement with 
energy issues more broadly than solely price could drive policy change. However, this was 
challenged by another participant who suggested that this might imply that Government 
might change policy even more frequently with perhaps “terrifying outcomes”. Standards 
and codes: one participant suggested that the development of appropriate standards and 
codes should be considered as a technical risk, whilst the enforcement a political risk. The 
role of the market and the Feed-in tariff (FiT) was discussed in the context of the risk of 
‘Changing policy or regulatory framework’. One participant suggested that the market as it 
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is currently constituted was not important enough to have any significant effect as it 
manifests itself as only a small proportion of the energy price. There was agreement that 
the FiT was poorly thought out before implementation. Another participant observed that 
the key piece of evidence that the FiT was a risk is that a change in the FiT rate (payment) 
could easily “make or kill PV”. Another participant noted that currently the cost of 
installation and operation of bi-directional meters far outweighed any financial and 
technical gains for exporting electricity generated by small-scale (residential) PV. 
 
10.2.3 Demand Reduction (DR) 
The inclusion of DR in the risk analysis was supported. But one participant raised the 
question of whether it might be better to consider DR at each and every stage of all the fuel 
supply chains. Meaning that every energy systems manufacturer, service provider, 
distributor, and user should consider a lack of DR activity as a risk. The main reason for 
proposing that DR be considered as a ‘negafuel’ is that it can be too easily subsumed and 
lost in a discussion. The point about every actor engaging in DR is well-made, but this 
analysis is at the national level. The aim is to prompt consideration of DR as an activity 
with significant value which requires specific policy instruments to given some level of 
coherence to such activities. But the point is taken and we will revisit our original method 
of including DR to see if improvements can be made to capture the micro-scale 
importance. 
The first risk raised was that the discount rate of the future value of DR is very 
aggressive, meaning that the long-term value of DR is not recognised, thus not worth 
investing in. The risk of rebound effects is high. There a number of studies which can be 
used to estimate the level of this risk. It was suggested that this risk might occur in Stage 4 
(conversion). Currently we had considered rebound effects as part of ‘Optimism bias’, but 
it was suggested that we examine whether rebound should be made an explicit risk. If DR 
were diffused through all stages, treating rebound explicitly would make the most sense. 
Lack of access to finance (capital) was identified as a cause of risk. The notion of equity 
raised in the discussion of PV may have relevance. 
Addressing the issue of energy waste was raised as an important element of DR. It 
was suggested that ‘lack of decreasing waste’ as a risk or ‘lack of increasing efficiency’ 
might capture this explicitly. However, waste through technical losses is already covered 
by ‘Operation failure’. Losses due to inefficiency are currently covered by ‘Pollution 
event’ i.e. an involuntary release of thermal energy (mostly) into the environment. We 
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would expect to include efficiency improvement as an innovation risk. We will examine 
whether ‘waste’ or ‘lack of efficiency’ should be made an explicit cause of risk. Also 
raised as an element of ‘Operational failure’ as a cause of risk was poor installation quality 
e.g. the incorrect installation of cavity wall insulation in West facing walls. One participant 
linked this to skills. 
At the exploitation stage, one participant highlighted incentives, and the 
recognition and spread of social norms. Incentives can be considered as an indicator of 
market failure, thus the cause of risk is the ‘lack of a well functioning market’. It was noted 
that the spread of social norms is more of a mechanism than a cause of risk. 
A new cause of risk not previously categorised explicitly was described as a ‘lack 
of reputational loss for house builders’. Meaning that poor standards go unpunished. It was 
suggested that this could be included as a ‘lack of enforcement of standards and codes’. It 
was suggested that we examine whether ‘lack of reputational loss for house builders’ as a 
cause of risk should be made explicit. 
 
10.2.4 Summary 
One of the key risks is the changing policy or regulatory framework. For solar PV, the 
feed-in tariff was highlighted as an example. Timescale informs the role of demand 
reduction (perhaps via a market price), but in the end encourages more consumption. The 
value of demand reduction is underplayed generally. Generally, the lack of access to 
capital was considered to be important. 
 
10.3 Group Two 
These notes are adapted from those of the group facilitator, Dr. Barry Rawn (Department 
of Electronic and Computer Engineering, Brunel University). 
 
10.3.1 Ocean (Tidal) 
Several participants identified tidal stream type of technology versus the barrage type (as 
proposed for the Severn Estuary) or lagoon, as most likely. Stages 2-4 (exploit, condition, 
convert) were identified as the most critical stages, though one expert felt exploring was 
also significant. A special feature agreed upon was the unusual operating environment. 
At Stages 2-4 (exploit, condition, convert) in the economic category of causes of 
risk the lack of access to capital was difficult not only because of high capital outlay, but 
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also concern over competitiveness due to current levelised cost of electricity. The group 
considered that there may be limited remaining learning curve benefits for reducing cost 
(only marginal improvements likely) and that the industry lacks long-term history. The 
group noted that at any particular site the available resource is limited (an energy density 
issue). For the manufacturing category, a lack of specialist equipment and an insufficient 
capacity to construct sites were noted as a significant risks. For the environment category, 
it was that hazards for pilot checks on resource are different and daunting. Poor time of day 
match with demand i.e. unevenly distributed demand compared the tide times which 
although predictable, shift was noted as risk. For the innovation category, funding needed 
to achieve viable civil engineering designs was thought to be the key risk. This was 
interpreted as the lack of public subsidy and that the R&D capacity or capability does not 
match the challenge. In the environment category, the fouling of blades e.g. due to 
barnacles, and other deep-sea conditions (such as difficult physical access and natural 
hazards) were the most important risks. Finally, the lack of specialists in the local 
workforce was noted. 
At Stage 5, (distribute), the high cost of connection due to distance and depth was 
the most significant issue, though economic impacts on other users of the area must be 
considered. For the environment category the group noted that exclusion zones imposed by 
environmental features could change. 
 
10.3.2 Nuclear (Fission) 
The group identified conversion (Stage 4) as most critical because the explore, exploit, and 
use stages all involved well understood commodities.  Exploring in particular was viewed 
as not a problem, though it was mentioned that political aspects can harm both local 
exploration or imports, even from a large and stable market for uranium or other fissile 
materials. The cost was flagged as the most serious impediment. Perception of one 
participant: “Lack of flexibility of production; more or less finished in future”. A 
participant stated that nuclear decommissioning costs are known, unless you account for 
removing the containment. The exception being Sellafield and Dounreay, which are 
uncertain. It is risky to use all the same reactor designs because if a design flaw emerges 
all reactors come off at the same time. 
In the economic category, the greatest risks noted were associated with capital 
expenditure and uncertain cost forecasts. The lack of access to capital is a special problem 
because of extremely high absolute capex which has led to additions to the bill of 
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consumers. Also noted was the treatment by the market due to lack of flexibility. Although 
decommissioning costs are put aside, some members of the group see these as small and 
relatively certain numbers, others saw these numbers as uncertain due to lack of certainty 
on whether it would be accepted by public or not. 
In the political category, the group noted that waste treatment plans are not trusted 
by the public. Furthermore, they observed that the general public opposed nuclear 
(although one participant observed that this is side-stepped in UK). However, this has in 
part led to the Government changing policy towards nuclear over a long period of time. 
There is an interesting interaction with the risks associated with the innovation category 
i.e. know-how becomes political. For example, the Czech Republic indigenised its know 
how, compared with Bulgaria which suffered after loss of central support following the 
collapse of the USSR. 
There was agreement that the nuclear sector was neither not innovating nor 
economic (always requiring subsidy). An interesting observation made was that negative 
learning rates demonstrated for projects in some countries arose because these are 
infrequent mega-projects, thus R&D capacity or capability may not match the challenge. 
Participants also noted that manufacturing of specialised components posed a risk to the 
industry. 
The group observed that a pollution event brings risk of regulator shut-down. Also 
in the technical category, it was clear that it is not possible to neutralize waste at 
decommissioning. Other risks discussed by the group were that the risk of natural hazards 
(environmental category) results in small number of suitable approvable sites, even in the 
UK. This risk is not normally considered from this perspective. Finally, specialist skills 
(and maintaining the skills levels) was recognised widely as a significant risk for the 
nuclear industry in the UK. 
 
10.3.3 Gas (Unconventional) 
In general, the risks were concentrated in the first two stages. The political and 
environmental risk categories were linked to each other by the group, and economic risks 
were also noted. Participants had differing views on technical risks; some considered that 
innovation, technical, and manufacturing were of least concern, while some saw skills as a 
problem (however, it was judged to be low). Another general observation by the group was 
the future unaffordability of mining fossil fuels. 
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 At Stage 1 (explore), the group noted four risks in the political category: public 
opposition to local exploration, that a lack of public engagement can lead to uncertainty or 
outright the denial of permission to access sites, explicit arrangements to share of 
economic benefit are key, as subsurface rights not present in the UK, and large-scale 
subsidies for shale decreasing at the expense of other unconventional fossil fuels. 
 At Stage 2 (exploit) the group identified a wider range of risks. In the Political 
category they discussed how infrastructure takes time to build during which period 
perceptions and support can change. Indeed changing policy or regulation was considered 
the main risk for shale gas and may take the form of pressure from carbon budgets which 
could change downstream usage and curtail demand. Linked to this was a suggestion from 
one participant that this uncertainty may lead to divestment, but other participants thought 
this to be unlikely. In the technical category it was noted that regulation is stronger in the 
UK i.e. the likelihood of a technical failure is lower. The group considered that there was 
some risk of skill sets not being available. A key risk noted by the group was whether or 
not a drilling site will yield commercial flow-rates (environmental category). 
 
10.3.4 Summary 
The system and processes themselves have effects which need to be discerned; the risk in 
failing to integrate “enough”. The context could be political, technical, or innovation. 
Optimism bias was considered to be a more significant risk than usually considered. A 
general comment about political risk was that the interconnections (physical infrastructure 
and commercial) are on the rise in the energy sector. However, this tension, in part created 
by globalisation, is with energy independence. 
 
10.4 Group Three 
These notes are adapted from those of the group facilitator, Prof. Richard Darton 
(Department of Engineering Science, University of Oxford). 
 
10.4.1 Oil 
One participant considered that the main risks are economic and in particular [oil] price 
volatility for greenfield projects. This person suggested that the UK plays against 
international competition and US shale is an obvious competitor. Another participant 
agreed that global price volatility is a risk. A participant asked what time-scale should we 
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consider? They suggested that electric vehicles will eventually (15-20 years) take over 
from the internal combustion engine, and that this will affect take-up of fossil fuel (a drop 
in consumer oil demand), but there is little appetite to drive this change at a faster rate still. 
Another participant was concerned that electric vehicles were already having effect and 
that work on efficiency in internal combustion engines is being dropped by car firms who 
see electric vehicles as the future. An associated risk to the viability of projects was 
identified as a reduction in demand – even the perception of it is a risk. However, another 
participant pointed out that there is demand for chemicals feedstocks. Another participant 
said that the political will is to encourage switch to EV rather than fiscal measures which 
will be politically unpalatable. But the will is scarcely sufficient to change [oil/gas 
demand] enough to meet the 1.5 °C target. So the 1.5 °C target can be seen as a risk to 
security because it will bear down on fossil fuels. [The risk is agreeing a target then not 
agreeing appropriate actions, leaving an uncertainty in future regulation/policy.] 
A participant raised the issue of peak oil saying that the public domain data on 
reserves is very poor and perhaps unreliable, adding that we are in a time when oil is being 
used faster than it is being discovered. They continued by suggesting that peak 
conventional oil is about here because of the growth in the extraction of unconventional 
oil, but that the big question is how quickly its use will be expanded. Conventional was 
defined as all oil liquids except fracked, but not kerogen-based. The risk was stated as 
conventional oil not being available to meet demand. Another participant said that up to 
five years ago the risk was seen in terms of price because unconventional was more 
expensive, but unconventional is getting cheaper. There was some disagreement about 
non-availability. Historically,  oil security is traditionally seen as producer-consumer 
balance. Another participant pointed out that political risk is changing because the US is 
now a competitive producer. 
A participant raised the case of innovation risk stating that the trend is to phase out 
subsidies which could put projects at risk. Another participant doubted that this was a risk. 
There was general agreement that the main risk for the UK is an uncertain 
regulatory framework. As an example of uncertainty in the  policy/regulatory framework, a 
participant suggested that the 1.5 °C target was not matched by policy; the 1.5 °C is 
agreed, but not the routes to meet it. Frequent changes of UK Government policy means 
that companies now apply a risk premium to investment decisions. 
Other risks mentioned were: revolution and war in Saudi, and maritime choke 
points (both of which can be interpreted as a risk of a lack of social stability). The risk 
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posed by the deployment of carbon abatement to fossil fuel projects was raised. The 
participant suggested that it could lead to reductions or loss of market. The productive 
future looks very different for oil and gas in a world where carbon abatement is prioritised 
versus one where it isn't. It may also dictate the pace of CCS and other carbon-friendly 
technologies. That is, a project is developed on the basis of a certain production profile e.g. 
from a gas field, and then some future point abatement policy leads to extra costs or loss of 
demand (weaker market). Thus, abatement poses a project risk and at any time in the future 
the risk may be crystallised by policy and regulation to abate carbon, which would affect 
projects. Another participant suggested that this was perhaps indistinct and less important 
than the threat posed by mass EV take-up. Furthermore, EV take-up was seen as relatively 
close in time and could happen even faster were it not that governments are wary of 
driving this change too fast. It was suggested that the motor industry lobby were not keen 
on a fast EV take-up. 
 
10.4.2 Offshore Wind 
There was agreement that the main risk is the frequently changing policy and regulatory 
framework has been very undermining to the UK. A specific example raised was Scottish 
independence. There was agreement that the levelised cost of electricity is falling much 
faster for solar and onshore wind, than for offshore wind. One participant thought that 
offshore wind was not competitive, but others disagreed saying that offshore wind costs 
are reducing and that the German and Danish experience is good. A participant suggested 
that they would strongly prefer political consensus and cross-party support and considered 
a ‘lack of political consensus’ as a risk. They continued, Ed Milliband politicised the cost 
of energy. Whilst there is consensus on climate change, this consensus does not feed 
through into policy. So we have seen back-pedalling of political stances on energy policy 
because energy prices are now a political issue. Some other countries manage this 
differently and work harder to reach cross-party support for longer-term policies. 
A question raised was if onshore wind and solar are more economic outside 
Europe, why would the UK benefit from pursuing technologies that are not globally 
competitive? If the market outside UK favours onshore/solar, said one participant, the UK 
should develop other skills. The risk as they saw it is that the UK develops skills that are 
not needed, however, there was some disagreement about this point. 
Another point raised was whether there a risk from Brexit. Another participant 
suggested that it could be, but was doubtful as it was not seen as problem at the moment. It 
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was noted that recently the UK slipped from number 3 or 4 on the Ernst and Young list of 
desirable places for renewables investment to number 12; with Germany or Denmark at the 
top. This was considered to be more damaging for attracting inward investment than 
Brexit. Another participant suggested that subsidies and regulations should not be changed 
overnight or without warning or consultation, with tapering is much preferred so as to 
create time for adjustment. 
 
10.4.3 Bioliquids 
Although not a risk as such, it was noted that the EROEI for all biofuels was very low [this 
could be seen as a risk in terms of environmental impact]. 
One participant stated that the main problem was in the politics and that oil is 
cheap. They continued by saying that uncertainties created by NGO campaigns on 
perceived problems, in particular the competition with land for food sources is over-
exaggerated. This participant considered that there is no real issue as the feedstock is 
generally agriwaste or grown on unproductive land, and Most of the UK biofuel supply is 
imported (from South America). There was some disagreement about whether metrics to 
measure the environmental impacts are sufficiently disaggregated. A participant 
considered independent check of the biomass supply chain to be thorough and that the 
public perceptions on this are quite wrong. For example forest cover in the EU is 
increasing rapidly, and the track and trace programmes being used. 
 
10.4.4 Summary 
The greatest concern was the changing of the policy landscape, described as “policy and 
regulatory meddling” leading to a risk premium in the market price. Misconceptions drive 
policy and behaviour and is incompatible with stable future climate policy. Also noted as 
important was the innovation category, in particular the transition to EVs, and it was noted 
that there may be a slowing innovation optimism. The Skills category was thought to be of 
the least concern. In oil and gas, for example, it was thought that there was an oversupply 
of skilled people. 
 
10.5 Conclusions of the Workshop 
During the open discussion session, the participants agreed that a changing policy or 
regulatory framework was the most significant risk across all fuels and process stages. 
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They commented that it was one which the UK Government should treat with urgency and 
the highest priority (within BEIS). The participants agreed on a further seven risks which 
they considered to be more important than others, but not as significant as a changing 
policy or regulatory framework (Table 10.2). 
 
Cause of Risk (unordered) Risk Category 
Changing policy or regulatory framework  Political  
Lack of access to capital Economic 
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing 
Optimism bias Innovation 
Significant public concern Political  
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic 
Lack of public subsidy Innovation 
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic 
Table 10.2 Summary of the risks identified as most significant by the workshop 
participants. 
 
10.5.1 Summary of Suggested Actions for Policy 
The participants made three suggestions for discussion with the Department for Business, 
Energy, and Industrial Strategy. In no particular order: 
1. Funding calls: the use of exploratory projects is the wrong approach because the 
public pays the development risk of the energy sector. This was considered as a 
form of privatising the profit whilst subsidising the risk.  
2. BEIS should be more conscious of, or explicit about acknowledging, optimism 
bias. 
3. Attempting to set up an open market is not working. The context for all energy 
policy is the supply-demand balance. Yet the simple use of £/MWh does not lead to 
a balance across the whole energy system because it is a poor metric for 
incorporating the requirements for flexibility and for multiple energy vectors. This 
means that a basket of relevant indicators is required to formulate, set, and judge 
policy instruments. It would be best not to use cost minimisation as a mechanism 
(or as a modelling tool). 
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One participant noted that the problem with ES, and energy issues in general, is 
that common perceptions are often very far from the truth. 
 
10.5.2 Comments on the Methodology 
We noted two criticisms of our methodology. The first that systemic risks are not being 
considered, only individual fuels. One participant noted that the EROEI for most fuels is 
getting worse e.g. PV never makes a contribution because it costs more energy to make 
than it generates (there was disagreement about this point). The second is that it appears to 
be about analysing the existing system – things as they are or are easily changed. 
Incorporating the risks goes some way to tackle this, but another participant thought that it 
is not a predictive tool as such. However, trends in data can be observed and used, though 
exogenous shocks cannot be accounted for without scenario analysis. Another question 
raised was how to account for risk interactions. 
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11 Conclusions 
We can draw conclusions across three areas: 1) the performance of the method, 2) the 
numerical results which flowed from applying the method, and 3) recommendations to 
mitigate risks in UK energy policy and security. We then suggest some key next steps to 
carry this work forward. 
 
11.1 The Performance of the Method 
Using the principles of the PAM we have created a set of risks which work well with a 
wide range of current and fledgling fuels; we make four observations. First, that creating a 
risk register for ES is a tractable proposition. Secondly, that our method has been tested 
with an expert group. Thirdly, that sensitivity is readily incorporated to yield reasonable 
ranges for the overall risk scores. Fourthly, that our set of causes of risk is able to 
accommodate fuels and processes with a wide range of production and operating scales. 
These are aided by the transparency of our approach. 
The six stages used give structure to the analysis, but are only one way in which the 
end-to-end process can be deconstructed. Using more stages gives greater detail, but 
increases the overhead of operating the method. In considering the limitations of this 
approach we need to appreciate that for complicated systems there is a balance to be struck 
between the level of detail of the analysis and the time required to obtain a useful set of 
causes of risk. The analysis can be neither too coarse nor too detailed. If we restricted our 
method to using the causes of risk without the six stages, then an intrinsically simpler 
analysis – albeit with a longer list of risk causes – could be screened against the fuel 
sources. By adding the process stages, the number of risk causes can be condensed by 
allowing (defined) interpretation of the causes of risk at each stage. In critically assessing 
the broad energy systems literature we estimated the levels of likelihood and impact for 
each cause of risk for each fuel and each process stage – creating the risk register. 
Our approach offers the advantage of sufficient flexibility to make it readily 
applicable to a wider variety of nations or other situations related to energy systems. 
Furthermore, our analyst allows for the fact that not all of the fuel sources have a reliance 
on every stage in the same way. Wind and solar electric are two clear examples where the 
conditioning stage (stage 4) is not relevant. Our framework and methodology can be 
adapted for examining fuel-types from specific or single sites (or nations) as part of an 
assessment that might include detailed or specific international relations knowledge, say. A 
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balanced judgment could be made about how important that source was to the ES at the 
system boundary. 
A valid criticism of our method is that it is designed to analyse an existing system – 
things as they are or have been historically. However, well established trends can be 
projected forward in a defensible ways (Roberts et al., 2019). All methods for forward 
projections make assumptions – some more heroic than others. Frequently in energy 
scenario modelling assumptions are made about macroeconomic performance, energy 
prices, and technology improvement. In our case we assume that risk profiles for stages 
and fuels is unchanging with time which at first glance appears an unreasonable 
assumption. Public and expert understanding and appreciation of risk changes over time 
i.e. acceptability of the consequences; for example, health and safety at work or 
environmental pollution. But usually such changes are incremental and slow. Although 
public opinion can change dramatically in the aftermath of a major incident such as 
Chernobyl, Fukushima, or the 2007/08 financial crash, memories and concerns can also 
fade fast with a relatively quick return to business-as-usual. Moreover, we have ‘priced’ in 
extreme possibilities where the occurrence of a risk could lead to a catastrophic outcome 
i.e. shutdown a site, operation, or activity.  
Incorporating risk adds a dimension to bridge the concepts of sustainability and 
security, but it is still not a predictive tool which can account for exogenous shocks. 
However, when used in conjunction with scenario analysis our method offers a powerful 
tool for assessing the value or barriers of competing proposed energy system 
configurations. Scenario analysis is complementary to our method. The error analysis 
(section 9.1.1) suggests that even quite sizable changes are not likely to change the 
groupings of the fuels in the rank order of risk. We suggest that this confirms that our 
approach is robust. 
The purpose of holding a workshop with industry experts was to ascertain why 
some causes of risk were more important than others and to identify which were the most 
important. Whilst the workshop participants were not certain that we tackled risks arising 
from the structure of the energy system, it is not clear to us that this arises from 
disaggregating it into process stages prior to identifying risks. It is very difficult to judge 
what risks may be systemic without assessing either their prevalence within the supply 
chain or their potential to create a cascade through the supply chain, or across different fuel 
supply chains. It is possible that every risk may appear systemic (or grossly under-
estimated) if the system is analysed as a single entity without structure. As systemic risks 
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may occur as a result of interactions, the structure must play an explicit part. Coupled risks 
a ‘risk couplet’ (or even a ‘risk triplet’) will not necessarily lead to a systemic risk as that 
would need a cascading (amplification) mechanism and generate a contagion.  
The practice of avoiding double-counting (when developing sustainability 
indicators) is a practice that highlights important overlaps in the system. For risk analysis 
double-counting means that some element of a risk is occurring in more than one place, 
which by definition means those entities are coupled in some way. The only way to 
understand interactions is to know something about the coupling strength i.e. have some 
data or hypothesis of how the risks are linked. For the UK, it is unlikely that many risks are 
strongly coupled because the supply of sources of fuel and final energy vectors is stable; 
the UK is not suffering from rationing or shortages, and electricity distribution outages are 
rare. This is the current state, but there is competition for scarce resources so the nature of 
the systemic risk may change. 
We conceived the sharing of infrastructure as lowering risk, whereas the notion of 
‘sharing’ in terms of systemic risk increases risk. Therefore we need always to be clear on 
the context. For example, the entry barrier for a new fuel source is lower (lower risk) if it 
generates an energy vector already in common use i.e. it shares the cost of the distribution 
infrastructure. This helps explain why it is hard for district heating, say, to gain a foothold 
because a new infrastructure is required. But this adds to the systemic risk of a shock or 
disruption to the means of distribution. However, disaggregating the distribution system 
leads to double-counting. 
 
11.2 Application of the Method 
The fuel ranking (Table 9.1) shows that non-renewables (fossil fuels and nuclear) confer 
the greatest levels of risk on an energy system. The only non-renewable in the bottom half 
of the table is DR. The broad split of renewables and non-renewables is not remarkable, 
but the exact position of some fuels and the detail of the importance of risks does warrant 
further comment. 
Demand reduction appearing in the middle of the table goes some way to 
explaining why DR programmes have not achieved the impact expected – the risks 
involved have been under-estimated previously. The misaligned theoretical savings and 
field measurements suggests that the ‘quality of the fuel’ (reliability of behaviour) as a 
cause of risk in particular has been underestimated. A second point we note is that DR is 
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not usually incorporated into future energy scenarios, and that the focus on primary energy 
supply misses the importance of DR. We suggest that by treating DR (or energy efficiency) 
as a ‘negafuel’ it can be automatically put on a par with fuel supply. We consider that 
finding a way – and preferably a  simple way – to change attitudes towards energy 
efficiency is imperative. Declaring efficiency as the ‘first fuel’ is clearly not having the 
desired effect. Our work shows that it is not the first fuel. Although proponents of DR do 
not assume that it will occur without intervention or effort, many other actors in the energy 
sector appear to assume that it will. We propose that a holistic risk-based approach to DR – 
including treating it as a negafuel – will open-up a new fronts to understand how to create 
programmes of DR which may be more successful than previous programmes. 
 The relatively high risk-ranking of the biofuels is surprising at first sight. However, 
the amount of chemical processing required is costly and complicated which attracts risks 
at a high-level, such as the lack of access to capital. The risk assessment sheds light on 
why biofuels are not making inroads into the marketplace in the way proponents have been 
hoping. The same is true for geothermal energy sources. Assessing the detail of the risks, 
and their relative importance, for different fuels gives signals for the shaping of strategies 
to develop future energy systems portfolios. 
Energy security, like sustainability, is multi-facetted and our analysis shows the 
variability in detailed indicators. From the UKERC and NG scenarios we see that a change 
in energy system configuration implies a transfer of risk from high carbon fuels to nuclear 
fission, demonstrating the importance of conducting a holistic analysis. For electricity 
generation the switch from non-renewables to renewables lowers risk, but for other final 
energy vectors, such as for heat and transport, this is not clear-cut. Our work shows that 
although various pathways and measures lead to lower annual carbon emissions, the risk 
profile may increase. This goes some way to explain why the market is finding difficulty in 
delivering a lower carbon energy system, even with subsidy and other support. The market 
may be better at assessing risks (by whatever methods) and its pricing is creating the 
barrier. A ‘whole systems’ approach to risk will assist in drilling down to find the key 
elements on which governments and companies should concentrate resources and 
expertise. The frequently changing policy and regulatory landscape suggests that the UK 
especially has not yet achieved a stable platform for energy (security) policy development. 
The power of this risk profiling technique allows analysts potentially to examine trade-offs 
between a more efficient technology using a fuel with a riskier upstream profile and a low 
risk fuel with an inefficient technology. 
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11.3 Policy Implications 
The emphasis of policy support (including through the UK Energy Technologies Institute) 
has been on reducing the costs of deploying a particular technology or process, but 
progress has been patchy. In part this is explained by many renewables having similar risk 
scores i.e. there are no clear winners. These ‘good’ fuels sources are competing for the 
same investment capital, skilled labour, and other inputs. Our analysis shows that cost 
reduction alone is insufficient to deliver an efficient and more environmentally benign 
energy system. If a risk-based analysis had been carried out across the whole of the fuel 
supply chain earlier other important or competing factors would be been revealed. If this 
renewables log-jam had been foreseen actions to mitigate the situation could have been 
taken. 
 A possible and logical response of policy to the fuel rank is to support maximal use 
of each fuel starting from the bottom of the list, moving upwards, to fill the lowest ‘risk 
state’ of the energy system to meet demand requirements. However, our method is blind to 
the capacity of technologies to deliver the final energy vector, the abundance of each fuel, 
and the availability of sites to deploy the conversion technologies (stage 4). That is to say 
that we have not used any sort of resource weighting. For example, there is no point in 
using the solar technologies at sites which do not face South. And in the case of Solar 
(thermal), the panels can only deliver warm water which must be used locally. 
Furthermore, an issue arises in assigning abundance to fossil fuels, say, as some proportion 
of the total global resource. 
Assumptions impact the risk profile and companies make investment decisions 
based on their assessment of risk. Therefore policymakers should scrutinise much more 
closely the assumptions made in scenarios produced by various energy systems models. 
The assumptions are frequently not transparent. With such differences between 
organisations which generate scenarios, how can a government make decisions based on 
energy systems modelling? The mis-modelling of schemes to support energy efficiency or 
particular technologies might have a lack of understanding of risk as the root cause. Private 
companies will make investment decisions incorporating a risk assessment; governments 
should do likewise. 
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The expert workshop participants identified policy and regulatory volatility as the 
key risk. By way of mitigation the participants made three suggestions for discussion with 
BEIS (in no particular order): 
1. Stop the use of funded exploratory projects because the public pays the 
development risk of the energy sector. This was considered as a form of privatising 
the profit whilst subsidising the risk.  
2. Greater consciousness of, or be explicit about acknowledging, optimism bias. 
3. Attempting to set up an open market is not working. The context for all energy 
policy is the supply-demand balance. Yet the simple use of £/MWh does not lead to 
a balance across the whole energy system because it is a poor metric for 
incorporating the requirements for flexibility and for multiple energy vectors. This 
means that a basket of relevant indicators is required to formulate, set, and judge 
policy instruments. It would be best not to use cost minimisation as a mechanism 
(or as a modelling tool). 
 
We make a fourth recommendation. As multi-partisan consensus in the UK is 
uncommon, we suggest to decouple energy policy from politics by creating an ‘Office for 
Energy Policy Responsibility’. Although not as limited as the Office for Budget 
Responsibility, it would have analogous functions for independent scrutiny. Such a body 
might assume the functions of the Climate Change Committee to give a comprehensive 
approach to long-term energy policy, including ES considerations. 
 
11.4 Further Work 
Developing our work from this point will take two principal directions. The first is 
incorporating risk analysis into the PAM for long-term ES, and the second is extending the 
risk analysis directly as a standalone method by improving, deepening, and applying it 
more widely . 
 
11.4.1 The Process Analysis Method for ES 
We outlined in chapter 1 the need to understand the role of risk before using the PAM to 
generate an indicator set for ES. Incorporating the causes of risk within the PAM output 
will create a hybrid method accounting for historically observed trends and important (but 
not yet occurring) risks. Past practice and historical decisions have created the topology 
 227 
and functionality of the present energy system(s). Current and future ES can only be built 
upon this system; the starting point is already defined. Some of the causes of risk identified 
can readily be broken down in the PAM, such as operational or infrastructure failure in the 
Technical category. Other causes of risk, such as the ‘lack of access to capital’, ‘changing 
policy or regulatory framework’, or ‘optimism bias’ could not be captured readily. In 
general, where a risk is observing an impact that has not yet occurred, a pure PAM 
approach will struggle to represent the impact adequately. 
 
11.4.2 Improving the Risk Analysis Method 
Aside from the mechanistic improvements already outlined we need to consider two 
additional concepts: the role of negotiation and the limitations of resource potential.  
The first is whether to incorporate explicitly negotiation (section 8.3.3) and at 
which scale; the negotiation to mitigate which risk and for whom is another. Given that the 
case study system boundary was a sovereign nation state, inter-Government negotiations 
might be the only factor to consider. However, some of these manifest themselves in other 
causes of risk. For example, the results of climate change negotiations could be 
incorporated in ‘changing policy or regulatory framework’. 
We have outlined the resource availability problem above. Since this characteristic 
of a fuel source might determine whether exploration is undertaken it is an important 
consideration. We suggest that it may be possible to normalise the risk profiles and scores 
with a measure of resource availability / potential.  
The discussion of systemic risk in fuel supply chains for ES is an unresolved issue. 
We noted the prevalence of the causes of risk in this study, but this did not necessarily 
confirm them as systemic in nature. The strength of risk interaction is not revealed in our 
study, but must exist in some form e.g. skilled engineers trained and working in the nuclear 
industry can’t also work on improving solar PV systems (opportunity cost). Investigating 
the causes of risk from the perspective of a network may offer insight into the likelihood of 
a cascading failure. 
 
11.4.3 Deepening the Risk Analysis Method 
We can examine each fuel chain individually or as part of a specialist collection grouped 
by factors such as common processing elements, distribution mechanisms, end use types, 
or the purpose of the final energy vector. 
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There are narratives to be created for each individual supply chain. But for fuels of 
particular importance it will be interesting to see if analysing a very detailed set of sub-
processes at each stage will yield a sophisticated view of how to better design and 
implement support mechanisms to mitigate risks. We will need to look at how the 
categories and causes might change or expand when drilling deeply into each stage. It will 
also be interesting to follow the profiles for individual causes of risk within and across 
fuels. We have only used renewable and non-renewable as broad categories to demonstrate 
the basic idea. 
We will synthesise the elements relating to heat as a systems-level topic. Heat 
demand in the UK (300 GW peak) is approximately an order of magnitude greater than 
electricity (50 GW peak) at present. Despite these figures heat has been under-researched; 
although companies with high heat use have always had an incentive to reduce demand 
and improve efficiency. The implications of the different risks occurring in the electrical 
and thermal supply chains for heat warrant further investigation. From our analysis it is 
clear that the attendant risks for district heat distribution networks are substantially 
different from the onsite exploitation of surplus industrial heat, or a CHP unit for a 
commercial building, or a block of residential flats, say. The coarse scale of the process 
descriptions do not capture the duality of output of CHP whether using gas or biomass. 
Therefore a more detailed analysis of any supply chain with heat as a final use needs to 
split out these branches. Interest in heat decarbonisation is growing, thus our analysis will 
be timely. 
Likewise, we suggest that there is merit in analysing transport energy resources. 
We judge that there are particular risks presented by the environment, to the environment 
(technical failures), political stability, and lack of innovation. The current development of 
electric and fuel cell vehicles, and biogenic liquid fuels will make this a topical study. 
 
11.4.4 Further Applications of the Risk Analysis Method 
The most obvious next step is to apply our method to one or more new nations. 
This can only conducted in collaboration as in-country expertise is required. Following 
recent talks given at international conferences (Axon and Darton, 2017, 2018) we have 
received interest from researchers in Australia and the USA. Although it is tempting to 
consider what might be the minimum risk portfolio of saleable fuels, we suggest that this 
may not be a useful question. The reason being that we do not have a clean sheet and 
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would have to scale it using resource potential. The only exception might be in aiding the 
design of energy systems for a developing nation with almost no existing infrastructure. 
Frequently, analysis methods will be applied to supra-national entities such as the 
European Union or the Gulf Co-operation Council, rather than aggregating studies of the 
individual nations which make up these bodies. We caution against this approach as the 
disparities between the member states can be significant; though we note that this might be 
less of a problem with the Gulf Co-operation Council member states. 
 Perhaps the most pressing of international energy and climate questions is how to 
reach the 1.5 °C global temperature rise target. This process is governed by the Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs). Whilst each nation uses its own methodology to arrive 
at a figure for the Paris Agreement, these GHG reductions need to be implemented 
somehow. The UK uses carbon budgets modelled and monitored by the Climate Change 
Committee. The current period in the modelling phase is the fifth carbon budget (5CB) 
spanning 2028-2032. Assessing the risk for this and other carbon budgets will be a useful 
contribution to UK energy policy. We will also wish to compare the portfolios suggested 
by alternative 5CB models such as those generated by Roberts et al. (2018). 
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A.  The Risk Matrix 
The following tables, one for each stage (all fuels), are the complete risk matrix. The 
arguments and information supporting the choice of values are given in chapters 4-7. The 





R Risk score (determines the consequence level) 
 
Colour key: 
 Low consequence level 
 Moderate consequence level 
 High consequence level 
 Risk not relevant for this fuel at this stage 











Cause of Risk Risk Category Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 3 2 6 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1
Lack of access to capital Economic Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 3 4 12 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1
Unable to agree a price for licence or permits Economic 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
Price volatility Economic 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1
Difficult physical access Environmental Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1
Natural hazards Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1
Quality of fuel source Environmental Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Lack of water availability Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of critical materials availability Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak technology transfer environment Innovation 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
Lack of public subsidy Innovation 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Only marginal improvements likely Innovation 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
Lack of material substitutability Innovation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R&D capacity or capability does not match the challenge Innovation 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0 0 0
Optimism bias Innovation Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 3 3 Macro 1 3 3 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 3 3 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4
Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components or conversion devices Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denial of permission to access sites Political Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 3 3 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 2 3 6
Lack of social stability Political Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2
Changing policy or regulatory framework Political Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0
Poor institutional governance Political Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2
Disputed landrights or resource ownership Political Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, standards and codes Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Significant public concern Political Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2
Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce Skills 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of vocational training of the local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Pollution event Technical Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 4 8 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 2 3 6 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning Technical Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Specialist equipment unavailable Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2
Operational failure Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1
Infrastructure failure Technical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Cause of Risk Risk Category Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2
Lack of access to capital Economic Micro 1 2 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 2 4 8 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 4 8 Macro 2 4 8 Macro 3 4 12 Macro 3 3 9 Macro 3 3 9 Macro 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 2 6 Macro 3 4 12 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 3 2 6
Unable to agree a price for licence or permits Economic 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 4 4 0
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1
Price volatility Economic Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 3 2 6 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2
Difficult physical access Environmental Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 3 9 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 1 1
Natural hazards Environmental Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 3 6
Quality of fuel source Environmental Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 2 4 8 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 3 1 3
Lack of water availability Environmental Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 3 2 6 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Lack of critical materials availability Environmental 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4
Weak technology transfer environment Innovation Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1
Lack of public subsidy Innovation Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2
Only marginal improvements likely Innovation Macro 3 1 3 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 3 1 3 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 3 1 3
Lack of material substitutability Innovation 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 3 6 0 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6
R&D capacity or capability does not match the challenge Innovation Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2
Optimism bias Innovation Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 2 6 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 3 3 9 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2
Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components or conversion devices Manufacturing Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4
Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 3 9 Macro 2 1 2 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 4 12 Meso 3 4 12 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 4 8 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 3 4 12 Meso 2 4 8
Denial of permission to access sites Political Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 1 4 4 Meso 1 4 4 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Micro 3 4 12
Lack of social stability Political 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changing policy or regulatory framework Political Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 4 8 Meso 3 2 6
Poor institutional governance Political 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disputed landrights or resource ownership Political Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2
Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, standards and codes Political Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 3 3 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 3 3 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Significant public concern Political Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 3 4 12
Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Lack of vocational training of the local workforce Skills Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2
Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2
Pollution event Technical Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2
Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1
Specialist equipment unavailable Technical Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1
Operational failure Technical Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 4 8 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 4 4 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 3 4 12 Micro 2 4 8 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2
Infrastructure failure Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 2 2
Stage 2: Exploit
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Cause of Risk Risk Category Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 3 3 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 3 3 Macro 1 3 3 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0
Lack of access to capital Economic Meso 2 2 4 Macro 3 3 9 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 Macro 3 3 9 Macro 2 4 8 0 Macro 3 4 12 0 0 Macro 3 3 9 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0
Unable to agree a price for licence or permits Economic 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 4 4 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 3 3 9 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Price volatility Economic Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Difficult physical access Environmental Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Natural hazards Environmental Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Quality of fuel source Environmental Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 3 1 3 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 3 1 3 0 0
Lack of water availability Environmental Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of critical materials availability Environmental Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Weak technology transfer environment Innovation Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Lack of public subsidy Innovation Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Only marginal improvements likely Innovation Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 3 3 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 3 1 3 0 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 3 1 3 0 Macro 3 1 3 0 0 Macro 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0
Lack of material substitutability Innovation Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 3 1 3 0 0 Macro 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
R&D capacity or capability does not match the challenge Innovation Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Optimism bias Innovation Macro 2 2 4 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components or conversion devices Manufacturing Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0
Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0
Denial of permission to access sites Political Micro 1 4 4 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 3 6 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of social stability Political 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changing policy or regulatory framework Political Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
Poor institutional governance Political 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disputed landrights or resource ownership Political Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, standards and codes Political Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Significant public concern Political Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 3 9 0 Micro 3 1 3 0 0 Micro 2 4 8 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Lack of vocational training of the local workforce Skills Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0
Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0
Pollution event Technical Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 0 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 2 4 8 0 0 Micro 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0
Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 3 3 9 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Specialist equipment unavailable Technical Micro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Operational failure Technical Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 4 4 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 0 Micro 1 4 4 Micro 1 4 4 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 4 4 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Infrastructure failure Technical Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
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Cause of Risk Risk Category Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 3 2 6 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 3 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 3 2 6 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0
Lack of access to capital Economic Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 Macro 3 4 12 Micro 2 3 6 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 3 4 12 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0
Unable to agree a price for licence or permits Economic Meso 1 3 3 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 3 4 12 0 Meso 1 3 3 0 Meso 1 3 3 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Price volatility Economic Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 3 4 12 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0
Difficult physical access Environmental Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Natural hazards Environmental Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Quality of fuel source Environmental Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0 Micro 3 1 3 0 0
Lack of water availability Environmental Micro 2 3 6 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 2 3 6 0 0 Micro 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Lack of critical materials availability Environmental Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Weak technology transfer environment Innovation Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 3 3 0 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 0
Lack of public subsidy Innovation Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 3 4 12 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
Only marginal improvements likely Innovation Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 3 6 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 3 3 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0
Lack of material substitutability Innovation Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
R&D capacity or capability does not match the challenge Innovation Macro 1 3 3 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 3 6 0 Macro 1 3 3 0 Macro 1 3 3 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 2 3 6 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0
Optimism bias Innovation Macro 2 1 2 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 Meso 3 3 9 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0 Macro 3 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 3 2 6 0 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 0
Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components or conversion devices Manufacturing Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 0
Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing Micro 2 1 2 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
Denial of permission to access sites Political Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0
Lack of social stability Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changing policy or regulatory framework Political Meso 1 3 3 0 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 Meso 1 3 3 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 1 3 3 0 Meso 1 3 3 0 0 Meso 2 4 8 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0
Poor institutional governance Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disputed landrights or resource ownership Political Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0
Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, standards and codes Political Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0
Significant public concern Political Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 0
Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Lack of vocational training of the local workforce Skills Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 0
Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 3 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0
Pollution event Technical Macro 3 4 12 0 0 Macro 3 1 3 0 Macro 3 4 12 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 4 12 0 Micro 3 4 12 0 0 Micro 1 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Macro 3 3 9 0 0
Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning Technical Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0
Specialist equipment unavailable Technical Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
Operational failure Technical Micro 2 2 4 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 4 8 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0
Infrastructure failure Technical Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0
Stage 4: Convert




Gas Gas (unconventional) Hydro Nuclear (fission) Ocean (tidal) Ocean (wave) Oil Solar (electric) Solar (thermal, 
water)
Thermal (geological) Thermal (low 
temperature)











Reactor ORC turbine Combustion
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Cause of Risk Risk Category Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1
Lack of access to capital Economic Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 3 3 9 Macro 3 3 9 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 3 3 9 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 3 3 9 Macro 2 2 4
Unable to agree a price for licence or permits Economic 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 3 3 0 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 2 2
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1
Price volatility Economic Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2
Difficult physical access Environmental Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 3 2 6 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 2 2
Natural hazards Environmental Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 2 4
Quality of fuel source Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Lack of water availability Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of critical materials availability Environmental Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4
Weak technology transfer environment Innovation Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1
Lack of public subsidy Innovation Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 3 1 3 0 0 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6
Only marginal improvements likely Innovation Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 3 1 3 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 0 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 1 2
Lack of material substitutability Innovation Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1
R&D capacity or capability does not match the challenge Innovation Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2
Optimism bias Innovation Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 0 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2
Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components or conversion devices Manufacturing Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 0 Macro 3 1 3 Meso 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 1 2 2
Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 1 3 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 2 2
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 0 0 0
Denial of permission to access sites Political Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 2 3 6 0 Micro 2 3 6 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 3 6
Lack of social stability Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changing policy or regulatory framework Political Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 2 6
Poor institutional governance Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disputed landrights or resource ownership Political Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2
Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, standards and codes Political Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1
Significant public concern Political Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 3 3 9 0 Micro 3 3 9 Micro 3 2 6 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 3 9
Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Lack of vocational training of the local workforce Skills Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4
Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 2 6 0 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 2 6
Pollution event Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 3 2 6 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1
Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1
Specialist equipment unavailable Technical Meso 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 0 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 2 2 0 Meso 1 2 2 0 0 Meso 1 2 2 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 2 2
Operational failure Technical Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 3 3 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 0 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 3 3 Meso 1 1 1
Infrastructure failure Technical 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 Micro 2 2 4 0 0 0 0
Stage 5: Distribute
Biogas Bioliquids Biomass (solids) Coal Demand 
reduction
Gas Gas (unconventional) Hydro Nuclear (fission) Ocean (tidal) Ocean (wave) Oil Solar (electric) Solar (thermal, 
water)
Thermal (geological) Thermal (low 
temperature)
Waste Wind (offshore) Wind (onshore)
Electricity 
networks






Pipelines (gas) Electricity 
networks
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Cause of Risk Risk Category Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I L*I Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R Scale L I R
Lack of a well-functioning market Economic Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 0 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1
Lack of access to capital Economic 0 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 0 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 Micro 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unable to agree a price for licence or permits Economic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertain decommissioning costs Economic 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 Micro 1 1 1 0 0 0
Price volatility Economic Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1
Difficult physical access Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Natural hazards Environmental Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2
Quality of fuel source Environmental Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Lack of water availability Environmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of critical materials availability Environmental Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 0 0 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4
Weak technology transfer environment Innovation Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4
Lack of public subsidy Innovation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Only marginal improvements likely Innovation Macro 1 2 2 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 2 2 0 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 3 1 3 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 3 2 6 Macro 1 2 2 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 1 2 2
Lack of material substitutability Innovation Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 3 6 0 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 2 2 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 3 6 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6 Macro 2 3 6
R&D capacity or capability does not match the challenge Innovation Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4
Optimism bias Innovation Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Macro 3 1 3 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 3 1 3 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 3 6
Insufficient capacity to manufacture system components or conversion devices Manufacturing Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 2 2 4 0 Macro 1 1 1 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4
Insufficient capacity to construct sites Manufacturing Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 1 3 0 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 3 9 0 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 0 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 3 9 0 Meso 3 4 12 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9 Meso 3 3 9
Insufficient rate of infrastructure construction Manufacturing 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 3 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Meso 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denial of permission to access sites Political 0 0 0 0 Micro 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of social stability Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changing policy or regulatory framework Political Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Macro 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4
Poor institutional governance Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disputed landrights or resource ownership Political 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insufficient rate of improvement in, or lack of enforcement of, standards and codes Political Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 3 6 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4
Significant public concern Political Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 1 3 0 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 2 6 Meso 3 1 3 0 Meso 3 1 3 0 0 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 3 1 3
Lack of basic education levels in the local workforce Skills Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 0 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1 Meso 1 1 1
Lack of vocational training of the local workforce Skills Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 0 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 2 4
Lack of specialists in the  local workforce Skills Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 3 1 3 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 0 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2 Meso 2 1 2
Pollution event Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 3 1 3 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1
Unable to neutralise waste at decommissioning Technical Micro 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 1 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 0 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 2 1 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 0 Meso 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 2 2 4
Specialist equipment unavailable Technical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operational failure Technical Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 1 1
Infrastructure failure Technical Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 2 2 4 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 1 1 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 0 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2 Micro 1 2 2
Stage 6: Use
Biogas Bioliquids Biomass (solids) Coal Demand 
reduction
Gas Gas (unconventional) Hydro Nuclear (fission) Ocean (tidal) Ocean (wave) Oil Solar (electric) Solar (thermal, 
water)
Thermal (geological) Thermal (low 
temperature)
Waste Wind (offshore) Wind (onshore)
Electrical devices Heat (onsite) Vehicles Electrical devices Heat (network) Electrical devices Electrical devices Heat (onsite) Electrical devices Heat (onsite) Electrical devices Electrical devices Electrical devices Electrical devices Vehicles Electrical devices Heat (onsite) Electrical devices Heat (onsite) Electrical devices Electrical devices Electrical devices
UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UKUK UK UK
 
 





B.  Additional Data Tables 
Table B.1 The causes of risk listed account for 50% or more of the total (absolute) risk 
score for each stage. The figure for the proportion is that of the mains causes of risk 
compared with the risk score of the stage. 
Stage Rank Cause of Risk  Category Score 
1: Explore 1 Quality of fuel source Environmental 87 
 2 Lack of access to capital Economic 50 
 3 Optimism bias  Innovation 49 
 4 Denial of permission to access 
sites 
Political 48 
 5 Significant public concern Political 48 
 6 Lack of social stability Political 47 
 7 Poor institutional governance Political 47 
 8 Specialist equipment unavailable Technical 42 
   Proportion 54% 
2: Exploit 1 Lack of access to capital Economic 121 
 2 Changing policy or regulatory 
framework 
Political 98 
 3 Insufficient rate of infrastructure 
construction 
Manufacturing 88 
 4 Significant public concern Political 81 
 5 Natural hazards Environmental 78 
 6 Operational failure Technical 71 
 7 Pollution event Technical 69 
 8 Lack of public subsidy Innovation 66 
 9 Unable to neutralise waste at 
decommissioning 
Technical 62 
 10 Optimism bias  Innovation 61 
 11 Lack of vocational training of the 
local workforce 
Skills 59 
 12 Lack of specialists in the  local 
workforce 
Skills 57 
   Proportion 52% 
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3: Condition 1 Lack of access to capital Economic 59 
 2 Pollution event Technical 41 
 3 Significant public concern Political 38 
 4 Changing policy or regulatory 
framework 
Political 31 
 5 Quality of fuel source Environmental 29 
 6 Operational failure Technical 28 
 7 Insufficient rate of infrastructure 
construction 
Manufacturing 27 
 8 Lack of specialists in the  local 
workforce 
Skills 26 
 9 Only marginal improvements 
likely 
Innovation 25 
 10 Unable to neutralise waste at 
decommissioning 
Technical 25 
   Proportion 50% 
4: Convert 1 Pollution event Technical 66 
 2 Lack of access to capital Economic 58 
 3 Changing policy or regulatory 
framework 
Political 46 
 4 Lack of a well-functioning market Economic 41 
 5 Operational failure Technical 40 
 6 Significant public concern Political 37 
 7 Optimism bias  Innovation 36 
 8 Lack of vocational training of the 
local workforce 
Skills 36 
 9 R&D capacity or capability does 
not match the challenge 
Innovation 35 
 10 Lack of specialists in the  local 
workforce 
Skills 35 
 11 Lack of public subsidy Innovation 34 
   Proportion 53% 
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5: Distribute 1 Lack of access to capital Economic 102 
 2 Lack of specialists in the  local 
workforce 
Skills 96 
 3 Changing policy or regulatory 
framework 
Political 94 
 4 Lack of vocational training of the 
local workforce 
Skills 86 
 5 Lack of public subsidy Innovation 85 
 6 Natural hazards Environmental 72 
 7 Significant public concern Political 71 
 8 Difficult physical access Environmental 56 
 9 Lack of critical materials 
availability 
Environmental 56 












 2 Changing policy or regulatory 
framework 
Political 100 
 3 Optimism bias  Innovation 98 
 4 Insufficient rate of improvement 
in, or lack of enforcement of, 
standards and codes 
Political 96 
 5 Lack of material substitutability Innovation 94 
 6 Lack of vocational training of the 
local workforce 
Skills 86 
 7 Insufficient capacity to 
manufacture system components 
or conversion devices 
Manufacturing 84 
 8 R&D capacity or capability does 
not match the challenge 
Innovation 80 
   Proportion 55% 
 
 
 
